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INTRODUCTION 
The general purpose of my dissertation is to 
investigate how we come to understand ourselves once the 
conception of subjectivity has been displaced from its 
foundational position in metaphysics. I call this problem 
the displacement of subjectivity, and I examine the problem 
of the displacement of subjectivity by enacting a reading of 
Heidegger's readings of Kant. I choose this approach to the 
problem because Heidegger was one of the first thinkers to 
investigate the problem of displacement. 1 Further, Heidegger 
enacted his investigation into the issue of the self through 
a critical retrieval of Kant, who was one of the first 
thinkers to institute radically the conception of 
subjectivity as the ground of metaphysics. Thus an 
investigation of Heidegger's readings of Kant will show how 
the conception of subjectivity is displaced, and how the 
1 Heidegger does not use the term displacement. 
However, Heidegger brings the idea of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity into question and raises the issue of self-
understanding within his own thought. Displacement is a term 
I use to encapsulate the problem of the transposed 
understanding of the self, once that self-understanding lies 
outside the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity. 
1 
displacement results in a different understanding of the 
self. 
2 
I develop my approach to the problem of the 
displacement of subjectivity in four parts. In the first 
chapter, I reintroduce and clarify the problem of 
displacement in the following way: first I specify the 
problem; second I situate my dissertation within my 
understanding of contemporary thought; third I describe the 
phenomenon of displacement through the phenomenon of 
decentering; and fourth I discuss three modes of reading the 
history of philosophy and justify why I choose certain ways 
of reading over other ways of reading the history of 
philosophy. 
In the second chapter I begin my examination of Kant. 
In order to understand how the displacement of subjectivity 
takes place within the Kantian project, we must first 
understand Kant's new conception of metaphysics. Once we 
understand the Kantian project, we can begin to gain an 
understanding of the Kantian conception of the imagination. 
I concentrate on the imagination because, as we come to see, 
the imagination is the factor that displaces subjectivity. 
In order to come to the point where we can understand the 
displacing effect of the imagination within subjectivity, we 
must first understand the role of the imagination. The 
examination of the imagination in this chapter focuses on 
its empirical and anthropological function, as the 
imagination appears in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View. 
In the third chapter I examine Kant's conception of 
the imagination within the Critique of Pure Reason. I 
concentrate on the Kantian conception of the imagination 
because I am examining Heidegger's retrieval of the 
imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. My 
particular focus is on Kant's presentation of the epistemic 
and ontological functions of the imagination. 
3 
The investigation of the Kantian conception of the 
imagination in the second and third chapters has three 
purposes. First I examine Kant's understanding of the 
empirical employment of the imagination. This investigation 
takes place at the end of chapter two. The study of the 
imagination in the APP serves to establish a contrast 
between the empirical and transcendental employment of the 
imagination. Further, the examination of the imagination in 
the APP serves as a clue to Kant's consistency regarding the 
imagination in the CPR. Second I investigate the imagination 
in the first edition deduction of the CPR. This 
investigation occurs in the first part of chapter three. I 
must point out that the two deductions written by Kant share 
the same metaphysical deduction, and thus Kant changes only 
the transcendental deductions. In this section, the 
examination of the metaphysical deduction of the categories 
applies to the two transcendental deductions. After 
4 
examining the metaphysical deduction, I give the argument of 
1 
the A Deduction." Third I examine the place of the 
imagination in the second edition deduction. I have two 
purposes for examining the imagination in the B edition of 
the CPR. On the one hand, I want to see the differences 
between the two deductions. On the other hand, I want to 
show how the imagination does not lose its place of priority 
in Kant's ontology. On this point I am in disagreement with 
Heidegger's reading of the B edition. The two deductions are 
different, but I do not see a recoil in the Kantian 
conception of the imagination. The deductions are different 
for other reasons. Specifically, I argue that the deductions 
are different in terms of their directionality. I understand 
the A Deduction as phenomenological description of the 
validity of the categories, while I understand the B 
Deduction as a strict transcendental deduction with no 
empirical admixture. This will become clear when I address 
the issue in the third chapter. 
At this point I must make a disclaimer. I am not going 
to investigate the entire corpus of Kant's examination of 
the imagination in the CPR, because I am going to omit a 
discussion of Kant's conception of "The Schematism of the 
Pure Concepts of Understanding.'' I omit a discussion of the 
schematism for three reasons. The first reason involves my 
2 I will refer to the first edition of the CPR as the A 
edition and the second edition of the CPR as the B edition. 
5 
approach to the solution of the differences between the 
deductions. Kant did not change his idea of schematism in 
either edition of the CPR. This fact alone proves nothing 
about the role of the imagination in the two deductions. At 
best, the fact that the schematism remains unchanged 
provides a challenge to Heidegger's claim in KPM regarding 
the Kantian recoil from the imagination. However, the 
analysis of the schematism reveals nothing about the role of 
the imagination in the deductions themselves. The second 
reason I omit a discussion of the schematism arises from 
Heidegger's analysis of the imagination in KPM. Heidegger's 
study of the schematism occurs in the second section of KPM. 
In this section, Heidegger shows how Kant carries out the 
laying of the foundations of metaphysics. The second section 
of KPM precedes Heidegger's understanding of the imagination 
in its primordiality. Heidegger presents the primordial 
character of the imagination in the third section of KPM. My 
concern is with Heidegger's understanding of the imagination 
in its primordial character and with Heidegger's retrieval 
of the imagination in its temporal character. The third 
reason I omit a discussion of the schematism concerns the 
direction I take in my dissertation. If my paper were on an 
understanding of Temporalitat, Kant's and Heidegger's 
conception of schemata as transcendental time determinations 
and horizonal, temporal interpretations would be important 
factors. A discussion of the schemata would take us in the 
direction of Heidegger's discussion of metontology, but the 
topic of metontology lies outside the boundaries of my 
dissertation. 
6 
In the fourth chapter I examine Kant's understanding 
of the imagination through two double readings. A double 
reading of a text is either a reading that exposes unthought 
of possibilities within a text and/or a reading that sees 
how the text disrupts the intentions within the text. I 
examine the first type of double reading in KPM, and I 
perform the second type of double reading upon the Kantian 
analysis of the imagination. In accordance with my 
dissertation, I investigate the effect these readings have 
upon the conception of subjectivity. 
Heidegger carries out the first type of double reading 
upon Kant in his examination and retrieval of the 
imagination. Explicitly we see Heidegger's double reading in 
two places in KPM. The first occurs in Heidegger's 
examination of the primordial character of imagination, and 
the second occurs in his retrieval of the imagination in 
terms of the conception of fundamental ontology. These two 
readings take place in sections three and four of KPM, and I 
concentrate on these two sections. We will see how the 
retrieval of the imagination moves us from the conception of 
ourselves as subjects to a conception of ourselves as 
Dasein. 
7 
I perform the second double reading. Where Heidegger 
pulls the imagination into his own project, I want to see 
how the Kantian conception of the imagination is disruptive 
to the Kantian project. In other words, if Kant's purpose is 
to establish subjectivity as the ground of the emergence of 
entities, i.e., as being, and if we understand being as 
presence, then I want to show how another reading of Kant 
defers the desire for presence in the metaphysical project. 
I show that the imagination resists incorporation into the 
framework of the metaphysics of presence, and that presence 
has within it an irretrievable absence. At this point, I 
discuss the disruptive effect of the imagination upon 
subjectivity and how the disruption affects our thinking of 
the self. 
CHAPTER I 
THE CLOSURE OF THE METAPHYSICS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of my dissertation is to show how 
Heidegger's reading of Kant brings to a close the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, while at the same time to call 
forth the need to rethink the meaning of who we are. I have 
given the name displacement to this play of closing and 
rethinking. This assertion requires some preliminary 
explanation. If we understand ourselves as human entities, 
then this mode of understanding must have within it both a 
sense of what an entity is and a sense of how this entity 
differentiates him/herself from other non-human entities. I 
call this type of understanding an understanding of the 
being of entities. We name the type of thinking that thinks 
the being of entities metaphysical thinking, and we call the 
discipline that investigates the being of entities 
metaphysics. An understanding of being allows us to 
understand what, that and how an entity is. In other words, 
an understanding of being is an understanding that allows 
8 
entities to come to be recognized as entities. In this 
sense, being has an a priori character, since being is 
always already there in any understanding of entities. Thus 
being is earlier than, or prior to, entities for us and 
allows us to understand entities as entities. We can 
designate being as presence, since the understanding of 
being allows us to understand how entities come to be 
present as entities. As an understanding of the being of 
entities, metaphysics can also be called ontology. 
9 
Metaphysics has the peculiar character of thinking the 
being of entities in terms of a particular entity, viz., the 
highest and most complete entity. Ordinarily, metaphysicians 
have conceived of this entity in terms of an unique and all-
powerful god. However, within the metaphysics of 
subjectivity we understand the being of entities from the 
perspective of subjectivity. In other words, the metaphysics 
of subjectivity takes the subject as the phenomenon that 
lets entities show themselves, or lets entities come to 
presence, i.e., subjectivity is being and the self-conscious 
subject is the highest entity. As an understanding of being 
in terms of the highest entity, metaphysics can also be 
called theology. When we gather the two parts of metaphysics 
into a whole, we can designate metaphysics as onto-theology, 
i.e., as an understanding of the totality of entities in 
terms of the highest entity. 
10 
The designation of metaphysics as onto-theology is not 
a neutral description of metaphysics. Instead, the 
designation of metaphysics as onto-theology names a problem, 
and the problem lies in the reduction of being to an entity, 
albeit the highest entity. Metaphysical thought accounts for 
its understanding of being always in terms of an entity. 
However, an understanding of an entity presupposes an 
understanding of being. Thus the being of the entity that 
comes to represent being is never questioned, i.e., being 
itself is never investigated. Instead, we come to understand 
both entities as a whole and being in terms of the highest 
entity. However, the being of the foundational entity, i.e., 
the being of the ground, remains unthought. Metaphysical 
thought forgets the difference between being and entities 
and leaves the difference unthought, which presents a 
problem for metaphysics. The possibility of onto-theology 
lies in the forgetfulness of being. 3 
The metaphysics of subjectivity is onto-theological. 
Unlike the metaphysics prior to Descartes, the metaphysics 
of subjectivity has a peculiar character. Within the 
3 In the essay "The Principle of Identity," Heidegger 
shows that metaphysical thought accounts for itself in a 
circular manner. He says that metaphysics is "thee-logic 
because it is onto-logic" and "onto-logic because it is 
thee-logic." As such, metaphysics can never account for its 
ground, since it remains within this circle. If metaphysics 
could explain the circle of onto-theology, then metaphysics 
would transgress its own boundaries and cease to be 
metaphysics. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 
p.60. 
11 
metaphysics of subjectivity, the understanding of being and 
the essential understanding of ourselves as self-
consciousness go hand in hand. Within the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, we come to understand ourselves as being 
instead of understanding ourselves in relationship to being. 
The result of understanding being in terms of self-
consciousness raises the following problem: if an 
understanding of being gives us an understanding of entities 
as entities, and if the subject is an entity, then we come 
to understand being in terms of an entity. Thus the self-
conscious subject shows itself to be the foundational 
entity, or ground, within the metaphysics of subjectivity. 
However, the understanding of being in terms of an entity 
conflates the difference between being and entities and 
leaves the difference unthought. Thus the metaphysics of 
subjectivity remains entrenched within the problem of onto-
theology. Being remains concealed within the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, and the ontological difference is not 
investigated. If the ontological difference remains 
unthought within the metaphysics of subjectivity, then the 
self-conscious subject does not show itself to be a 
primordial phenomenon, i.e., does not show itself to be the 
ground of metaphysics, because the ground has something 
unthought within it. In other words, the notion of ground 
comes into question. 
12 
The loss of the ground has at least two consequences. 
First, the loss of the ground results in the recognition 
that we do not understand being. Second, the loss of the 
ground as the loss of the understanding of being means that 
we lack the understanding of who we are. Now I can raise the 
problem. If we understand the basic structures of 
metaphysics in terms of self-consciousness, and if this 
understanding of being comes radically into question, i.e., 
undergoes displacement, then how do we understand the 
conception of human being when the foundation is undermined? 
I contend that Heidegger performed this act of 
displacement. Heidegger brought the conception of 
subjectivity as a self-grounding and self-constituting 
phenomenon into question, and thus Heidegger undermined the 
metaphysics of subjectivity. In order to see how Heidegger 
undermined the metaphysics of subjectivity, I am going to 
examine Heidegger's own analyses of the place where 
subjectivity received the first expression of its full 
force, viz., within Kantian metaphysics. Particularly, I am 
investigating the places where Kant shows subjectivity to be 
the ground of metaphysics and the places where Heidegger 
exposes the abyss within Kant's ~hinking of the ground. 
Where Kant's thinking attempts to reinstitute the activity 
of metaphysics, Heidegger's thinking decenters the very 
basis of metaphysics. But then the question arises: how do 
13 
we understand ourselves when the ground for that 
understanding has been removed? 
Within the brief introduction of the problem of 
displacement just given, I have raised the following issues: 
the current situation cf contemporary thought, the 
phenomenon of decentering, and the problem of interpreting 
the history philosophy. I will now expand on these issues 
and set the stage for the dissertation more explicitly than 
I have done up to this point. 
B. THE LOCUS OP CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT: 
THE CLOSURE OF METAPHYSICS 
Philosophy is not conducted in a void. Every 
philosophical undertaking has its own locus that arises out 
of a current situation, and the task of the philosopher is 
to respond to the given situation. For the response to be 
possible, the philosopher must have an understanding of the 
current state of affairs. Thus the question arises: how do I 
assess the current philosophical situation? 
I introduce my assessment of the philosophical 
situation through Nietzsche. In the Twilight of the Idols, 
Nietzsche discusses what he calls the "history of an 
error. 114 This Nietzschean outline of the history of an error 
traces the various interpretations of the concept of the 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The 
Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking 
Press, 1968), pp. 485-486. 
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"true world" from Greek philosophy up to the present day. In 
this historical outline, Nietzsche reveals that the 
conception of the "true world" has changed six times. 
One possible explanation for the changing conception 
of truth is that we possess more knowledge than the previous 
generations possessed. This explanation would be rooted in 
the idea that humankind progresses from primitive to 
civilized conditions, and thus humankind sees matters more 
clearly as we progress out of our ignorant condition. 
However, another explanation is possible. I can 
understand and explain the changes in the true world as 
displacements. If we linger a moment on Nietzsche's 
reflection, we can see a different idea at work than the 
idea of progress. If we give thought to the idea of the true 
world changing, then we must realize that we are confronted 
with a contradiction. The contradiction arises from the fact 
that according to the definition of the word "truth," what 
is true should not change. Truth should abide. However, what 
the history reveals is that truth does not abide, i.e. truth 
changes. As a matter of fact, the very conception of the 
true world undergoes changes or displacements. Within 
Nietzsche's interpretation, the conception of the true 
world, synonymously called being, has been degenerating, 
i.e., losing power. If we consider being as presence, and if 
being is equated with truth, then Nietzsche presents being 
as becoming absent. Being is not there. The true is not 
true. What should be constant changes. Thus the concept of 
the true world is a myth, meaning in Nietzsche's sense, an 
error. According to Nietzsche, the current stage of this 
history is the recognition of the abolition of the true 
world. 
If the true world shows itself as an untruth, then 
the question arises: "What world has remained? 115 The 
15 
quickest and the most thoughtless answer to the question is 
that the world of mere appearance remains once the true 
world is abolished. In the Republic, Plato called the world 
of mere appearance the world of shadows. However, Nietzsche 
discards this answer, because he recognizes that the true 
world and the apparent world are correlates of each other. 
The true and the apparent are not simply oppositional 
concepts; they are also appositional concepts: one concept 
explains the other concept. Thus without the true world, the 
world of appearance must fall away as well. For Nietzsche, 
the recognition of the dissolution of the true/apparent 
world is characterized as "mid-day," the time of the least 
6 
shadows, and as an "end of the longest error." With the 
advent of midday, Nietzsche announces the end, or closure, 
of metaphysical thought. The end of metaphysical thinking 
calls forth a thinking that no longer accepts the 
S Twilight, p.486. 
6 Twilight, p.486. 
appositional oppositions as constituting philosophical 
7 
thought. 
If each conception of the true world, or being, 
operates as an interpretive model for entities within the 
world, then the conception of the human entity must change 
in each of those errors/eras, and the conception of the 
human entity does change in each error/era. Nietzsche 
16 
structures the history of an error in terms of the different 
conceptions of the human entity that arise in these 
errors/eras. These different conceptions of the human entity 
unfold within the six interpretations of the true world as 
the "virtuous man," the "sinner," the subject, the 
8 positivist, the "free spirit" and finally "Zarathustra." As 
we can see, Nietzsche refers to the subject as one of the 
interpretations of the human entity, and thus the subject is 
only one interpretation among many interpretations of the 
human entity, depending upon how we conceive of truth and 
being. Hence the understanding of what it means to be human 
There is an element of Nietzschean irony present 
within the history of an error. On the one hand, Nietzsche 
shows that metaphysical thought cannot be consistent 
according to its own standard of truth. In other words, if 
truth is an error, then truth ends up being contradictory, 
i.e., truth ends up being its opposite. On the other hand, 
the error is what characterizes metaphysics. Thus 
metaphysics cannot become consistent simply by revising its 
idea of truth again. After all, the historical revision of 
truth is precisely the problem Nietzsche is addressing. In 
essence, the 'correction' of truth entails the abolition of 
truth and, along with this, the abolition of the philosophy 
of truth, i.e, metaphysics. 
8 Twilight, pp. 485-486. 
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has a history and changes along with the conceptions of 
being. Thus, in opposition to the metaphysical understanding 
of the self that tries to understand the self in terms of a 
fixed essence, Nietzsche shows that our own self-
understanding undergoes change, depending upon what 
interpretation of the true world is operative during a 
particular error/era. The conception of the self-conscious 
subject is an error, since it is part of the history of an 
error. 
I understand the contemporary setting of philosophical 
thought as being at the end of the history of an error. In 
other words, I understand the current philosophical 
situation as being within a history that has run its course 
and come into question. I call the current philosophical 
situation the closure, or the end, of metaphysics, and I am 
placing my project within the advent of the closure. 
I understand closure as the bringing into question of 
what has not been questioned previously. In this sense, the 
closure of metaphysics means neither the eradication of 
metaphysical thought, the ~erfection of thought, nor the 
cessation of thinking. Instead the closure of metaphysical 
thought is an opening into what has not been thought within 
the text of metaphysics itself. The thinking of what has not 
been thought in metaphysics is only possible if metaphysics 
has reached a place where its appositional oppositions come 
into question. 
In "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," 
Heidegger defines "end'' in the following way: 
The old meaning of the word "end" means the same 
a~ place: from one end to the other means from one 
place to another. The end of philosophy is the 
place, that place in which the whole of 
philosophy's history is gathered in its most 
extreme pofsibility. End as completion means this 
gathering. 
The end as a gathering into completion is the closure of 
metaphysical thought, where the foundational concepts of 
18 
philosophy come into question. What is given us to think is 
the closure and the corresponding space the closure opens 
up. 
I want to examine the closure cf the metaphysics cf 
subjectivity. This closure does not eradicate the conception 
cf subjectivity and its corresponding conceptions of mind 
and objectivity. Empirically speaking, we see that the 
discourse of the metaphysics cf subjectivity operates in 
philosophy today. Nonetheless, the closure heralded by 
Nietzsche does bring the conception of subjectivity into 
question. If we take Heidegger's sense of closure as end, 
then we can see that the closure of something is a 
redirecting of thought, where what is to be thought achieves 
its utmost possibility. 
Given our historical situation, certain possibilities 
are given to us to think. I use the passive voice 
9 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell 
Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 375. 
19 
construction quite consciously in this statement. While we 
can respond to our historical situation, we are not the 
authors of our historical situation. I cannot create the 
space where questioning takes place, since I am always 
already within the space. The way I have chosen to question 
the metaphysics of subjectivity lies in the fact that the 
metaphysics of subjectivity has fulfilled itself, and the 
fulfillment allows for the very basis of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity to be questioned. Philosophical thought has 
undergone a displacement. For example, the closure and 
reopening of the sensible/intelligible opposition in Kant's 
thought, Marx's inversion of Hegelian thought and 
Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism are facts given to us to 
think in our contemporary milieu. Furthermore, we can think 
beyond these possibilities. For example, we are at the point 
of thinking the meaning of being and of thinking differance. 
We can think these latter possibilities as well as the 
former possibilities because a certain decentering occurs in 
the focus of any text of metaphysics that brings certain 
elements of the text into question. Inroads can be made into 
this thought, but only if we recognize what is there to be 
thought. 
C. DECENTERING 
The discussion of the setting of my dissertation has 
brought me to the issue of decentering. Decentering is a way 
20 
to understand the play of displacement. First, I describe 
decentering in general, and second I specify instances of 
decentering in order to concretize the general conception. 
The description of decentering leads me to a discussion of 
the way I read the history of philosophy. 
In a general sense, I understand decentering as a 
force operative within any text that does not allow the text 
to be self-contained. Since an understanding of decentering 
depends on the phenomenon of the text, I must explain the 
phenomenon of text. Then I can explain the way decentering 
works within a text. A text is a network of differential 
effects and forces held together by a unifying thread that 
10 interweaves itself throughout this network. The 
differential play of forces within a text gives rise to 
meaning. A text can be a book, but a text is not simply a 
book. A text can also be a political institution, a 
political issue, the field of metaphysics, the nuclear 
issue, the conception of the university, a poem, a 
photograph, a map, or any other place meaning could possibly 
11 
arise. If I may be allowed a comparison, a text is both 
similar and dissimilar to Heidegger's concept of the world 
as a referential totality of our involvement with entities, 
10 Jacques Derrida, "Critical Response: II: But 
beyond ... ," trans. Peggy Kamuf, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, Autumn, 1986), 13, p. 168. 
11 James Kern and James Newton, nAn Interview with .Jacques 
Derrida," The Literary Review, (Edinburgh: Sunlight Press 
Ltd., 1980), p. 21. 
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ourselves and other people. On the one hand, a text is 
similar to the phenomenon of world because a text is a 
referential totality. The forces operative within the text 
allow the different elements within the text to refer to 
each other. On the other hand, a text is dissimilar to the 
phenomenon of world because a text does not end and begin 
with Dasein. In other words, a text is not simply the Worin 
of Dasein's assignments but is the place where we find 
ourselves assigned. 
Generally, a text presents us with an interweaving of 
forces that are connected by a guiding thread, i.e., the 
oppositions within any text are not sporadic. On the one 
hand, when we interpret or read a text we can see the 
reasons why a text is ordered in a particular way, the 
reasons one thing is granted priority over another thing, 
the intentions of an author or participant within a text, 
the historical period of the text, as well as other factors 
too numerous to mention in this context. On the other hand, 
there are elements within the text that disrupt the 
intentions of the text. A text is like a Koch curve. A Koch 
curve represents the paradox of infinite length with a 
finite space, where the possibilities of the length are 
dependent upon the initial shape of the figure. A text is a 
finite space with a multitude of interpretations or 
readings, where the readings are dependent upon the initial 
text. Where a text represents a center, ground or guiding 
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force within its confines, there is a play among these 
forces that gives rise to possibilities not part of the 
intentions at work in the text. This is what I call 
decentering, viz., the play of forces that disrupt the text 
and give rise to other possibilities of thought. A 
decentering reading shows how the text does not retain its 
homogeneity. In this context, homogeneity does not refer to 
logical consistency. I will state overtly that any 
philosophical text should be free of explicit contradiction, 
otherwise we would be dealing with nonsense. In a text that 
is homogeneous, there are forces at play that order and 
>tructure the text according to a guiding principle. 
Decentering, as a force of heterogeneity, disrupts the 
intentional homogeneity of a text and brings the original 
project of the text into question. 
Since we have the general sense of decentering in 
view, I can begin to specify how the force of decentering is 
operative within a text. Decentering can occur in two ways. 
On the one hand, decentering can result in a recentering of 
the basic oppositions of t~e text. This type of decentering 
occurs in metaphysics, where the decentered principle 
becomes replaced by a new principle that restructures and 
recenters the textual oppositions in a different way. On the 
other hand, decentering can leave the text without a new 
center, and what is left for us to think becomes something 
other than what is given to us to think in the metaphysical 
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project. In fact, a sense of otherness itself that is no 
longer understood in reference to sameness is given us to 
think. In order to explain the two different modes of 
decentering, I will use two examples that relate to the 
metaphysics of subjectivity. I exemplify the metaphysical 
sense of decentering by briefly examining Descartes' move 
from god to the subject as the ground of metaphysics, and I 
exemplify a non-metaphysical sense of decentering by 
reexamining Nietzsche's history of an error. My examples 
must be brief at this juncture and are only inserted for 
explanatory purposes. Since I consider my own project to be 
a project of decentering, the full comprehension of how to 
understand the play of decentering can only be seen as we 
proceed through my text. 
I place the beginning of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity within Cartesian thought. To see the beginning 
of modern thought in Descartes is not new, and I see no 
reason to change this beginning. My reasoning is that 
Descartes was the first to view the phenomenon of the 
subject, i.e., the cogito, as the foundation for the 
understanding of all entities. Only through a clear and 
distinct representation of the self as a thinking entity can 
we come to any certainty about entities outside of us. 
Through understanding the cogito ergo sum as the first 
principle and ground of certainty, the subject becomes the 
highest being and makes possible the presence of other 
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entities. The subject becomes the center of metaphysics, 
i the subject stands as the hub of onto-theology. , e • I 
Within the metaphysics of subjectivity, we define the 
subject as self-consciousness. Through self-consciousness, 
the subject becomes the ground for the understanding of 
entities. As self-conscious, I am not simply aware of 
entities confronting me. Instead, I am aware that I am aware 
of entities. In other words, I come to an understanding of 
objects as being objects through self-consciousness. 
With Descartes and the advent of the centrality of 
subjectivity, a decentering move occurred. Where a 
conception of god as the moving principle or creator of all 
entities occupied a central position in the thought of 
metaphysics, now the subject began to occupy a central 
position. With the displacement of god and the replacement 
. of the subject as the highest entity, both a decentering and 
a recentering occurred within metaphysical thought itself. 
Playing with the metaphor of closure, let me say that 
Descartes began to close, or call to an end, to the 
foundation of Medieval thought by decentering the concept of 
god and putting in god 1 s place the conception of the 
subject. Descartes 1 decentering move does not eradicate the 
concept of god. The subject is not creative of entities ex 
nihilo. However the subject does become creative of 
foundational representations, or thoughts, that allow for 
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entities to show themselves. Thus the displacement of one 
ground gives rise to a replacement with another ground. The 
displacement/replacement effects a transference from one 
entity to another entity as the highest entity, while at the 
same time giving rise to a new sense of being. 
What I have just described is the metaphysical meaning 
of decentering and closure. Within metaphysics, when one 
ground is displaced, another arises to take its place. Thus 
a decentering becomes a recentering, and metaphysical 
thought has a new ground to think. This process of 
decentering/recentering does not eradicate the previous 
concepts. However the decentered concepts lose the power 
they possessed under the previous interpretation, and the 
recentered concepts are thought along the lines of the newly 
established ground. For example, Descartes does not 
eradicate the sensible/intelligible opposition, which is one 
of the basic oppositions of metaphysical thinking. Instead 
he rethinks the opposition within a new ground. In this way, 
Descartes recenters the sensible/intelligible opposition 
within metaphysics and redirects the opposition according to 
12 I must point out that Descartes uses the coaito to 
come to the knowledge of a god, because the cogito is not 
primordial enough to assure itself of its own existence 
outside of the present moment. In Descartes, the mode of 
access to certainty through the cogito is in need of more 
stable ground than the cogito can establish. Kant is the 
first thinker to see the cogito in its primordial, grounding 
character. 
the new ground. We will reopen this topic when we examine 
Kant's philosophy and his conception of critique. 
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Allow me to introduce the force of decentering into 
the metaphysics of subjectivity through a question: what 
happens if a force reveals itself within a text of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, such that this force brings the 
very conception of ground itself into question? In other 
words, what happens if a force removes not only the subject 
from its function as a ground, but also radically disrupts 
the conception of ground itself? If this type of decentering 
could be found, then there could be no recentering. Within 
the context of decentering that I am adopting, some other 
entity does not come to take the subject's place. Instead 
the whole conception of subjectivity, as a foundational 
entity, comes into question. Along with the conception of 
subjectivity coming into question, the conception of ground 
comes into question. Again, decentering does not eradicate 
phenomena, but decentering does displace the priority of the 
phenomena. In this instance, the priority of the subject 
would be displaced. Only nothing arises to takes the 
subject's place. At this point, the project of metaphysics, 
understood as onto-theology comes into question. 
We see this sense of decentering depicted in 
Nietzsche's ''History of an Error." I have already discussed 
this example, but now I will present the example in terms of 
decentering. At the sixth stage of the history, Nietzsche 
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shOWS that the true world is at an end. The closure of the 
true world has taken place, or has at least announced 
itself. As we saw previously, the closure of the true world 
carries along with it the closure of the apparent world. In 
other words, the end of the true world displaces the 
true/apparent opposition and thus displaces any opposition 
that comes under the interpretation of the true world. Thus, 
the opposition between the intelligible/sensible worlds 
undergoes displacement, since the intelligible/sensible 
opposition is an interpretation that arises within the 
Nietzschean History of an Error. In this case, the closure 
of the opposition does not result in a recentering of the 
opposition. What is left to think? Nietzsche directs us to 
the thought that opens at the closure of the real world by 
saying 11 INC IP IT ZARATHUSTRA. 1113 Nietzsche presents us with 
Zarathustra as the matter of thought, which is a thinking of 
the overcoming of the "last man" and the passage beyond to 
the overman. 14 Nietzsche offers to us to rethink who we are, 
once the metaphysical oppositions lose their power and are 
put out of play. 
I draw the following conclusion from my previous 
remarks: if the conception of subjectivity involves a 
specific understanding of selfhood, and if the conception of 
13 Twilight, p. 41. 
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra; in The 
Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking 
Press 1968), p.129f. 
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subjectivity undergoes displacement, then the conception of 
selfhood must change in the decentered movement. 
Furthermore, if the metaphysical oppositions undergo a 
decentering that displaces the oppositions and does not 
recenter the metaphysical oppositions, then we must see how 
selfhood can be understood in a way that does not think in 
terms of the oppositions. 
D. READING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
The issue of decentering leads me to the issue of 
reading the history of philosophy. Since I am placing my 
dissertation within the closure of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, I need to discuss how I am going to confront 
the history of philosophy in general, and particularly how I 
am going to confront Kant's thought. There are a multitude 
of ways to confront the history of philosophy. I will 
examine three modes of reading the history of. philosophy. I 
call these three modes of historical confrontation the 
polemical, destructive and deconstructive readings of the 
history of philosophy. I will briefly examine each mode of 
confrontation, and then state why I choose the destructive 
and deconstructive readings as my modes of interpretation. 
The polemical confrontation with a thinker's thought 
is primarily the act of defending or disputing the claims of 
the thinker. In other words, a polemic is an argumentative 
style of confrontation. When philosopher's engage each other 
polemically, they choose sides and debate an issue. The 
focus of the polemical style is to engage in a commentary 
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with the thinker's wrttings, while at the same time arguing 
for or against the thinker's position. In other words, a 
polemical reading is not merely a commentary that duplicates 
the thinker's thought, rather a polemical reading presents a 
15 problem that is in need of a solution. Some representative 
Kant scholars who engage in the polemical style are D. 
Henrich, H. Allison, J. Bennett, N. K. Smith, H. J. Paton, 
and P. Guyer. 
A paradigmatic example of the polemical style of Kant 
scholarship is P. Guyer's text, Kant and the Claims of 
Knowledge. Guyer is a Kant scholar who believes in the 
patchwork theory first put forward by Hans Vahinger and 
introduced into American philosophy by Norman Kemp Smith. 16 
.Guyer's claim is that Kant must base his transcendental 
idealism on an ontological realism. Guyer reads Kant as an 
epistemolgist, who is trying to establish the conditions of 
15 I contend there is no such thing as objective 
commentary. A reading of a philosophical text that merely 
tries to repeat the author's intention already changes the 
meaning of the text. As I showed earlier in the paper, 
philosophical thought arises out of a situation. This 
situation creates a backdrop for any reading and should not 
be ignored, even though the backdrop is ignored for the most 
part. 
16 The patchwork theory involves a way of reading Kant. 
Its main tenet is that Kant wrote the sections of the CPR 
over consecutive years, and the sections are not homogeneous 
with each other. In other words, patchwork theorists claim 
the CPR is not coherent. I do not abide by this reading. My 
reading of the CPR shows the work to be totally coherent. 
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hOW we come to know objects. According to Guyer, Kant 
analyzes the capacities of the hum.an subject that allow the 
subject to give rise to knowledge claims. However, Guyer 
says that Kant had to prove the existence of the external 
world of objects, so that we could come to know objects and 
to avoid the pitfalls of a Berkeleyan idealism. So our 
knowledge of objects depends on the reality, or existence, 
of those objects external to us. Kant gives this proof, not 
well according to Guyer, in the section of the CPR entitled 
"The Refutation of Idealism." Basically, Guyer sees Kant as 
vacillating between an idealistic and realistic approach to 
our knowledge of objects, while Guyer maintains that Kant 
was a 'closet' realist. 
Given certain parameters, Guyer's reading is 
plausible, but disputable. One problematic claim in Guyer's 
reading concerns his equation of a study of the subject's 
faculties with epistemology and a study of objects with 
ontology. This equation makes Guyer miss the fact that Kant 
is doing ontology in the CPR. Thus Guyer thinks that Kant's 
real concern is to prove the existence of the external world 
and not to establish the objectivity of the· object. 
However, my real problem with Guyer is not with his 
scholarship, but with the presuppositions he accepts 
uncritically in order to read Kant the way he does. To 
defend either the claim of realism or idealism, he must 
presuppose the basic opposition between the subject and the 
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object. Further, the presupposition involves the need of an 
isolated subject who must find a way to get outside of 
itself. Moreover, both the object, as an external thing, and 
the subject, as an isolated interior thing, are conceived of 
in terms of being Vorhanden, i.e., present-at-hand. 17 
However, the question of being of the subject and the object 
is lacking. Guyer does not broach the question of existence, 
and he accepts merely the sense of existence as present-at-
hand. The issue of being is not a part of Guyer's reading of 
Kant, and his work suffers from that lack. 
In what I have just said, I have briefly engaged 
myself in Guyer's issue. To engage myself in Guyer's issue 
means to accept the parameters he sets forth for the debate. 
His parameters require the acceptance of the opposition 
between idealism and realism, as well as the foundational 
opposition between the subject and the object.· However, what 
Guyer leaves unexamined is the basis of the oppositions. If 
I raise the issue of the presuppositions and infrastructures 
of Guyer's debate, I become excluded from the debate. I 
would be excluded from the debate because the seeking of the 
presuppositions of a text and the investigation into the 
oppositional forces that make up the text require a 
different discourse than the polemical style. The polemical 
style remains within the metaphysical oppositions, even if 
17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), p. 248. 
the polemicist refuses to acknowledge the metaphysical 
parameters. The polemical style of decentering involves a 
constant recentering of the oppositions. 
The second reading I discuss is the destructive 
reading of the history of philosophy. This was Heidegger's 
strategy. Heidegger called his destructive reading a 
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Wiederholung, and I understand Wiederholung as the retrieval 
of the unthought in a thinker's work. Heidegger saw the 
unthought as the meaning of being, which he conceived of as 
the temporal projection, or understanding, of an entity, or 
the totality of entities, upon their being. I want to 
discuss the sense of retrieval pertinent to my project, 
which arises out of Heidegger's reading of Kant in KPM. 18 
Heidegger discusses his notion of retrieval in Being 
and Time. In BT, Heidegger sets the groundwork for the 
possibility of a retrieval in terms of the Seinsfrage, the 
question of being. Specifically, Heidegger predicates the 
possibility of a retrieval upon the oblivion of being, i.e., 
upon the oblivion of the difference between being and 
entities. In BT, Heidegger wanted to show how time is the 
meaning of being and how time had underlain implicitly the 
history of metaphysics. In other .words, since the history of 
metaphysics had always interpreted being in terms of 
18 I am focusing on Heidegger's reading of Kant in KPM. 
However, Heidegger has other interpretations of Kant that come 
after KPM that show a change in both his understanding of Kant 
and his understanding of retrieval. This change lies beyond 
the scope of my dissertation. 
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presence, the history of metaphysics presented being in 
terms of time. However, the interpretation of being in terms 
of time had not been explicitly addressed. Heidegger sought 
to retrieve this possibility by destroying the history of 
metaphysics. How are we to understand destruction in light 
of the oblivion of being? 
Destruction is not equal to eradication. In his 
investigation of the history of metaphysics, Heidegger 
wanted neither to obliterate nor deny the history of 
metaphysics. Heidegger's reading of the history of 
metaphysics took place in terms of an Auseinanderstezung, 
confrontation with the thought of the thinker. In a 
metaphoric sense, Heidegger's reading was an act of 
violence. In his reading, Heidegger attempted to wrest from 
the thinker's thought the concealed sense of being operative 
within the text. In other words, Heidegger tried to divulge 
the temporal interpretation of being implicitly operative 
within a text. 19 
19 In Cassirer's issue with Heidegger's reading of 
Kant, Cassirer is concerned that Heidegger does not see 
Kant's explicit intention in the critical project. According 
to Cassirer, Kant's explicit intention is "to deny knowledge 
in order to make room for faith" (Bxxx). In other words, 
Kant wanted to define the limits of knowledge, i.e., what we 
can know of entities, and to establish the bounds of 
morality, since Kant saw morality as the proper destination 
of human being, defined in terms of personhood. 
To think that Heidegger did not see the importance of 
morality in the Kantian corpus would be a grave mistake. In 
KPM and BP, Heidegger sees that the true essence of the 
human being for Kant does not lie within the limits of self-
consciousness. Heidegger states that the true sense of 
(continued ... ) 
Heidegger develops his sense of retrieval further in 
his discussion of the phenomenological method in the Basic 
problems of Phenomenology. Both BT and BP are 
contemporaneous, so the one helps to explain the other. 
Heidegger breaks the method down into three components: 
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reduction, construction, and destruction. Unlike Husserlian 
reduction which suspends the natural world and attempts to 
get to the essential, noetic structures of consciousness and 
the meaning structures of things, called noema, Heideggerean 
reduction involves a redirection of sight away from entities 
within the world to our understanding of the being of 
entities within the world. Through the reduction, we focus 
upon an entity's mode of disclosure. This shift of attention 
also involves a self-understanding, since we are entities 
who recognize through the reduction that we are entities who 
ask the question of the meaning of being. Through the act of 
19 ( ••• continued) 
selfhood in Kant lies within the conception of moral 
personhood (KPM, p.163, and BP, p.131). However, Heidegger 
is also aware that Kant first had to delimit the realm of 
the.sensible in order to get to the realm of the 
supersensible. Furthermore, the sensible and the 
supersensible are both understood through temporal 
determinations, i.e, the changing and the eternal. Thus a 
temporal understanding of the realms lies at the basis of 
the separation of the sensible and the supersensible. 
Heidegger saw that this temporal understanding had to be 
uncovered prior to an investigation of Kant's work, since it 
was what remained unsaid in the Kantian project. 
Cassirer does not go deeply enough in his own 
understanding of Kant, and only projects his reading of Kant 
upon a metaphysical horizon. On the other hand, Heidegger 
reads Kant from a horizon that cannot simply be given within 
the confines of metaphysics, since Heidegger's horizon 
brings into question the metaphysical horizon itself. 
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the question, we see that we gain access to the 
understanding of being through ourselves. 
However the reduction is in need of a construction. 
since our access to being is different from our access to an 
entity, and since our access to being is primarily concealed 
from us in our everydayness, Heidegger says that being "must 
be brought to view in a free projection. 1120 By the term 
projection, Heidegger means an understanding of being. In 
the phenomenological construction, we attempt to understand 
an entity in terms of its being. In other words, since being 
is always the being of entities, the reductive view of being 
must always be directed back toward our projective 
understanding of entities. There is no such thing as being, 
since being is not a thing. Heidegger's attempt to construct 
an understanding of being must be entity-related, either 
directed toward a particular entity (Dasein), directed 
towards a type of entity {equipment, objects), or directed 
toward das Seiende im Ganzen. While the reduction refocuses 
our attention upon being, the construction attempts to come 
to an understanding of being. 
The third part of the method involves· the task of 
destruction. Reduction and construction are in need of 
destruction for the following reason: any understanding of 
being arises out of the particular situation we find 
20 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
trans. Albert Hofstadter {Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1982), p. 22. 
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ourselves in at the given moment. The way we describe our 
understanding of being is determined by that situation. The 
situation is historical, i.e., the situation has arisen out 
of a history that has comprehended being in many ways. 
However, the traditional modes of Seinsverstandnis have 
obscured our understanding of being, especially if the 
traditional reading of being has not recognized the 
ontological difference. Thus the traditional conceptions of 
being must undergo a destruction "down to the sources from 
~1 
which they are drawn."· However, the destruction of the 
traditional concepts of being is not an eradication of the 
concepts, but rather a retrieval of the possibility of the 
formation of the concepts themselves. The destruction is a 
retrieval of the meaning of being out of the oblivion of 
being perpetrated by the history of metaphysics. Heidegger 
refers to the phenomenological method as a dismantling, 
i.e., a retrieval of the meaning of being out of the 
oblivion of being along with the attempt to make thematic 
the understanding of being. 22 To make this more concrete, 
Heidegger reads the history of metaphysics in light of the 
temporal understanding of being. We will see this reading 
when we look at KPM. 
21 BP, p.23. 
22 I am translating the word "Abbau" as dismantling, 
while Albert Hofstadter translates Abbau as "de-
constructing. 11 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der 
Phanomenologie, in Gesamtausgabe Bd.24 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1975}, p.31, and BP, p.23. 
The third reading of the history of philosophy is a 
oerridean reading, which has come to be called 
deconstruction. When reading a text deconstructively, a 
double reading occurs. On the one hand, the reader must be 
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able to produce the structures of the text. As Derrida says, 
the structures of signification present within a text serve 
as an 11 indispensable guardrail" for any critical reading, 
i.e., the text prevents a critical reading from 
23 indiscriminately rambling into any 'unauthorized' areas. 
On the other hand, the reader must also produce the forces 
operative within the text that the text itself cannot 
incorporate. These forces make the structure of the text 
possible and open the text to something other than what the 
thinker "would mean. 1124 As Derrida says, there is a play of 
differance within a text. This play of differance is "an 
operation of differing which at the same time both fissures 
and retards presence, submitting simultaneously to a 
23 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatari 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1976), p.158. 
24 On Grammatology, p.158. In this section of On 
Grammatology, Derrida discusses the place of the writer 
within his/her own text. He says,, the writer "writes in a 
language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life 
his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely." The 
same statement can be said about the reader. The writer and 
the reader stand within a text and possess no standpoint 
outside the text that gives them an absolute vantage point 
either on the text being read or on the text being written. 
In other words, "there is nothing outside of the text, 11 and 
an idealism that could possibly supply its own ground is not 
possible. (Ibid.) 
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primordial division and delay." 25 This reading shows how 
being, presence, cannot maintain itself, and thus undermines 
metaphysical thought. Since I am dealing with the issue of 
temporality in Kant and Heidegger, my deconstructive reading 
bas to show how the movement of temporality decenters and 
disrupts being, and hence decenters our self-understanding. 
I direct my deconstructive reading at the role Kant 
assigns to the imagination in the CPR. Here I show how the 
imagination is disruptive of presence, such that presence 
cannot maintain itself within the text. In other words, I 
examine whether objectivity, which is the being or presence 
of the object, and its ground in the subject attains the 
unity demanded by the concept of being as presence, or 
whether a force disrupts the metaphysical desire for 
presence. In this reading, the issue of decentering comes to 
the forefront, and I must show how the deconstructive 
decentering affects our self-understanding. 
All of the above is only introductory and is in need 
of further clarification. What we need to do is see if the 
force of decentering is operative within the metaphysics of 
subjectivity. Thus we must turn our attention to Kant. 
25 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David 
Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973}, 
p.88. 
CHAPTER II 
KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring us to the 
point where we can come to understand the role of the 
imagination in Kantian metaphysics. We cannot understand the 
place of the imagination in Kant's metaphysics without first 
having an overall view of the project in the CPR. Once we 
have a sense of the project, then we can begin to 
investigate the imagination. 
This chapter has two sections. First I explain Kant's 
critical project. I do this by interpreting Kant's 
Copernican revolution within the context of 
decentering/recentering. Kant sees himself as placing 
metaphysics upon a newly secured foundation. The re-laying 
of the metaphysical foundations requires the razing of the 
old foundations of dogmatic metaphysics, so that the 
foundations can be rebuilt. The disruption of the ground is 
only a reinstitution of the ground. Second I begin to 
investigate the imagination. I introduce the imagination 
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through an analysis of its empirical employment. Kant 
presents the empirical sense of the imagination in APP. I 
concentrate on the areas of the APP pertinent to the Kantian 
metaphysical project. I also explain why the APP can provide 
a clue to the understanding of the locus of the imagination 
in the first and second editions of the transcendental 
deduction. 
B. THE DECENTERING/RECENTERING OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
SUBJECTIVITY: THE KANTIAN COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 
Kant begins the first and second editions of the CPR 
with a metaphor. This metaphor both sets the tone of the 
entire Kantian critical project and portrays the 
metaphysical play of decentering and recentering. The image 
that pervades Kant's thought is the image of war, 
specifically the image of the "battle-field" 26 Kant views 
the current state of metaphysics as a field of confrontation 
being waged on two fronts. I designate the two fronts in 
terms of cause and effect. The cause of the war lies in our 
natural tendency for metaphysics. As entities endowed with 
reason, Kant says we are weighed down with questions that we 
can neither ignore nor answer. These unanswerable questions 
26 The metaphor of the battlefield appears in both the 
first and the second edition prefaces of the CPR. The 
difference between the two appearances of the metaphor is only 
in terms of the place each occurs in the prefaces. In the A 
edition, Kant begins the preface with the metaphor and uses 
the metaphor to explain his project. In the B edition, the 
metaphor occurs after Kant has begun to discuss his project. 
involve our raison d'etre and are concerned with the 
concepts of the existence of god, freedom and immortality. 
Yet the answers to these questions lie beyond our finite, 
rational powers of comprehension. Nonetheless we cannot 
ignore the questions. Our natural metaphysical tendency 
compels us to respond to these questions. 
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The need to respond to these metaphysical questions 
produces an effect, i.e., our natural metaphysical tendency 
gives rise to a thematic investigation of the metaphysical 
questions. However, the thematization of the questions has 
resulted in war because of the groundlessness and 
discrepancy of answers to the questions. Thus the war is not 
something extrinsic to human reason, rather the war arises 
within human reason. 
The war receives the paradigm of its battlefield in 
ancient philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of Plato. 
Given a particular reading of Platonic philosophy, Plato 
provided the scene upon which the war would be waged for the 
next two thousand years. We call this paradigmatic scene the 
divided line. 
In the Republic, Plato presented the image of the 
divided line to show Glaucon the difference between what is 
opinable and what is knowable (509c - 5lld). The basic 
division on the divided line is between the sensible and 
intelligible realms. The sensible world of shadows and 
things keeps us mired in the world of imagination and 
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opinion, while the intelligible world of mathematical 
objects and ideas provides us with the true locus of our 
knowledge. The intelligible world is the place of truth and 
knowledge because mathematical objects and ideas are 
unchanging. Hence we can fix our minds upon these unchanging 
intelligible entities. Regardless of the fact that Plato 
presents the divided line in an image, the paradigm of the 
sensible/intelligible worlds becomes one of the basic 
paradigms of philosophical thought, and subsequent thinkers 
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recast the paradigm in various ways. 
Kant recasts the sensible/intelligible opposition 
within his own thought. On the one hand, Kant sees the 
sensible/intelligible opposition as the battlefield where 
the war is being waged. On the other hand, Kant wants to 
27 A matter worthy of thought is the fact that the 
divided line is itself an image. Thus the depiction of the 
intelligible world depends upon an image. In other words, we 
do not know the intelligible world except in terms of an 
image. This would lead us to think that Plato placed the 
divided line on the lowest rung of the ladder, viz., in 
images. However this is not correct. Plato places neither 
artistic nor pedagogical images on the divided line. So 
Plato has depicted an image of the sensible/intelligible 
worlds, but this type of image is not accounted for on the 
divided line. Further, the divided line is an image that is 
not generated from an original thing, since the divided line 
is the only way we see the sensible/original opposition. 
Thus we cannot account for the image of the divided line in 
terms of the opposition between original and copy. This 
produces a dual undermining of the sensible/intelligible 
opposition. On the one hand, the opposition is only seen in 
an image and hence is not intelligible. On the other hand, 
the divided line cannot account for itself in terms of the 
oppositions created by the divided line. Plato is already 
involved in an undermining of the sensible/intelligible 
opposition presented in the Republic. 
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reinstate the opposition within metaphysics in a new way. 
one Kant commentator, Norman Kemp Smith, believes the war is 
being waged between rationalism and empiricism. 28 Smith 
reads Kant as equating scepticism and empiricism, and Smith 
derives from this that scepticism is empirical and 
irrational. This is not what Kant says. Kant understands the 
struggle as a war being waged between dogmatism and 
scepticism (Aix}. On the one side, dogmatism represents a 
"despotic" rule, where the dogmatist governs without 
providing a guideline by which to rule (Aix}. Without the 
guidelines, a capriciousness arises within dogmatism, since 
the dogmatist cannot necessarily ground his/her right to 
rule. Without the ground, this capriciousness gives rise to 
a conflict within dogmatism itself. Different parties arise 
that wish to rule, and numerous ungrounded principles arise. 
The ungrounded play of dogmatism gives rise to 
28 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to 'Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason', 3rd ed., (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1984), p. 14. Smith has Hume in mind when he 
describes scepticism, but he is wrong to call scepticism 
irrational. Scepticism exercises its rational capacity in 
order to show that judgment must be deferred in all cases 
where a ground cannot be substantiated. Unlike Smith, Kant 
sees scepticism as an ongoing force within metaphysics, and 
scepticism has been present since the inception of 
metaphysics. For Kant, Hume is only one instance of 
scepticism, but he is an important instance. 
For Smith to be consistent with his own equation of 
empiricism and scepticism, he would have to include Locke 
under scepticism. However, Kant does not regard Locke as a 
sceptic, but as a physiologist who tries to put an end to 
the war. In reference to Kant's discussion, Locke could be 
viewed as a dogmatist, who, having failed to provide the 
necessary ground for his solution to metaphysics, came under 
the scepticism of Hume. 
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scepticism. Kant understands the sceptic as a nomadic 
anarchist, who uses his/her logic against the ungrounded 
claims of the dogmatist in order to disrupt the pseudo-
order of the dogmatist (Aix). If the dogmatist is a creator 
of the state, the sceptic tries to open the city to the 
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wilderness. Kant views the dogmatists as having the upper 
hand, and yet Kant recognizes that the dogmatists can only 
maintain their rule through either self-imposed tyranny or 
sceptical apathy. 
Kant wants to end the war and institute peace into 
metaphysics by creating a constitutional monarchy. Kant 
wants to reestablish philosophy as the "Queen of all the 
sciences," but the reinstated queen cannot be dogmatic or 
the conflict continues (Aviii). Thus Kant must provide a 
ground for the queen's rule. In order to establish this 
,ground, Kant sets up a "tribunal" that establishes a 
29 One way the opposition between the outside and the 
inside arises within Kant's thought ls in terms of the city 
and the wilderness. Kant views philosophy as primarily being 
conducted inside the city, while the outside, the 
wilderness, is foreign to philosophy and needs to be 
incorporated into the city. For Kant, the wilderness needs 
to be domesticated or gentrified, and perhaps the Critique 
of Judgement provides the way the gentrification is to take 
place. 
Kant has a less ambivalent relationship to the city 
and country, or the inside and the outside, than Plato has. 
Plato has Socrates stand in different relationships to the 
city and the country in the dialogues. In the Phaedrus, 
Socrates gives speeches on beauty outside the city; in the 
Republic, Socrates philosophizes at the Piraeus, which is 
both outside and inside Athens; in the Apology, Socrates 
defends philosophy and is condemned to death within the 
city. Thus Plato sees the city as a problem to philosophy, 
even though Plato philosophizes inside and outside the city. 
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constitution and limits the queen's power (Axii). In this 
way, the queen becomes law-directed and loses her capricious 
character. Through the tribunal, Kant establishes an order 
of justice for the order of truth and puts an end to the war 
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of metaphysics. 
The war has resulted in a decentering of the ground of 
philosophy. The foundation has been exposed and shown to be 
in need of repair. By repairing the foundation, Kant 
recenters the basic paradigm of philosophy. If I reinsert 
Kant's references in place of the metaphors, then we can see 
that the queen is reason, the tribunal is a critique that 
repairs the foundation, and the critique is of pure reason. 
In other words, the critique investigates the application 
and limits of reason. 
In effect, Kant rethinks the paradigm of the 
opposition between the sensible and the intelligible worlds. 
In the CPR, Kant analyzes the limits of what is knowable and 
redefines the boundaries of the two spheres. As Kant shows 
in the results of the CPR, the subject matter of the 
intelligible world is not accessible to human knowledge, 
since the intelligible world transcends the limits of human 
reason. However, the sensible world remains open to our 
scrutiny and becomes the place of knowledge. 
30 The metaphor of war that Kant uses in his text is 
not innocent. Instead an interesting problem arises from 
Kant's use of the metaphor of war, viz., the idea of justice 
interceding for truth and of ethics preceding metaphysics. 
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If we view this analysis within the interpretative 
horizon of decentering/recentering, then we can see that 
Kant closes off the possibility of knowing what lies beyond 
the limits of experience. Where previous philosophers had 
interpreted the intelligible world as the most knowable 
sphere, Kant decenters the intelligible world by showing 
that the intelligible world is unknowable. Kant removes the 
intelligible world from its place of prominence in 
metaphysics, by showing that the subject does not have the 
ability to know anything about god, immortality and the 
world as a whole. In other words, Kant decenters the 
intelligible/sensible opposition as the opposition was 
handed down to him. So there is a closure of the 
intelligible realm in terms of knowledge, and the proper 
object of metaphysics becomes the sensible world. 
However, Kant does not eradicate the intelligible 
world. Kant shows that we do not have knowledge of 
intelligible things, but he reopens the intelligible world 
by placing the intelligible within a new interpretation. 
Kant redirects the focus of the intelligible world toward 
the sensible world. According to Kant, the subject has the 
ability to know sensible things but does not have the 
ability to know intelligible things. However, we can know 
sensible things because the intelligible realm supplies a 
structure and order to the sensible things. In other words, 
knowledge is not subject to the flux of the empirical realm 
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but is subject to an a priori structure. Thus Kant relegates 
knowledge to the sensible world, while keeping the order and 
structure of knowledge in the intelligible world. 
Kant finds other uses for the intelligible realm. 
Though our knowledge of the intelligible world is closed off 
from us, there are still regulative and practical uses of 
the ideas of pure reason. As Kant says, he "found it 
necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for 
faith" (Bxxx). Thus Kant reopens the door to the 
intelligible world, and recenters the sensible/intelligible 
opposition within a new ground. 
The Kantian recentered reinterpretation of the 
sensible/intelligible world is possible only because Kant 
institutes a new ground into metaphysical thought. Kant's 
idea of the Copernican revolution is an expression of the 
new ground Kant institutes in metaphysics. Just as 
Copernicus changed the place of the spectator in physics, 
Kant changed the place of the subject in metaphysics (Bxvi). 
Seeking the possibility of a priori knowledge, Kant saw that 
if our knowledge depended upon objects and had to "conform 
to the constitution of objects," then we could not have a 
priori knowledge (Bxvii). Things .in the empirical realm can 
always be different than the way they appear at the moment. 
Thus there would be no necessity to the things we know, if 
our knowledge of things arose from the mere receptivity of 
object. Hume exposed this radical possibility to Kant. 
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However, if the object had to conform to our faculties 
of intuition and conceptualization, then we could establish 
an a priori necessity and certainty regarding our knowledge 
of objects. The subject would be the one determining the 
object in terms of his/her own power, and the subject would 
be the ground of the possibility of all knowledge. This is 
precisely the turn, or revolution, Kant performs. Kant 
realizes that our knowledge of an object is always of the 
representation of the object and not of the object itself. 
If the power of representation is within the subject, then 
this power makes the representation of the thing possible 
and is prior to any empirical experience of the thing. So 
the question arises: how are these representations possible? 
The province of metaphysics has to do with the 
possibility of experience and with the possibility of the 
objects of experience. In other words, metaphysics is a 
transcendental investigation. Empirical experience yields 
judgments of specific things, but experience does not yield 
their conditions of possibility. Nonetheless, we do make 
judgments about experience and these judgments are 
synthetic, since the predicate in the judgment amplifies our 
knowledge of the subject beyond what the concept of the 
subject has within its definition. I make apophantical 
judgments constantly. But the fact that I can make empirical 
judgments, for example, 'the grass is green,' or 'if there 
is lightning, then there is thunder, 1 does not explain how I 
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make these judgments. Kant wants to discover how we can make 
these judgments, and how we account for the necessity of 
these judgments. Due to the lack of necessity in empirical 
apophantical judgments, they are not the proper object of 
metaphysical inquiry. Thus the proper subject matter of 
metaphysics must be intelligible, since the ground cannot be 
located within empirical experience. 
Besides empirical judgments, there are a priori 
judgments. One type of a priori judgment is what Kant calls 
analytic judgments. Analytic judgments are "explicative,'' 
not "ampliative" (A7, Bll). In an analytic a priori 
judgment, there is no amplification of knowledge beyond the 
subject of the judgment. In other words, the predicate of 
the analytic judgment shows what is already contained in the 
subject term, and the subject term of an analytic judgment 
can be the concept either of an empirical thing or of an 
intelligible thing. The following propositions are examples 
of analytic judgments: 'for every cause, there is an 
effect,' 'cogito ergo sum, 1 'a bachelor is an unmarried 
male,' 'a body is an extended thing,' and 'a triangle is a 
plane figure with three angles.' In all of these judgments, 
the predicate term expresses merely what is contained within 
the subject term. The only criterion needed to examine an 
analytic judgment is the principle of non-contradiction. For 
example, If I said a body is a non-extended thing, then this 
statement would be contradictory with the established 
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concept of a body, since a body cannot be both extended and 
non-extended. 
Analytic judgments were traditionally the basic 
objects of study in metaphysics, and correspondingly the 
principle of Identity and the Principle of Non-contradiction 
became the basic principles of metaphysics. Without 
specifically discussing analytic judgments, Aristotle sets 
up the Principle of Non-contradiction as the basic principle 
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of metaphysics. In Meditations on First Philosophy, 
Descartes derives analytic judgments from the clear and 
distinct ideas of the res cogitans and the res extensa. He 
goes on from there to use these judgments within his act of 
regrounding metaphysics. From the distinction between the 
cogito and bodies, Descartes sees himself as being able to 
prove the existence of god and the reality of the external 
world. 
Kant saw a problem with analytic judgments. While it 
is true that a priori analytic judgments do yield necessity, 
they do not show how disparate concepts can be connected 
with each other, i.e, they do not expand our knowledge 
beyond what is given in the subject term. Thus from the 
analytic definition of a body, I cannot derive the concept 
of color. Nonetheless, I see color in my experience of 
bodies and I expect color to appear in a body necessarily. 
Thunder is not an analytic constituent of lightning. Yet I 
31 See Book 4 of Aristotle's Metaphysics. 
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connect lightning and thunder in my experience, and I go so 
far as to connect them necessarily. From these examples we 
can see that empirical judgments are ampliative, but I 
cannot derive necessity from experience. Analytic judgments 
provide necessity, but I cannot expand my knowledge beyond 
what is already contained in the subject term. So I derive 
the necessity of the connection of disparate things neither 
from experience nor from the analytic character of 
something. This leads Kant to conjecture that the proper 
object of metaphysics is something besides analytic and 
empirical judgments. 
For Kant, the proper study of metaphysics is a priori 
synthetic judgments. These judgments expand our knowledge, 
guarantee the necessity of the subject matter, and are not 
based in experience. An example will serve to illustrate the 
conception of an a priori synthetic judgment. If I strike a 
match, then I expect ignition to occur. What occurs in this 
context is that I perceive the match and the striker, but I 
do not perceive the cause of the ignition. According to 
Kant, I add the concept of causality to the event, and 
thereby expand my knowledge beyond what I perceive in the 
act. I do not empirically sense the cause, but I understand 
the act causally. What I posit with necessity is not the 
empirical material of the match and the striker, but the 
causal relationship that should occur between the two. I do 
not find the necessity in the concept of match, nor do I 
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find necessity in the concept of the striker, nor do I find 
the necessity of the causal interaction in the concept of 
causality itself. Instead I find the necessity in the fact 
that there is a law that relates the two things in an 
essential way. I expect a necessary sequence of before and 
after to happen. If the expectant empirical sequence fails 
and ignition does not occur, then I do not question the fact 
that causality is not present. Instead I find fault with the 
material, and I know that either the match or the striker is 
faulty. There is a necessity present to the way I regulate 
my experience. The fact that I understand something as 
necessary raises a question: how is it possible to 
understand an empirical act as causally necessary? 
This is the reason Kant investigates a priori 
synthetic judgments, so that he can see how our empirical 
judgments, our judgments about objects, possess the element 
of necessity. On the one hand, the element of necessity lies 
outside the sphere of the empirical. On the other hand, the 
element of necessity pertains to the empirical. The 
investigation of a priori synthetic judgments is the 
investigation of the principles that provide certainty to 
our experience. The investigation into a priori synthetic 
judgments that provide certainty to our experience is an 
investigation into the conditions of the possibility of 
experience. 
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Kant's tribunal, his critique of pure reason, is an 
investigation into the conditions of the possibility of ~ 
Eriori synthetic judgments. These are judgments which make 
knowledge possible, because they make experience itself 
possible. Further, since Kant understands our experience as 
being directed toward objects, the inquiry into the 
conditions of the possibility of experience is also an 
inquiry into the possibility of the objects of experience. 
Kant's analysis into the possibility of a priori synthetic 
knowledge is an investigation into the meaning of being we 
call objectivity. Thus the Kantian project is an ontological 
investigation. 
Kant shows the possibility of the a priori synthetic 
judgments through an investigation of our rational capacity 
in its connectedness with our sensibility. Sensibility 
becomes the limiting condition of reason for the finite 
subject, and the infringement of reason upon sensibility 
exposes reason's transgression. However, the issue of Kant's 
thought is not the fact that we are both sensible and 
rational entities. Kant accepts this fact without question. 
What is at stake in Kant's thought is the issue of 
connectedness, i.e., the way our sensible and rational 
components come together. In other words, Kant's issue is 
the problem of synthesis, and Kant's discussion of the 
imagination is the place synthesis arises. Imagination comes 
to play a key role in Kant's recentering of the 
sensible/intelligible opposition. We must see how Kant 
understands the imagination. 
C. THE EMPIRICAL IMAGINATION 
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In this section, I focus on Kant's empirical 
description of the imagination in Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. I explain the Kantian sense of 
anthropology, examine the Kantian conception of the 
empirical imagination, and discuss the relationship between 
the findings in the APP and the CPR. 
I am justified in using the APP in this section for 
three reasons. First, the APP has Kant's most complete 
investigation of the empirical imagination. Second, since 
Kant investigates the imagination in the A Deduction by 
moving from the empirical to the transcendental level, an 
. understanding of the imagination in its empirical employment 
will facilitate an understanding of the imagination in its 
transcendental employment in the CPR. Third, the way Kant 
presents the imagination in the APP poses a problem for 
Heidegger's claim that Kant recoiled from the imagination in 
the second edition of the CPR. The third reason requires an 
explanation. 
Heidegger claims that Kant's rewriting of the B 
Deduction is a movement away from the insights Kant had into 
the imagination in the A Deduction. If Heidegger's claim is 
justifiable, then Kant had to relinquish the insights he 
gained into the workings of the imagination. What lends 
credence to Heidegger's hypothesis is the fact that the 
detailed analysis of the imagination is lacking in the B 
Deduction. 
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Based upon the way I have set up the issue, 
Heidegger's claim can be brought into question if a text is 
found that shows the same insights at work in Kant's thought 
after the writing of the B edition of the CPR. This text is 
the APP. The APP is a series of lectures Kant had published 
in 1797. He had given the lectures for thirty years. This 
means that Kant began to give his lectures on anthropology 
before he published the CPR. He published the APP only after 
he was too old to lecture any longer. Some sections and 
insights of the investigation of the imagination in the APP 
parallel the investigation of the imagination in the first 
edition of the CPR. Further, Kant did not revise the APP in 
view of his revision of the CPR. I infer from this fact that 
Kant continued to maintain the same ideas about the 
imagination in the B edition as he had in the A edition of 
the CPR. If Kant maintained the same ideas of the 
imagination, then the question of why Kant reworked the 
deduction of the categories of the understanding needs to be 
raised. Did Kant back away from the imagination, as 
Heidegger states, or did Kant rewrite the deduction for 
other reasons? At this point, I have not proven anything 
either about Heidegger's hypothesis or about Kant's reason 
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for rewriting the B Deduction. However, I have brought 
Heidegger's hypothesis into question and suggested that the 
APP provides a clue for reexamining the B Deduction in a 
different way. 
For Kant, anthropology is an empirical investigation 
into the way human beings understand themselves and function 
within their world. As a study of entities, anthropology is 
an antic study. An anthropological study can investigate 
32 human beings either physiologically or pragmatically. In a 
physiological study, we would investigate neurophysiological 
and biological phenomenon that affect our interaction in the 
world. In other words, a physiological study is study of the 
natural causes of human interaction in the world of 
experience. In Kant's time, this was a very speculative 
study and remains so today. We have more information 
regarding the workings of the brain than Kant had, and yet 
we are not even sure today how to interpret the data we have 
regarding brain interaction and human events. Even in our 
contemporary times, we possess very little knowledge about 
the way the brain operates. 
Instead of speculating on physiological anthropology, 
Kant focuses primarily upon what he calls pragmatic 
anthropology. This is a study of the way human beings 
respond and act within their world. In other words, a 
32 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View, trans. Mary .J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1974) I P• 3. 
pragmatic study investigates the effects we cause as 11 free 
agents. 1133 As free beings, we never experience our causal 
power, since causality is not an empirical event. 
Nonetheless, I can experience and study the effects I 
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produce in the world. A pragmatic anthropology investigates 
precisely this phenomenon. Furthermore, Kant deals with 
anthropology pragmatically because an anthropological 
understanding should instruct us on how to be better 
persons, since we come to an empirical understanding of 
ourselves and others. 
Kant distinguishes anthropology from logic and 
psychology. The three disciplines investigate the self, but 
they investigate the self in different ways. Logic is an 
investigation into apperception and supplies rules for the 
employment of the understanding. Psychology studies the 
province of inner sense and provides an empirical 
understanding of the way we apprehend ourselves. Logic and 
psychology provide a basis for anthropology, because the 
understanding and inner sense have their effects in the 
world. However, they are not the thematic investigation of 
study in anthropology, since they do not involve an 
empirical study of ourselves in the world. In an 
anthropological study, we must presuppose the findings of 
logic and psychology. 
33 APP I p. 3. 
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Kant divides the APP into two main parts, the 
Anthropological Didactic and the Anthropological 
characteristic. The Didactic deals with the ways in which 
the cognitive faculty, the appetitive faculty and the 
feelings of pleasure and pain pragmatically affect ourselves 
and the world. The Anthropological Characteristic considers 
empirical notions of the way we understand ourselves and 
others in terms of personhood, sex, ethnicity, race, and 
species. Since the imagination arises in the Didactic, I 
focus on the analysis there. 
The first part of the Didactic is a study into the 
faculty of cognition, and Kant begins the Didactic with an 
anthropological examination of self-consciousness. In other 
words, Kant's begins the APP with the essence of the human 
being by distinguishing us from entities that only possess 
consciousness, viz., animals. From the analysis of self-
consciousness, Kant proceeds in his investigation to the 
possibility of self-observation, to the conception of ideas, 
to our passive power of sensibility, to the exterior senses, 
to inner sense, to sense impressions, to problems with the 
senses, to imagination and finally to cognition. In almost 
all of these studies, Kant focuses on the experiential 
characteristics of the cognitive faculties. At no point does 
Kant try to justify this beginning. Since the anthropology 
is an ontic investigation, Kant avoids transcendental 
discussions. Instead he takes the beginning as being self-
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evident and uses his transcendental philosophy, i.e., his 
understanding of the being of the subject, as a general 
guide for these lectures. 
The presupposition behind Kant's anthropological 
investigation is that an understanding of the self is a 
prerequisite for the understanding of our involvement and 
others' involvement in the world. We see this understanding 
emerge at the beginning of the APP , when Kant seeks the 
generation of self-consciousness within our empirical 
experience. For example, after stating that self-
consciousness constitutes our personhood and ranks us above 
entities without reason, Kant speaks about the child's 
growing awareness of selfhood and the onset of selfishness. 
As the child becomes aware of her/himself, the child becomes 
a 11 little dictator," and attempts to rule the world 
34 
. tyrannically. The child's awareness of his/her own 
selfhood brings with it an understanding of the world and 
frames the child's experience. 
In the APP, Kant assigns the imagination to the realm 
of sensibility and groups the imagination with the exterior 
and interior senses. There are five exterior senses and only 
one interior sense. Kant calls the interior sense self-
affection. The imagination and sensibility are similar 
because both powers involve the presentation of an object. 
However the mode of presentation is different for the 
34 APP, p.10. 
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imagination and sensibility. Our senses are capable of 
representing a particular object present to us at any given 
moment, as long as I am present to the object. I must be 
alongside of the object, if I am going to represent the 
object sensibly. Our sensible capacities are merely 
receptive of a given object, regardless of whether the 
object is exterior or interior to us. 
The mode of presentation for the imagination is 
different from the mode of presentation for sensibility, 
because the imagination can represent an object that is not 
present to the subject at the given moment. In other words, 
the imagination is capable of representing an object in the 
absence of the object. The imagination is not creative of 
the presentation ex nihilo. The senses underlie the 
imagination and provide the material for the imagination. 
The imagination would not function without sensibility. 
However, the power of the imagination extends beyond the 
receptive power of sensibility. The imagination is not 
simply receptive but is recollective. Thus the imagination 
can recall sensible objects without the presence of the 
object, and imagination can play with the recollected 
representations by connecting different impressions and 
creating phantastic images. 
According to Kant, sense and imagination are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for experience. Kant defines 
experience, or empirical knowledge, as the connection of 
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empirical intuition "with the concept of the object". 35 
Experiential knowledge requires a cognitive and a sensible 
element. Our sensibility must be supplemented by our 
capacity for understanding. Thus there is both a passive and 
an active component to the subject that allows for knowledge 
to occur. 
In the APP, Kant relates the discussion of the 
constitution of experience to the roles of inner sense and 
apperception. Both inner sense and apperception are modes of 
consciousness. We apprehend ourselves as we appear to 
ourselves within inner sense, and we grant unity to our 
experience within apperception. In self-apprehension, we do 
not understand ourselves as a unity. As a matter of fact, we 
do not understand ourselves at all in this condition. In 
inner sense, we gather receptively the manifold of intuition 
and hold the manifold together. Further we have an 
appearance of ourselves that is successively given and 
simultaneously held together. Apperception has no content. 
If the experience is going to possess any unity, then 
apperception must accompany any representation I have. Kant 
points out that this description does not belong to an 
anthropological investigation. Instead the discussion of 
knowledge belongs to a metaphysical investigation. However, 
Kant's investigation of the faculties of the subject call 
35 APP, p.44. 
for this brief aside in the APP, so that inner sense and 
apperception can be distinguished from each other. 
In this discussion of knowledge, Kant omits an 
investigation of the imagination. He omits this discussion 
because the issue would take him well beyond the sphere of 
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anthropology. Nonetheless a problem arises that Kant defers, 
viz., the problem of how understanding and sensibility come 
together. I postpone the discussion of the imagination and 
its connection to knowledge until we look at the CPR. 
However, the discussions of the imagination that follow in 
the APP allude to the issue of synthesis. 
In the section of the APP devoted to the imagination, 
Kant states that the imagination can be "either productive 
or reproductive. 1136 Reproductive imagination is simply the 
ability to recollect an "empirical intuition," while the 
productive imagination is "a capacity for the original 
presentation" of the object which is prior to the experience 
of the object. 37 The reproductive imagination recollects 
objects in their absence. This is easy to exemplify. I can 
form the image of an apple without having an apple in front 
of me, because I have perceived apples during my lifetime. 
We can reproduce images for anything we have perceived. 
36 APP, p.44. 
37 Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Anthropologie, 
Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Padagogik, herausgegeben 
Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 
p.466. I have translated this section from the German. 
having defined the productive imagination, Kant gives his 
example of an original presentation in productive 
imagination. Original presentations in productive 
imagination are the "pure intuitions of space and time." 38 
Kant does not justify this claim and omits a discussion of 
how the pure intuitions of space and time are original 
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presentations of the imagination. He defers the metaphysical 
discussion and presupposes the findings of the CPR in this 
text. The omission of the transcendental discussion is due 
to the limits of the anthropological context in which Kant 
is working. The interesting point to raise here is that 
space and time are original exhibitions of the presentation 
of the object for the subject, and they are not part of the 
senses but rather belong to the imagination. The implication 
is that space and time are pure images, but Kant does not 
develop this implication. 3g 
I contend that Kant is not clear in his discussion of 
productive imagination in the APP, and this is very 
uncharacteristic of Kant. Kant is usually very careful in 
drawing distinctions between the phenomena he is 
investigating. However, Kant introduces two senses of 
productive imagination in the APP without clearly 
38 APP, p.44. 
3s On the one hand, the idea of space and time as 
products of the imagination gives support to Heidegger's 
thesis of the connection between time and imagination. On 
the other hand, his hypothesis of the recoil in the second 
edition loses some of its power. 
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productive imagination in the APP without clearly 
distingu1sh1ng between them. On the one hand we are given a 
view of the productive imagination in its transcendental 
capacity, i.e., we see time and space as pure intuitions and 
original exhibitions of the productive imagination. On the 
other hand Kant discusses the productive imagination in an 
empirical manner, i.e., the productive imagination employs 
the material of sensibility and is creative of images. Kant 
should have used different designations for the two 
40 different employments of the productive imagination. 
Kant understands the empirical, productive imagination 
as a pichtungsvermogen, i.e., a capacity for creating and 
manipulating images. 41 The entire investigation is on the 
empirical invention cf images. Under this designation of the 
empirically productive imagination, Kant examines 
. experiences of genius, fanaticism, the image of man as the 
rational being, the use of the imagination in place of a 
40 I can only speculate on the reason Kant did not give 
two designations to the productive imagination. One thought 
that comes to mind is that Kant was caught in the idea of 
poiesis. In empirical productive imagination, I can make new 
images because I connect images I possess in new ways. We 
have an original/copy opposition at work. The new image is 
only a result of images which are copies of original things. 
In transcendental imagination, this idea begins to break 
down. There are no originals from which we can make copies. 
So can we talk about the act as an act of production? 
Perhaps Kant was not able to think this idea, since his own 
idea of the finite was only comprehensible in reference to 
the infinite. 
41 Anthropologie, p.466. 
42 loss of one of the senses, fantasy, dreams and madness. 
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For the most part, Kant examines the empirical use of 
productive imagination. However one section of the APP 
deserves special attention, since this section has 
ramifications for the CPR. The German title of the section 
in the APP is "Von dem Sinnlichen Dichtungsvermogen nach 
seine Verschieden Arten. 11 In this section, Kant describes 
three modes of the imagination's ability to connect and 
construct representations. Through the imagination, our 
sensible capacity can form intuitions in space, associate 
intuitions in time, and connect representations with one 
another due to their affinity. The specific discussions of 
these uses of the imagination are anthropological, and do 
not constitute anything new regarding the imagination in its 
basic determinations. In fact, the anthropological 
discussions of the imagination are reminiscent of Hume's 
discussion of the imagination's ability to reproduce images 
that resemble things, to hold things as being contiguous, 
and to associate disparate events. However, there are two 
issues that arise in this context. 
The first issue concerns something I said previously. 
The three uses Kant describes of the empirical imagination 
involve the apprehension, reproduction and recognition of 
representations. These three designations of the imagination 
42 Note that Kant places madness within the imagination 
and not within reason. 
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are precisely what Kant used to describe the reproductive 
imagination in the first edition deduction of the CPR. I 
find this connection between the two texts to be important 
because of the time factor involved in the publication of 
the CPR and the publication of the APP. Kant began the 
lectures of the APP while working on the CPR. Thirty years 
later, after the republication of the CPR, and after Kant 
totally reworked the deduction of the categories, Kant does 
not bother to revise the section on the imagination in the 
APP. It is true that the actual empirical investigation of 
the imagination as Dichtstungvermogen does not specifically 
pertain to the CPR. Yet Kant maintains the same functions of 
the imagination in his anthropology as he does in the A 
Deduction, and Kant maintains the imagination's connection 
to time. There is an analogy between the two texts, and Kant 
does not back away from his idea that time and imagination 
belong together. 
The second issue concerns the section Kant devotes to 
the affinity of representations. The section on affinity 
deserves some attention, since it bears upon both 
Heidegger's and Kant's analyses of the imagination. In the 
APP, Kant defines affinity as "the unification of the 
manifold out of the origin from one ground. 1143 In affinity 
we unify what we have associated and hold it together, so 
that we can bring together different representations. We see 
43 Anthropologie, p.479. My translation. 
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how different representations contain a common descent. 44 
Through an affinity of representations, what we have 
associated is subject to a rule of the understanding and 
prevents our experience from becoming haphazard. Kant says 
he borrows the meaning of the word affinity, Verwandschaft, 
from chemistry. In chemistry, an affinity results when two 
different elements bond together to make a new molecule. For 
example, there is an affinity between hydrogen and oxygen 
when they bond together and form water. Kant likens this to 
the affinity between sensibility and understanding. These 
two capacities of the subject are "dissimilar elements, 11 and 
yet their content binds together to make experience 
possible. 45 Kant says that this intimate bonding, or 
affinity, seems to originate from a 11 common root." 46 Kant 
does not discount this possibility, but he says he cannot 
understand how two heterogeneous elements can arise from a 
common root. So he leaves behind the speculation on the 
common root. Nonetheless, the issue of the common root 
arises in the section on the synthesis of the imagination 
that makes affinity possible. At this point in time, Kant is 
still wondering how the content of sensibility and 
understanding are unified. The i~sue of the imagination as 
the power of synthesis is still very present to Kant and 
44 The word Kant uses in this context is Abstammung. 
45 APP I p. 53. 
46 APP I p. 53. 
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remains unresolved late in Kant's life. Let us now turn to 
Kant's transcendental attempts to resolve the connectedness 
of sensibility and understanding. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE IMAGINATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
My main purpose in this chapter is to examine the 
ontological priority of the transcendental imagination in 
Kant's metaphysics. Since Kant sees the fundamental project 
of metaphysics as the establishment of synthetic a priori 
judgments, the act of synthesis has a particular place of 
importance in Kantian metaphysics. Imagination is the 
subject's capacity for synthesis. I argue that the 
imagination is the constituent factor for the possibility of 
synthetic a priori knowledge, and I show that the 
transcendental imagination makes an understanding of being 
possible. 
I concentrate on the areas in the CPR where the basic 
character of the imagination arises, i.e., I concentrate on 
the deductions of the categories of the understanding. 
Through an analysis of the imagination in the metaphysical 
and transcendental deductions of the CPR, I show how Kant's 
understanding of the synthetic function of the imagination 
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10 
exposes the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, and 
thus exposes an understanding of being. 
I am not focusing on the Schematism of the 
understanding. 47 Unlike the Schematism, which is an 
investigation into the possible temporal modes of 
categorical employment, the deductions are Kant's arguments 
for establishing the validity of the sensible employment of 
the categories of the understanding. In other words, the 
deductions are an investigation into the possibility of 
metaphysics itself, and the findings of the deduction make 
possible a discussion of the schematization of the 
categories. Where the Schematism shows how the categories 
are employable, the deductions show that the categories are 
employable. Kant predicates the Wie-sein upon the Dass-
sein. 
An investigation into the deductions of the categories 
presents a particular problem not found anywhere else in the 
CPR. The problem is that Kant completely rewrote the 
47 See pages 4 - 5 of my dissertation for a further 
discussion of the reason I do not examine the Schematism. 
Nonetheless, the Schematism is an interestipg and key 
chapter of the CPR. Allison claims rightly that Kant 
justifies the possibility of synthetic judgments in the 
Schematism, since schemata show how the categories are made 
sensible through the imagination. Thus the possibility of 
schematization belongs to the imagination and not to the 
understanding. The title "Schematism of the Pure 
Understanding" is misleading, since schematization is 
something the understanding undergoes and is not a property 
of the understanding. See Henry Allison, Kant's · 
Transcendental Idealism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983). 
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transcendental deduction~ in the second edition of the CPR. 
There are different wayc to deal with the problem of the twc 
deductions. I can: 1. concentrate on the A edition deduction 
and disregard the B edition deduction; 2. concentrate on the 
B edition deduction and disregard the A edition deduction; 
or 3. concentrate en both the A and B edition deductions. I 
am going to concentrate on both the A and B edition 
deductions for the following reason: I want to show the 
imagination does not lose its ontological priority in the 
second edition. So I am taking issue with Heidegger's claim 
of the Kantian recoil from the imagination in the B 
Deduction. Further, I want to explore the differences 
between the two deductions to see why Kant rewrote the 
deductions. I argue that Kant could not write the B 
Deduction without having the findings of the A Deduction 
before him. 48 
I divide my investigation cf the imagination in the 
deductions into three sections, taking as my clue the way 
Kant conducted his investigations. First I examine Kant's 
metaphysical deduction of the categories, since this is the 
first place the imagination arises in the CPR. In this 
section, we must come to understand both the role of the 
metaphysical deduction and the place of the imagination 
48 This argument of "A before B" would be trivial if I 
were only referring to an empirical fact. Instead, I will 
argue that without the foundation Kant laid in the A 
edition, the B deduction would not have been possible. 
within the metaphysical deduction. In this section, I also 
explain Kant's understanding of logic. 
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Second I examine the first edition transcendental 
deduction cf the categories. I argue that we can and should 
understand the A Deduction as a phenomenological 
investigation into the employment of the categories of the 
understanding. Kant's investigation of the synthetic 
character of the imagination shows hew the transcendental 
syntheses are always already operative within different 
modes cf empirical syntheses. Thus Kant shows how we must 
sight a sense of the a priori character of the capacities 
fer knowledge within experience. In other words, there is a 
sighting of essence within existence in the A Deduction. In 
order to understand the phenomenological character of the A 
Deduction, we must come to understand the relationship Kant 
describes between the imagination and the understanding. 
Moreover, since Kant rewrote the transcendental deduction, I 
discuss the problems the A Deduction raises fer Kant's 
understanding of his metaphysical project. 
Third I examine the transcendental deduction of the 
second edition of the CPR. The B Deduction does not 
stylistically resemble the A Deduction, and thus the B 
Deduction does not have the phenomenological character of 
the A Deduction. Instead, the B Deduction has a strict 
transcendental character in the Kantian sense, i.e., the B 
Deduction begins from the essence of the understanding and 
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descends to the employment of understanding. There is no 
empirical admixture in the B Deduction, as there is in the A 
Deduction. Through an examination of the argument of the B 
Deduction, I want to see how the B Deduction differs from 
the A Deduction, how the imagination arises in the B 
Deduction, how the imagination does not lose its place of 
priority in Kant's project, and how the A Deduction 
underlies the B Deduction. 
B. THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION 
In this section, I investigate Kant's introductory 
comments on logic and the metaphysical deduction of the 
categories. These are the sections of the CPR p.receding the 
transcendental deduction. Since Kant raises the issue of the 
imagination in this section of the CPR, I concentrate 
primarily upon an examination of the metaphysical deduction. 
However, the metaphysical deduction is nonsensical without 
an understanding of Kant's conception of logic. So I examine 
first the Kantian conception of logic and second the 
metaphysical deduction. 
In order to understand the Kantian conception of 
logic, we must understand how Kant partitions the CPR. The 
basic division of the CPR is between the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements and the Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method. 49 The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements has two 
subsections, the Transcendental Aesthetic and the 
Transcendental Logic. Kant derives the division of the 
Doctrine of Elements into Aesthetic and Logic from the two 
basic stems of knowledge, viz., sensibility and cognition. 
The basis for this division lies in the paradigm of the 
divided line and the division between the sensible-
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/intelligible worlds. Kant's reappropriation of the divided 
line represents the sensible/intelligible realms in terms of 
the faculties of representation within the subject. In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant investigates the pure, ~ 
priori sources of sensible reception. These two sources are 
the pure intuitions of space and time, and Kant grants a 
priority to time over space in his investigation. The 
discussion of the intuitions occupy our attention in the 
section on Heidegger's retrieval of the imagination, and so 
I defer this discussion for now. 
Kant divides the Transcendental Logic into the 
Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. In 
the Transcendental Analytic, Kant investigates the proper 
employment of our intellect. In this investigation, he shows 
how the understanding provides unity to our experience and 
that the proper destination of the understanding lies in its 
49 Kant's discussions of methodology are fascinating, 
but they do not pertain to my project. So I will not 
investigate the Doctrine of Method. I will instead 
concentrate on the Doctrine of Elements. 
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directedness toward sensibility. In the Transcendental 
Dialectic, Kant investigates the improper employment of our 
intellect. In this investigation, Kant shows how reason 
possesses a natural tendency to transgress its limits and 
cross over into sensibility. In the Dialectic, we come to 
understand that we must curb our insatiable appetite for 
what we cannot know, and we learn recollectively the proper 
employment of the intellect. 
There is an ambiguity in Kant's thought regarding the 
place of the imagination. The imagination does not occupy a 
separate place in the CPR. In essence, the imagination did 
not occupy a separate place in the APP. However, the 
placement of the imagination exposes a difference between 
the APP and CPR. In the APP, Kant assigned the imagination 
to the sphere of sensibility, since both the senses and the 
imagination involved a presentation of the object. Then 
Kant's discussion of the empirical role of the understanding 
followed upon his investigation of the imagination. Kant 
does not change the stems of knowledge in the CPR, but he 
does shift the locus of the imagination to the section 
involving the understanding. As opposed to pis analysis in 
the APP, Kant does not examine the imagination under the 
province of sensibility. Even though Kant referred to the 
pure intuitions of space and time as original presentations 
of the productive imagination in the APP, the imagination 
does not arise in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Instead the 
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imagination appears in the Transcendental Logic. 
particularly, Kant investigates the imagination in the 
sections of the Logic called the Analytic of Concepts and 
the Analytic of Principles. Thus Kant treats the 
metaphysical conception of the imagination within the 
confines of the understanding and not within the confines of 
sensibility, as he had done in his anthropological studies. 
This shift suggests a certain ambiguity on Kant's part 
regarding the locus of the imagination. If Kant understands 
sensibility as a receptive capacity of representation and 
understanding as a spontaneous capacity for unifying 
sensibly given representations, then the Kantian ambiguity 
suggests that the imagination has both a receptive and 
spontaneous character. We must come to understand the 
ambiguity. In order to understand this, we must analyze the 
imagination in the Transcendental Analytic, which we do when 
we come to the deductions. 
Kant had an uncanny ability for analysis. At the 
beginning of any new section of the CPR, Kant saw the need 
to demarcate what he was investigating. He would 
painstakingly map out his territory. I have already shown 
Kant's basic division of the territory in the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements, viz., the division between the 
sensible and the intelligible. The division occurs within 
the subject itself. According to the psychology of Kant's 
time, Kant conceived of the subject as possessing certain 
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capacities, and a particular employment of these capacities 
was the proper object of study in metaphysics. Kant called 
the proper employment of these capacities transcendental, 
and Kant saw that the transcendental employment of the 
faculties made their empirical employment possible. 
In a transcendental analysis, the empirical employment 
of the faculty cannot serve as the basis of the 
transcendental employment. The reason for this is simple. If 
you are going to determine the being of entities, you cannot 
speak about the entities until you determine their being. 
Since the empirical employment of our capacities is oriented 
toward entities, we must disregard this employment when 
conducting a metaphysical investigation. Instead we must 
focus on the condition of the possibility of the entities, 
i.e., their being. 
Having already investigated the pure intuitions of 
space and time as the a priori conditions of sensibility in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant begins to investigate our 
cognitive faculty. He performs this investigation under the 
heading of Transcendental Logic. Kant wants to understand 
what transcendental logic is. The term logic is a class 
term, or a genus, and the genus of logic contains more than 
transcendental logic. So Kant begins to analyze the class of 
logic in order to see what properly constitutes 
transcendental logic and how transcendental logic is 
different from other modes of logic. 
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The introduction to the Transcendental Logic is an 
analysis of logic. Kant begins this section by repeating the 
fact that knowledge originates out of "two primordial 
sources of, the mind," viz. , sensi bi 1 i ty and understanding 
(A50,B74). Sensibility is our "capacity for receiving 
representations," while the understanding is the mind's 
spontaneous power of "producing representations from itself" 
(A51,B76). If understanding and sensibility did not come 
together, we would have no knowledge. In the Aesthetic, Kant 
was able to determine the rules for sensibility by 
reflecting upon our transcendental intuition. In the Logic, 
Kant determines the rules for cognition by reflecting upon 
the understanding. As different sources of representation, 
the two capacities have their own science, or determinative 
area of study (A52,B76). 
Having stated that we study the understanding under 
logic, Kant divides logic according to its use. Since logic 
provides the rules for the understanding, logic has both a 
particular and a general employment. Logic can either 
provide the rules for a particular domain of study or 
provide the rules for thought in general. We can call the 
rules for the particular employment of the understanding a 
50 
regional ontology. A regional ontology establishes the 
rules and method of a particular type of entity and its 
5° Kant does not use the term regional ontology, but I 
cannot see why he would mind the designation. 
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correlative science, so that studies can be conducted in 
this area. However the particular logic must presuppose for 
its foundation a general logic that establishes the rules of 
thought in general and has no particular domain of objects 
for its study. General Logic is an abstract, formal mode of 
thought that disregards all objects. 
Kant divides general logic into pure and applied 
general logic. Neither pure nor applied general logic deal 
with entities. In pure general logic, we study the basic 
rules and definitions of concepts, judgments and syllogisms. 
This study is formal and devoid of all material content. In 
applied general logic, we study how to correct our reasoning 
about concrete matters. In other words, we learn how to 
correct inferential error. Both modes of logic investigate 
the rules of correct concept, judgment and syllogism usage. 
However, pure general logic prescribes the rules in general, 
while applied general logic shows the empirical employment 
of the rules of pure logic. Only pure general logic is a 
"science", since it supplies the rules of thought and is a 
priori (A54,B78). 
I should point out here that Kant's modes of analysis 
can occur in three ways. Kant analyzes things in terms of 
their objects, in terms of their source of knowledge, and/or 
in terms of the direction of the knowledge. When we studied 
the APP, we saw how investigations can be divided according 
to the object of study. In the CPR, we can see the other two 
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modes of analysis. Kant separates sensibility and 
understanding according to the source of their knowledge. 
They are two distinct elements of knowledge. As Kant says, 
"the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think 
nothing" (A51,B75). Thus Kant treats them separately in the 
CPR. However, when Kant investigates the single topic, he 
separates the phenomenon in terms of its employment or 
direction. Kant analyzes logic according to its direction, 
and the analysis is always directed towards either 
distinguishing the pure from the empirical employment, or 
distinguishing the purely formal from the object-directed 
employment. So far in this discussion, we have seen the 
latter usage of analysis in the investigation of logic, 
i.e., how Kant has distinguished the pure and applied usages 
of logic. Further, whenever Kant makes a distinction between 
the pure and applied employment of a faculty in a 
metaphysical inquiry, he omits the applied employment and 
concentrates on the pure employment. 
Having determined that pure logic provides the formal 
rules for thought in general, Kant directs his attention 
away from applied logic towards the difference between pure 
general logic and transcendental logic. What distinguishes 
pure general logic from transcendental logic is not the 
pure/applied distinction, since neither mode of logic is 
empirical. Both general and transcendental logic are~ 
priori. Kant distinguishes the two by looking at their 
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direction. On the one hand, general logic provides only the 
rules for thought in general and has no content. For 
example, the rules of judgment formation are not content-
oriented. The rule that all categorical propositions must 
contain a quantifier, subject, copula and predicate has 
nothing to do with the content of the judgments. The rules 
of inference hold for all modes of reasoning regardless of 
the content of the propositions. On the other hand, 
transcendental logic is object-oriented, i.e., it is there 
to prescribe the rules for the cognition of objects. 
However, transcendental logic is not empirically directed, 
rather it is directed to the constitution of objects in 
general. Transcendental logic is a priori knowledge about 
both the type of representations that constitute the being 
of objects, i.e., their objectivity, and the employment of 
these representations. The representations that constitute 
the being of objects are the pure categories of the 
understanding, and the pure intuitions of space and time are 
the constitutive field of employment for the categories. 
According to Kant, transcendental logic is "a logic of 
truth" (A62,B87). However, if Kant understands truth as the 
correspondence of the thing and the intellect, and if 
transcendental logic is a priori and does not have any 
connection with empirical things, then how can 
transcendental logic be a logic of truth? Transcendental 
truth is not empirical truth, but it is the condition of 
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empirical truth. If empirical truth is the ''agreement of 
knowledge with its object," then transcendental logic 
establishes the conditions that make agreement possible. 
(A58,B82). Thus the criterion of truth within transcendental 
logic is not a criterion of correspondence. 
In general logic, we have a sense of a priori truth. 
The criterion of judging in general logic is the Principle 
of Non-contradiction, whereby we can judge something to be 
either true or false without the need of experience. The 
problem with general logic is that there is no amplification 
of knowledge beyond the subject term. We saw this in our 
discussion of analytic judgments. Further, general logic is 
merely formal in its operation and is indifferent to the 
content of its propositions. The Principle of Non-
contradiction provides a necessary condition for knowledge 
but not a sufficient condition. Since transcendental logic 
provides for the possibility of objects in general, its 
criterion of truth cannot simply be the Principle of Non-
contradiction. 
Transcendental logic must provide both an a priori 
condition for empirical truth and a sufficient condition for 
knowledge. The establishment of a priori synthetic judgments 
satisfies these conditions and shows how truth is possible. 
However, the type of truth found in transcendental logic is 
not the truth of entities. Transcendental logic shows how 
the correspondence of the thing and the intellect are 
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possible, but transcendental truth is not empirical truth. 
As a disclosure of what constitutes the thought of an object 
in general, the analysis of transcendental logic is a 
disclosure of being. As Kant says, knowledge cannot oppose 
the categories of the understanding and the principles of 
thought "without losing all content, that is, all 
relationship to any object, and therefore all truth" 
(A63,B87). Transcendental logic is Kant's understanding of 
51 the logos. 
The next section in the Transcendental Logic is the 
Transcendental Analytic. The first part of the 
Transcendental Analytic is an analysis of the understanding 
itself. Kant wants to determine what belongs to the 
understanding and how the understanding functions correctly. 
Kant investigates the content and function of the 
understanding through the use of deductions. By deduction, 
Kant is not referring to general logic and its process of 
syllogistic inference. Instead, Kant has in mind the legal 
meaning of deduction. This does not mean that Kant violates 
the rules of logic. Kant is extremely rigorous in his 
thought. This means that logical deduction is not what Kant 
51 Within the Transcendental Logic in the CPR, Kant 
also explains the difference between dialectical logic and 
transcendental dialectic. Dialectical logic deals with 
sophistical argumentation, while transcendental dialectic 
deals with extension of our knowledge beyond the limits of 
experience. Both logics are illusory and are in need of a 
critique. I insert this brief summary of dialectic only to 
finish Kant's discussion of logic. The content of the 
Dialectic is beyond the scope of this project. 
84 
has in mind when he uses the term deduction in the CPR. In 
Kant's time, the word deduction had a specifically legal use 
52 
as well as a logical use. We see this sense of deduction 
in the CPR itself, where Kant speaks about deduction in 
terms of "quid facti'' and "quid juris" (A84,B116). The 
former designates what belongs to a legal claim, while the 
later defends the claim. In other words, when a claim is in 
dispute regarding its legal right, deductions were written 
to justify the claim. Both claims of fact and claims of 
right require proof. I refer to the metaphysical deduction 
as the proof of fact and to the transcendental deduction as 
the proof of right. 
In the CPR, Kant does not specifically refer to the 
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metaphysical deduction in terms of quid fact!. However, 
the designation fits the metaphysical deduction for the 
following reason: the question of fact is the question of 
content. In other words, an answer to the question of fact 
reveals the contents of the legal claim. Once one knows what 
belongs to the claim, then he/she can broach the question of 
right. 
52 Dieter Henrich has written an illuminating article 
on this subject. See Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a 
Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart 
Forster (Stanford: Stanford University, 1989). 
53 In fact, Kant does not call the first section of the 
Analytic of Concepts in the Transcendental Analytic the 
metaphysical deduction until the second edition of the CPR 
(B159). However, since Kant is referring to the same section 
in both editions of the CPR, I will keep the designation. 
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Since a metaphysical deduction considers the quid 
facti, the metaphysical deduction shows what belongs 
properly to a faculty of the subject. Just as the 
metaphysical exposition reveals the a priori content of the 
pure intuitions, the metaphysical deduction reveals the ~ 
54 priori content of the understanding. Kant's purpose in the 
metaphysical deduction is to show that the categories of the 
understanding are the same as the logical functions of 
thought. The difference between the two lies in their 
employment. The logical functions of thought are not 
directed toward any specific content, while the categories 
are directed toward the pure intuitions of space and time. 
In the metaphysical deduction, Kant takes us down a 
path by offering us four Leitfaden. These four leads, or 
clues, enable us to find our way down the path and into the 
clearing. 55 The key to grasping the metaphysical deduction 
lies in grasping Kant's four clues that build consecutively 
upon one another. 
The first clue Kant offers us is the concept of unity. 
54 In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant discussed the 
metaphysical and transcendental expositions of the a priori 
intuitions of space and time. Expositions determine the 
correct content and employment of a concept. Kant considers 
the expositions of space and time to be the deductions of 
space and time (A87,B119). 
55 I have continued to translate Leitfaden as clues, 
even though I think leads would be a better word than clues. 
Kant is leading us in the direction of finding the 
categories. Specifically, the four leads Kant offers are not 
clues. Metaphorically, the metaphysical deduction is not a 
detective story, rather it is a path. 
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According to Kant, metaphysics must proceed from a 
transcendental perspective and order everything "according 
to a single principle" (A67,B92). If metaphysics does not 
order everything according to a single principle, then there 
is neither necessity to the order of the metaphysician's 
findings nor necessity in the findings themselves. For Kant, 
Locke's analysis is an example of the haphazard character of 
the categories of the understanding. Locke was able to 
identify the categories, but he was not able to order them 
from a single principle, since he placed their origin within 
experience. As I have discussed, there is no necessity to 
empirical experience. 
If we are to proceed transcendentally, we must 
discover the principle that properly guides our 
systematization of the categories. Since we are already 
aware of a priori knowledge in logic and the pure 
intuitions, we can at least look for a transcendental 
condition for our understanding. We must only remember that 
the principle must supply a necessary unity to the system. 
Kant's second clue lies in his con~eption of judgment. 
We know that we are searching for unity, so. judgment must 
involve a sense of unity. Knowledge has two stems, intuition 
and understanding. Intuition, i.e., sensibility, is the 
affective mode of our being. We are able to be affected and 
receptive to matters of sense. Unlike intuition, the 
understanding acts discursively and represents conceptually. 
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gant considers conceptual representation to be a "function" 
of the understanding (A68,B93). For Kant, when the 
understanding functions, it takes up numerous 
representations into one representation and generates 
concepts. Concepts do not have specific use in and of 
themselves. We employ the concepts of our understanding in a 
specific way, that is, we use our concepts to make judgments 
about objects. Since concepts are the result of the 
gathering of representations into a unity and judgment is 
the employment of concepts, both concepts and judgments are 
"mediate" modes of representation and knowledge (A68,B93). 
Concepts do not refer immediately to representation of 
objects. Instead concepts refer to either intuitive 
representations or other mediated representations. Judgments 
connect concepts and yield knowledge of objects. For 
example, I can see a tree. I can also think "tree." My 
perception of the tree is only possible as long as I am 
present to the tree. I can have the thought of the tree 
without being present to the tree, and the concept of the 
tree is indifferent to any specific type of tree. So I have 
gathered numerous representations under the concept of tree. 
Nonetheless if I do not connect the mediated concept of tree 
with other concepts, I do not have any knowledge. I have 
knowledge only when I judge by means of concepts. When I say 
"the tree is a body," I connect two different concepts 
together and understand trees as being bodies. Since 
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understanding gives rise to concepts and judgments, and 
since concepts find their true employment in judgments, Kant 
calls the understanding the ''faculty of judgment" (A69,B94). 
An investigation of the conception of unity has led us 
to the conception of judgment, and we see that every concept 
the understanding can generate is usable in a judgment. Both 
concepts and judgments are modes of mediation. While the 
concept is a gathering of multiple intuitive representations 
into a unity, judgment is the connection of concepts to 
comprise knowledge. If understanding is the capacity for 
judgment, and if we can establish the basic modes of 
judgment, then Kant says we should be able to comprehend how 
the understanding functions. 
The third clue brings us to an understanding of the 
forms of judgment. Kant examines the basic, logical forms of 
judgment. The logical forms of judgment are known to anyone 
who has studied logic. Specifically the forms are the basic 
modes in which the understanding generates propositions. The 
logical forms of propositions lack content, i.e., they do 
not refer to particular objects. We can analyze the form of 
judgments and see what con~titutes their form in general. 56 
An analysis of judgment reveals four basic characteristics 
of judgment. First, every proposition must have a quantity. 
56 Scholars who claim that the Kantian forms of 
judgment are arbitrary do not understand Kant. The logical 
forms of judgment are not arbitrary, and Kant sees no need 
to explain them because they can be found in any 
Aristotelian logic text. 
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i.e., each proposition must be either universal, particular 
or singular. Second, every proposition must have a quality, 
i.e., each proposition must be either affirmative, negative 
or infinite. 57 Third, every proposition has a specific 
organized form. The organization occurs either in a 
categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive way (A70,B95). 
Fourth, every proposition has a truth-content, i.e., a 
proposition can express something probably, actually or 
necessarily. These are the basic forms of judgment, and all 
instances of particular propositions fit into these forms. 
Furthermore, these forms are the way the understanding 
provides unity to its representations regardless of the 
content of the proposition. In other words, we can derive an 
analytic unity from the forms of judgment. 
However, the fact that the forms of propositions are 
contentless creates a problem for a transcendental logic. 
The purpose of the Transcendental Logic is to show how the 
forms of judgment have an objective reference. The forms of 
judgment are the forms of the understanding. Unlike formal 
logic, we use the forms of our understanding in order to 
57 In the Logik, Kant discusses the quality of 
infinity. Simply, the quality of infinity incorporates both 
an affirmative and a negative quality into a proposition by 
the use of class complements. For example, I can obversely 
express the negative judgment 'No cats are dogs' as the 
infinite judgment 'All cats are non-dogs.' The infinite 
judgment expresses both class-exclusion, viz., that cats are 
not dogs, and class-inclusion, viz., that cats lie in the 
sphere of everything outside of the class of dogs. Schriften 
zur Metaphysik und Logik, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, 1977) Bd. VI, p.534. 
know things. If the modes of understanding are empty, we 
need something to make the forms of judgment correspond to 
sensibility. 
The final clue brings us to the problem of the 
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connection between understanding and sensibility, i.e., Kant 
leads us to the problem of synthesis. The element of 
synthesis completes the metaphysical deduction. There is no 
knowledge of objects, unless we can connect the forms of 
judgment with sensible representations. Understanding and 
sensibility are two different functions of the subject. The 
understanding performs spontaneously, while sensibility is 
receptive. Our sensibility can provide material for the 
understanding, but the senses understand nothing. The 
understanding unifies representations, but the understanding 
senses nothing. 58 In order to know something, I must be 
cognitively able to synthesize what is given sensibly to me. 
We are in need of a mode of synthesis to connect the forms 
of judgment and sensibility. 
58 Kant does suggest other modes of intuition and 
understanding. For example, both an understanding that 
intuits and a mode of intuition that is discursive are ways 
Kant describes god. What Kant calls intellectual intuition 
is truly beyond our powers of comprehension. I can conceive 
of the idea of intellectual intuition, but I cannot know it. 
In fact, we cannot even truly comprehend this possibility, 
since we describe intellectual intuition in terms of our own 
finite perspective. We are not primordially intuitive, i.e., 
we are not creative of objects. This is not our way of 
being. We are receptive intuitively of objects, and hence 
our mode of intuition is "derivative" (872). There is a 
sublime component to the idea of intellectual intuition that 
we can neither image nor comprehend. 
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As a mode of connection, synthesis is a gathering. In 
a general sense, Kant defines synthesis as "the act of 
putting different representations together, and of grasping 
what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge" 
(A77,Bl03). The general definition of synthesis makes 
reference to our two sources of representations. On the one 
hand, synthesis gathers different representations together 
and allows the representations to be unified. The material 
for synthesis comes from sensibility, and the unity given to 
the synthesis comes from the understanding. The material and 
the unification of the material can be either pure or 
empirical, and we can perform either a pure or an empirical 
synthesis. However, the main point of Kant's discussion of 
synthesis lies in his claim that knowledge is only possible 
through an act of synthesis. Without synthesis, there is no 
knowledge, i.e., there is no connection of the manifold of 
sensible representations with the conceptual unity provided 
by the understanding. Synthesis is the "first origin of our 
knowledge" (A78,B103). 59 
59 We must realize the radical nature of Kant's claim 
regarding synthesis. Synthesis makes knowledge possible and 
the entire Kantian project possible. Kant is analyzing the 
components of knowledge in the CPR. This analysis is 
possible only if synthesis is already present and operative. 
Synthesis precedes analysis, not vice versa. Kant's analysis 
in the CPR is not creative of the elements of knowledge. 
Kant's project is a description of the components of 
knowledge and their proper employment. Kant's analysis in 
the CPR is an attempt to wrest from the phenomenon of 
subjectivity the transcendental conditions that lie hidden 
within our own experience. Kant's project is 
phenomenological. 
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The subject's ability to synthesize disparate elements 
of knowledge lies within the imagination. 60 In other words, 
the imagination gathers what is given within sensibility and 
connects it to the understanding. Neither sensibility nor 
understanding synthesizes. The former receives 
representations, while the latter unifies representations. 
There is a strangeness to the imagination that the 
other capacities do not possess. I know what belongs to 
sensibility and understanding, viz., space, time and the 
functions of judgments. However the content of the 
imagination eludes us. I know that the imagination functions 
synthetically, but I do not know what the imagination 
contains. We know the imagination only through its synthetic 
effect. As Kant says, the imagination is "a blind but 
indispensable function of the soul, without which we should 
have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely 
ever conscious" (A78,B103). 
The synthesis performed by the imagination does not 
yield knowledge. In order to attain knowledge, the synthesis 
must be unified and ordered according to a single principle. 
The function of unification belongs to the understanding. We 
have three factors at work in the attainment of knowledge 
60 The connection between the imagination and synthesis 
is not originally Kant's idea. The importance of the 
imagination for knowledge arises within empiricism, 
particularly Hume. Hume had made the connection between 
synthesis and imagination prior to Kant. However, Hume's 
analysis remained within the empirical realm, while Kant's 
analysis moved into the transcendental realm. 
that correspond to three different operations. Intuition 
corresponds to reception, imagination corresponds to 
synthesis, and understanding corresponds to unity. 
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Within transcendental logic, we synthesize the content 
of the understanding and sensibility in an a priori manner. 
In the act of synthesis, the understanding does not change 
its content. As the functions of judgment unify different 
representations "under one concept," the same functions of 
judgment provide unity to the manifold of intuition when the 
manifold is synthesized (A78, B104). When the functions of 
judgment apply to sensibility, Kant calls the functions of 
judgment the categories of the understanding. 
Kant has presented the following steps in the 
metaphysical deduction. First, we recognized that 
transcendental philosophy must seek a single principle as 
its starting point. The starting point is a unified 
principle. Thus we realize that knowledge requires unity. 
Second, the understanding unifies through judgment. Third, 
there are basic modes of unity that are essential for the 
creation of any type of judgment. Within general logic, the 
functions of unity in judgment abstract from all content and 
show how an analytical unity of ~epresentations is possible. 
Fourth, the content of the understanding and sensibility 
must be synthesized in order for knowledge to be possible. 
Furthermore, synthesis precedes analysis. So we base the 
analytic unity provided in general logic upon a synthetic 
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unity. The synthetic unity results when the imagination 
synthesizes the functions of judgment and the pure 
intuitions. Through the synthesis, the understanding can 
apply its forms of unity to a sensible content. In this way, 
the forms of judgment attain an objective reference. Kant 
refers to the objective functions of judgment as the 
categories of the understanding. 
At this point, the question of quid facti has been 
answered. We have seen the content of the understanding and 
have arrived at the categories of the understanding. 
However, the question of quid juris has not been answered. 
The valid employment of the categories has not been 
addressed. Thus the need for the transcendental deduction 
arises. Kant's purpose in the transcendental deduction is to 
show how the subjective categories of the understanding 
obtain "objective validity" and thereby make experience 
possible (A89,B122). In other words, Kant is investigating 
how the intelligible realm interacts validly with the 
sensible realm. This purpose remains the same for both the A 
and B transcendental deduction, but Kant's mode of deduction 
differs in the two editions. In the metaphysical deduction, 
Kant has referred to the two basic elements that constitute 
the transcendental deductions. These elements are synthesis 
and unity. By emphasizing either synthesis or unity, Kant's 
approach to the deductions is different. In the A Deduction, 
the key element is synthesis, while in the B Deduction the 
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key element is unity. 
C. THE FIRST EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
In this section, I examine the A Deduction and see how 
Kant justifies the employment of the categories of the 
understanding. By Kant's own admission, the transcendental 
deduction is the most difficult investigation in the CPR. 
The key element that unravels the intricate web of the A 
Deduction is the Kantian conception of synthesis. Since 
synthesis is a function of the imagination, an understanding 
of the A Deduction requires an understanding of the 
imagination. 
Different Kant scholars have approached the deductions 
in different ways. For example, there are dialectical, 
epistemological and metaphysical interpretations of the 
deductions. I have found in my study of the A Deduction that 
the deduction resembles a phenomenological analysis. I 
contend that we can understand the A Deduction better if we 
regard Kant's analysis as a phenomenological investigation 
than if we regard the analysis as if it were an 
epistemological argument for justification. I do not contend 
that Kant understood the A Deduction as a phenomenological 
analysis. I only contend that we can achieve a better 
understanding of the deduction in this way. Kant's explicit 
intention in the CPR is not to present the A Deduction as a 
phenomenological analysis. This would be impossible, since 
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Kant did not have the elements of phenomenology at his 
disposal. However, this historical fact does not mean that a 
phenomenological reading is an incorrect reading. We can 
make the same claim about the epistemological reading of 
Kant prevalent in contemporary thought. Both an 
epistemological and phenomenological interpretation are 
foreign to Kant's explicit intention. Nonetheless, the 
epistemologists who interpret Kant contend that their 
studies shed light on Kant's thought. In the same spirit of 
understanding, I contend that a phenomenological reading of 
Kant's thought can provide us with an understanding of the A 
Deduction. 
While I believe that much can be learned from studying 
the epistemological investigations of Kantian philosophy, I 
am in disagreement with the basic idea of reading Kant as an 
epistemologist. Kant is not doing epistemology, i.e., Kant 
is neither trying to justify true belief nor is he arguing 
for contemporary versions of either idealism or realism. 
Kant is performing an ontological investigation in the CPR. 
By ontological investigation, I do not mean that Kant is 
arguing for the reality of objects. Instead, an ontological 
investigation is an analysis into the conditions that make 
experience possible. In Kant's sense, an analysis into the 
conditions of the possibility of experience is 
simultaneously an investigation into the "conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience" {A111). I base my 
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contention that we can understand the A Deduction as a 
phenomenological investigation upon the fact that the CPR is 
an ontological project. To show this, I proceed in the 
fellowing way: first I explain how I understand 
phenomenology; second I show how Kant's discussion of 
necessity and contingency allows us to understand the A 
Deduction as a phenomenological investigation; third I 
describe the structure of the A Deduction; and fourth I 
examine the content of the A Deduction by following through 
Kant's analysis of synthesis and imagination. 
In order to claim that we can understand the A 
Deduction in a phenomenological manner, I must explain how I 
understand the term phenomenology. Following Heidegger, 
phenomenology is not the mere description of entities. 
Instead, phenomenology is an investigation into the being of 
entities. If being is what lies concealed in any appearance 
of entities, then phenomenology tries to remove being from 
this concealment. Being is not something substantial that 
exists apart from entities. Instead being is the way we 
understand entities, and being "is in every case the being 
61 
of some entity." A specific understanding cf entities 
makes their appearance possible. 
An understanding of being is not primarily a cognitive 
comprehension. For the most part, an understanding of being 
61 BT, p.61. I am following Heidegger's view of 
phenomenology and not Husserl's view. 
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is pre-cognitive, i.e., pre-ontological. We are already in 
our world with entities and grasping entities as entities. I 
am never simply confronted with mere things. I exist with a 
sense of what something is, that something is and how 
something is. The possibility of having entities already 
understood as entities is my mode of existence. 
The pre-ontological understanding requires a 
thematization if the understanding of being is going to 
become clear. If being is always the being of entities, then 
our access to being must come through either an entity or 
entities. A different sense of beingness (Seiendheit) 
emerges depending upon the type of entities we are 
investigating, and yet a sense of being in general emerges 
within the different conceptions of beingness. The mere 
description of entities does not yield a specific or general 
understanding of being. Instead we must see how an 
understanding of being arises within the appearance of 
entities. 62 Since we are the entities who understand being, 
62 Heidegger's problem with Kant is not that Kant is 
non-phenomenological. Heidegger's problem with Kant is that 
Kant did not investigate the being of the subject in a 
radical manner. Heidegger shows this in the first chapter of 
BP. Nonetheless, Heidegger makes various claims about the 
phenomenological orientation of Kant's enterprise in BT. For 
example, Heidegger considers the CPR to be a regional 
ontology "of that area of being called Nature" (BT, p.31). 
Furthermore, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenon examines 
Kant's use of the term phenomenon. On the one· hand, 
Heidegger sees that Kant's use of phenomenon relates to mere 
appearance and is not phenomenological. On the other hand, 
Heidegger says that Kant's investigation of a priori 
intuition has within it a phenomenological sense of 
(continued ... ) 
an investigation of the self ought to give rise to an 
understanding of being. 
Kant viewed being in terms of objectivity, but Kant 
saw that we come to objects through the self. Thus an 
investigation of the self and its mode of being yields an 
understanding of the being of the object. Kant called the 
ontological turn to the self the Copernican Revolution. 
99 
I can begin to show the phenomenological character of 
the A Deduction through a brief discussion of Kant's 
relationship to Hume. Hume's empirical analysis of 
representation revealed the lack of necessity within the 
empirical realm. Beginning with our confrontation with the 
object, Hume showed that we did not experience substance or 
causality, i.e., substance and causality did not appear in 
our experience of things. Instead we experienced things with 
particular properties, and only though habit did we expect 
one thing to happen after another. From his observations, 
Hume drew the following conclusions: 1. substance and 
causality were interpolations that essentially did not 
belong to experience; 2. there was no necessity to 
experience. 
Kant saw that Hume's conclusions were true only under 
62 ( •.• continued) 
phenomenon. The Kantian conception of intuition allows 
something to appear, while at the same time holding itself 
back for the appearance of the entity. In other words, the 
intuitions of space and time never themselves appear, yet 
the intuitions can be explicitly grasped and show themselves 
as the a priori conditions of appearances. 
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one condition, viz., under the condition of being totally 
dependent upon exterior objects for our experience. However, 
Hume's own analysis suggested another possibility. On the 
one hand, Kant saw that Hume was correct: I do not 
experience causality. On the other hand, Kant saw that I 
understand my experience in terms of causality. Hume could 
not see necessity within empirical experience, i.e., within 
our reception of objects, but Hume's own conception of habit 
suggests that there is more to experience than the mere 
reception of sensible appearances. There is an interaction 
to experience between the subject and the object, or between 
sense reception and understanding. However, Hume disregarded 
this possibility and did not divulge what was concealed in 
experience. 
Awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant saw a 
hidden element within experience. Kant saw that we 
understand experience causally and conjectured that 
something may be hidden within the appearance of things that 
nonetheless makes the appearance of the things possible. 
Kant conjectured that if necessity cannot be found within 
the empirical realm, then necessity may lie within the 
subject and its modes of being. In other words, we possess 
an understanding of the being of entities that is hidden 
within our experience of entities, and yet makes our 
experience of things possible. Kant saw the need to uncover 
this understanding of being. Both the Transcendental 
Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic are Kant's 
attempts to make the being of objects thematic, i.e., to 
expose the being of objects. In this sense, Kant 1 s 
investigation is a phenomenological investigation. 
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As I said previously, if being is always the being of 
entities, then the access to being must come through an 
entity. Kant understands the being of objects as 
objectivity. Since the entity that has access to objectivity 
is the subject, Kant analyzes the subject in the CPR. The 
two possible ways the subject has access to objects is 
through sensibility and understanding. Through sensibility, 
we have the capacity to receive the impressions of objects 
in virtue of the intuitions of space and time. Through the 
understanding, we have the capacity to unify appearances. 
Kant's problem in the deduction is how to connect the two 
sources of knowledge. The mode of connection occurs through 
the synthetic·power of the imagination. 
Without explicitly calling the A Deduction a 
phenomenological investigation, Kant explains the A 
Deduction in terms of the play of the concealment of being 
within the appearance of entities. This play occurs in three 
places. The first occurrence takes place in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Received appearances only appear 
in the pure intuitions of space and time, while space and 
time themselves do not appear. The second occurrence takes 
place with the understanding. We do not experience the 
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categories of the understanding, i.e., they do not appear. 
Nonetheless, there is an order to our experience that is 
necessary. The necessity does not lie within the object of 
my experience, since empirical objects can always be other 
than they appear to be, i.e., they can change. The necessity 
within my experience must lie elsewhere. If our access to 
entities is through the subject and necessity does not lie 
within the object, then the necessity must emerge from the 
subject and the way the subject understands entities. In 
other words, a sense of being must emerge that shows how our 
understanding of entities is possible. As Kant says, the 
deduction must determine if "a priori concepts do not also 
serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything 
can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general" 
(A93,B126}. The third and the most radical place the 
concealment occurs is in the imagination. Kant. knows that we 
have to synthesize sensibility and understanding to have 
knowledge, i.e., to make objectivity possible. However he 
does not know how the imagination functions. The imagination 
is so concealed that it withdraws itself in the synthesis of 
the content of sensibility and understanding. 
The transcendental deduction arises within the 
Transcendental Analytic and thus after the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. Since sensibility has already been investigated 
prior to the deduction, Kant turns his attention to the two 
remaining sources of the "conditions of the possibility of 
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experience" (A94). These are imagination and apperception. 
Kant investigates these two sources in the A Deduction 
within the context of synthesis. 
The structure of the A Deduction displays the 
phenomenological approach to Kant•s employment of the 
categories. In the A Deduction, Kant seeks the a priori 
concepts by taking his starting point from the metaphysical 
deduction. In the metaphysical deduction, Kant has shown the 
content of the categories of the understanding but has not 
shown the right of their employment in experience. However, 
the clues of unity and synthesis that led us to the 
categories become the issues of the transcendental 
deduction. Kant takes up the notions of unity and synthesis 
in the transcendental deduction and investigates them 
thematically. 
Kant investigates the notions of synthesis and unity 
by beginning with their empirical manifestation and moving 
into their transcendental aspect. Kant adopts a method of 
abstraction in order to show the movement from the empirical 
to the transcendental. Kant says "we must enquire what are 
the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of 
experience rests, and which remain as its underlying ground 
when everything empirical is abstracted from experience" 
(A95-96). We should not understand abstraction as a 
stripping away of layers, as if abstraction were an 
eradication of empirical experience. Rather abstraction 
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involves an articulation of what lies hidden within 
experience. Since abstraction literally means to separate, 
we can understand abstraction as analysis. In the analysis, 
we should come to understand what makes experience possible, 
i.e., how necessity arises out of experience. Essentially, 
the analysis is an uncovering of the a priori out of the a 
posteriori. 
The structure of the A Deduction has two main 
sections, which Kant calls a subjective and objective 
deduction (Axvii). Kant's phenomenological analysis begins 
in the subjective deduction. The subjective deduction is an 
investigation into the subject's capacities of sensibility, 
imagination and understanding in terms of their synthetic 
character. Since the analysis of the subjective deduction 
revolves around synthesis, the underlying theme of the 
subjective deduction is the imagination. He begins with the 
empirical senses of synthesis and sees how a transcendental 
mode of synthesis is already present within the empirical 
acts of synthesis. After Kant has accounted for the 
transcendental function of synthesis and the unifying 
function of the categories, Kant moves into the objective 
deduction. In the objective deduction, Kant shows how the 
transcendental employment of the categories constitutes our 
understanding of the being of objects. 
We can justify Kant's use of synthesis as the key to 
an understanding of the A Deduction in two ways. First, the 
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project of the CPR is to show how a priori synthetic 
judgments are possible. Thus the notion of synthesis is 
central to Kant's entire project. Second, the metaphysical 
deduction shows how the understanding is in need of a 
synthesis, if the understanding is to have an empirical 
employment. In the metaphysical deduction, we came to 
understand that knowledge is possible only if our capacities 
for knowledge come together. If our capacities remained 
isolated, there would be no knowledge. For knowledge to be 
possible, it is necessary that intuitions be given and that 
the categories think the objects. While intuition and 
understanding are necessary for experience, a sufficient 
condition is lacking for experience, viz., the way the two 
come together. In other words, the account of synthesis is 
lacking. The A Deduction is an attempt to account for the 
synthesis of intuition and understanding by showing that the 
goal of synthesis is unity. 
The purpose of the subjective deduction is "to prepare 
rather than instruct the reader" for the objective deduction 
(A98). The reader's preparation occurs through an 
investigation of the three subjective sources of knowledge 
that make objectivity possible. Kant does not merely explain 
the three sources of knowledge. He examines the three 
sources of knowledge in terms of their cognitive functions, 
i.e., in terms of their synthetic character. Knowledge is 
only possible if the sources of knowledge function as a 
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whole. Thus we must see how the capacities of the mind come 
together. 
In essence, the subjective deduction is not an 
investigation into the modes of knowledge per se, but an 
investigation into the function of synthesis. If synthesis 
is the function of the imagination, then the subjective 
deduction is an investigation into the imagination. Kant 
does not overtly make this claim, but we can draw the 
implication from what Kant does in the subjective deduction. 
I should also point out that this continues in the objective 
deduction. Kant justifies the employment of the categories 
by showing how the imagination and the understanding come 
together. 
Before Kant gives the subjective deduction, he 
prefaces his investigation with an important insight. The 
insight is not only important for the subjective deduction, 
the insight is also important for the objective deduction 
and for the entire Kantian project. The insight is that all 
a priori and a posteriori representations have as their 
limiting condition the a priori intuition of time. Without 
time, there are no representations and knowledge is not 
possible. This insight is important for the following 
reason: we do not know things in themselves. What we know 
are representations, and representations are "modifications 
of the mind 11 (A99). As modifications of the mind, 
representations belong to inner sense, and the possibility 
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of inner sense occurs through time. Time is the limiting 
condition of our representations, and the sources of 
knowledge are bound to time. In time, representations are 
"ordered, connected and brought into relation," i.e., all 
representations must be temporally synthesized in the way 
that is proper to the source of knowledge (A99). The 
conceptions of order, connection and bringing into relation 
correspond to the three modes of synthesis functioning 
within the three subjective sources of knowledge. 
Kant begins the subjective deduction by introducing 
the three subjective sources of knowledge. The three 
subjective sources are sensibility, imagination and 
apperception (A95). Kant introduces these subjective sources 
of knowledge through the concept of synthesis, and each 
subjective mode of knowledge has its own particular sense of 
synthesis. Kant understands sensibility as being "synoptic," 
the imagination as being properly synthetic, and the 
understanding, i.e., apperception, as being combinative 
(A95). In sensible intuition, I gather the manifold 
synoptically. In imagination, I synthesize the manifold. In 
the understanding, I provide the form of unity for the 
synthesis. Since the goal of knowledge is to give unity to 
the manifold of intuition, Kant depicts the modes of 
synthesis in a hierarchical relationship. Intuition is on 
the bottom and understanding is on the top of the hierarchy 
of knowledge. Thus intuition has to move towards the 
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understanding in order for knowledge to become possible. In 
other words, the movement is from the most dispersed to the 
most unified mode of the object. 63 
In keeping with the phenomenological character of the 
deduction, Kant begins his examination of synthesis by 
analyzing the empirical elements of knowledge, and then 
moving to the transcendental character that reveals itself 
in each instance of the empirical instance of synthesis. 
Since knowledge is a type of gathering to Kant, Kant 
ascribes a mode of synthesis to each source of knowledge. 
Thus Kant describes three modes of synthesis, viz., "the 
apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind 
in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their 
recognition in a concept" (A97). I consider each mode of 
synthesis in the above order moving from the bottom to the 
top of the hierarchy. 
For Kant, the act of apprehension is the mind's 
ability to seize the appearance of something and arrest, or 
hold, the appearance in view. When I sense something 
empirically, whether I sense an external object or myself, I 
receive a manifold of sensation. If I did not have the 
ability to seize the manifold, I would have nothing in view 
63 One possible way to understand the hierarchy is in 
terms of formal and final causality.The fact that intuition 
lies at the base of the hierarchy does not remove intuition 
from its place of importance. Intuition lies at the base 
because intuition is the foundation of knowledge and 
understanding is the goal of knowledge. 
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except a chaotic flux of sensation. Instead I have the 
ability to apprehend something intuitively. Through the act 
of apprehension, I seize the thing with my senses and gather 
the thing at some specific moment in time. As long as I keep 
apprehending the thing, the thing remains intuitively the 
same. Even if I am operating on the transcendental realm, my 
pure intuitions of space and time are synoptic, i.e., viewed 
as wholes wherein the manifold of sense appears. Things must 
appear in space and be held together in discrete moments of 
time, if I am going to know something. If I am going to have 
knowledge, the synoptic character of intuition requires a 
synthesis. 
The only reason I can apprehend the manifold is 
because the manifold is given to me in time, and hence is 
apprehended in discrete moments. In other words, 
apprehension is possible only because time is the limiting 
condition of all knowledge. All our representations are 
subject to the a priori intuition of time. The synoptic 
manifold can only be held together if the manifold is 
synthesized, i.e., apprehended. Apprehension is an intuitive 
synthesis which is capable of grasping the manifold "in a 
single representation" (A99). Our ability to grasp discrete 
moments in time allows us to apprehend the present. 
Apprehension is not simply empirical but must also be 
a priori. If apprehension were merely empirical, then the 
object would be the cause of my apprehension, i.e., the 
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object would apprehend me. However, I could not even speak 
about an object or a manifold, unless I was first able to 
apprehend the manifold and have representations appear in 
space and time. The fact that I can apprehend objects points 
to a prior condition of the mind that makes empirical 
apprehension possible. If we were not capable of a priori 
apprehension, then we would not be able to represent space 
and time. We can represent to ourselves the a priori 
character of space and time only because we can synthesize 
64 them. We could not hold the manifold together either 
empirically or transcendentally without the synthesis of 
apprehension. 
Apprehension is necessary but not sufficient for the 
knowledge of objects. We see in experience that we never 
simply hold the manifold together at discrete moments in 
time. If the past moments were not associated with the 
present moments, then there would not be any experience. 
Representations need to be associated with one another, 
i.e., my perceptions of the thing I am perceiving at the 
moment must be connected with the same thing I have 
perceived at previous moments. Otherwise I could not connect 
my past with my present perceptions and depict what I 
64 Without a pure synthesis of apprehension, the 
Transcendental Aesthetic would not be possible. Space and 
time would not be known, or at least representable to us. 
The awareness of space and time requires our ability to 
seize the intuitions as a whole and to represent them as 
such. 
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perceive as the selfsame object. Furthermore, the 
association of representations cannot be contingent. If the 
association were contingent, then there would not be any 
reason for something being the way it is, since it could be 
otherwise. Without this ability to associate 
representations, i.e., to reproduce past representations 
with present representations, I would not have any 
experience. The least requirement of perception is the 
connection of past appearances with the present appearance. 
Since sensibility is only receptive, it cannot be 
reproductive. The imagination is reproductive. Kant's 
definition of the imagination in the APP described the 
imagination as the ability to reproduce an image of the 
object in the object's absence. Through the imagination, we 
synthesize the manifold and connect the past with the 
present. However, we do not find the necessity of the 
reproduction of the past with the present in experience. In 
experience, the representations I connect are appearances 
that are mine. The object does not impress the necessity 
upon me. As Kant says, "appearances are not things in 
themselves, but are the mere play of our representations, 
and in the end reduce to determinations of inner sense" 
(AlOl). In other words, if I did not possess a prior ability 
to connect representations with one another, I could not 
reproduce things empirically. The necessity of the synthesis 
must arise from my own synthetic ability to connect the 
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representations with one another. Thus the reproductive 
imagination must be productive, i.e., able to produce the 
synthesis prior to the reception of impressions and prior to 
the reproduction of representations. The imagination is not 
productive of the representations ex nihilo, but is 
productive of the possibility of the connection of the past 
and present representations prior to experience. The 
connection of the past and the present is the foundational 
criterion for experience. Thus the imagination has a 
transcendental capacity and is the condition of "the very 
possibility of all experience" (AlOl). 65 In other words, the 
transcendental imaginative synthesis makes experience 
possible. 
The synthesis of the present and the past 
representations is still not sufficient for knowledge. 
Besides being able to apprehend and reproduce 
representations, I must be able to unify my representations. 
In other words, I must be able to recognize what is being 
apprehended and reproduced. Recognition is the ability to 
take up the synthesized flow of perceptions and grasp them 
within an unified whole. Through recognition, I come to 
acknowledge the object as being there. For example, I could 
65 Smith's translation is confusing on Kant's last 
point in the section on the synthesis of reproduction. Kant 
says that both the synthesis of apprehension and the 
synthesis of reproduction constitute "the transcendental 
ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge 
whatsoever"(Al02). Smith's translation can be read as only 
applying to the synthesis of apprehension. 
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not have the concept of a tree, if I did not have the 
ability to unify the representations and make them coalesce 
into a whole. Recognition encompasses both the unity of the 
synthesis and the acknowledgement of the object. 
Regardless of the concept I have before me, I must 
realize the object is only "an object of representations'' 
(Al04). What I am capable of knowing is what I am capable of 
representing. An object separate from our representations is 
something totally beyond our ability to grasp, since what we 
possess are representations intuitively received, 
synthetically apprehended, reproduced and recognized. This 
does not mean that an object beyond my representations does 
not exist. This means only that I do not know the noumenal 
object. I know only what I can represent to myself. 
The ability to bring our representations to concepts 
brings with it "an element of necessity" (A104). When I say 
"a tree is a living thing," I do not mean just one tree, but 
all trees are living things. This is not an arbitrary 
determination of experience. I expect this fact to 
necessarily hold without exception. Yet if I do not know the 
thing itself, then the necessity cannot arise from the thing 
itself. Instead, the necessity must arise from the unity 
consciousness bestows upon the representations I have 
synthetically apprehended and reproduced. Redognition is in 
need of cognition. 
If a necessary unity is to happen, then the 
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unification must happen according to a "rule 11 (A105). 
Further, the rule must arise out of a transcendental 
condition, since all necessity is transcendental. For 
concept formation to occur, there must be a transcendental 
unity of consciousness. Kant calls this "transcendental 
apperception" (A107). 
Transcendental apperception and concept formation are 
essentially connected. If the concept is a function of unity 
and if transcendental apperception represents the unity of 
consciousness, then transcendental apperception makes 
concept formation possible. All modes of synthesis find 
their unity in transcendental apperception, i.e., the 
representations are unified in apperception. 
Apperception is not mere consciousness. Knowledge 
would not be possible if we could not bring our 
representation into one consciousness. When we apperceive, 
we are aware of our consciousness of the object, i.e., we 
are self-conscious. Within knowledge, the identity of the 
self must accompany all of my representations, or there 
could be no knowledge. The unity of experience is only 
rooted in the unity of the self as remaining identical 
throughout all change. So unity is not bestowed upon us by 
the object. The Ding an sich is something beyond our 
comprehension. Instead unity arises out of the self. Since 
we are the same throughout the changes of representations, 
we grant unity to experience prior to the reception of 
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empirical intuitions. The unity of apperception represents 
our condition of futurity, and our futurity lies in the mode 
of possibility. This sense of futurity cannot simply be 
characterized as the not-yet of a now point, i.e., as that 
which is to become actual. The futurity of apperception is 
never actualized. Instead, we must understand the futurity 
of apperception in terms of the a priori. As a priori, the 
futurity of apperception never becomes present. Instead, the 
future makes possible the present while resisting 
incorporation into the present. In other words, the unity of 
apperception is always outstanding. The unity of 
apperception occurs before the influx of sensation and makes 
the unity of experience possible. If apperception were not 
operative prior to the sensations, we could not unify the 
sensations. Self-consciousness acts expectantly, i.e., the 
unity is expected to happen. 
If apperception is our ability to unify 
representations and bring the representations to concepts, 
then apperception is a faculty of rules, i.e., ways in which 
intuitions are unified by the mind. These rules are the 
categories, i.e., "the conditions of thought in a possible 
experience" (A111). If the rules are the categories of the 
understanding, then they are the "fundamental concepts by 
which we think objects in general for appearances and have 
therefore a priori objective validity" {A111). Further, if 
the categories are the modes through which we combine what 
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we have apprehended and reproduced, then Kant has justified 
the legitimate use of the categories. The subjective 
deduction proves the validity of the categories. 
Throughout the subjective deduction, Kant has shown 
how the empirical mode of our existence shows forth the 
transcendental mode of our existence. The contingency of our 
empirical experience expresses a necessity that does not 
emerge in empirical experience per se, yet empirical 
experience cannot be without the basic conditions set forth 
in the subjective deduction. Kant lets the necessity emerge 
from what shows itself in experience, viz., within empirical 
experience a necessity is hidden that emerges through the 
analysis of what shows itself in experience. The subjective 
deduction is not constructive of the elements of experience. 
Kant can only see what emerges from experience itself in 
terms of its essence. Literally, the subjective deduction is 
an apodictic description, i.e., a description of what shows 
66 itself within the phenomenon. The subjective deduction 
makes sense only as a phenomenological description of 
subjectivity. 
We can see the phenomenological chara~ter of the 
subjective deduction of the categories further in Kant's 
description of association and affinity. As has been stated, 
66 Apodictic and apophantic are related to each other. 
Both involve modes of self-showing or self-manifestation. 
The revealment of necessity out of the empirical order is an 
apodictic showing of what lies concealed within experience, 
and yet experience cannot be without it. 
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the empirical experience of objects never shows a necessity 
in and of itself. Nonetheless, the empirical rules of 
association and affinity suggest a necessity within our 
experience. Association is an empirical rule whereby we make 
a connection of a before and after sequence in our 
experience. For Kant, the ability to associate things in 
experience lies in the condition of affinity. Affinity is 
the ability to combine diverse representations and to 
represent them as a whole. For example, I can associate 
different representations of a tree occurring sequentially, 
only because I can unify the representations into a concept 
of a tree. If I could not depict unity within diversity, 
there could be no association. The "affinity of the 
manifold" is possible only because I can hold the affinity 
within the selfsame consciousness. Thereby I give unity to 
my experience. We have called self-consciousness 
apperception. Since self-consciousness employs the 
categories as its modes of thought, the categories are rules 
according to which objects are thought. Thus the necessity 
of the categories emerges out of experience, without their 
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necessity arising from experience. 
The subjective deduction establishes the validity of 
67 Not having at his disposal the findings of 
phenomenology, Kant explains the subjective deduction as an 
exposition that moves from effect to cause. I have explained 
this movement from effect to cause in terms of a self-
showing that reveals the essence of the subjective sources 
of knowledge within their empirical manifestation. 
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categories by showing how empirical syntheses presuppose 
transcendental syntheses. However, if Kant contends that the 
subjective deduction proves the validity of the categories, 
then why does Kant see a need for the objective deduction? 
Kant explains the need for the objective deduction in the 
preface to the A edition of the CPR. The subjective 
deduction attempts to show how understanding is itself 
possible (Axvii). Yet, the revealment of the a priori modes 
of thought is not the main purpose of the deduction. The 
main purpose of the deduction is to establish the limits of 
understanding and reason (Axvii). On the one hand, we can 
establish the limits of experience only by understanding how 
the subject functions. On the other hand, we have to 
establish the legitimate extension of the categories. The 
subjective deduction shows how the subjective sources of 
knowledge function in terms of their synthetic character. 
The objective deduction sets up the legitimate employment of 
the categories, i.e., it establishes the rights and limits 
of understanding and reason. Nonetheless, the objective 
deduction would not be possible without the subjective 
deduction. At this point, we can turn our attention to the 
objective deduction. 
Kant divides the objective deduction into two 
sections, and Kant uses the two sections to show how the 
categories obtain their legitimate employment. In the first 
section, Kant legitimates the employment of the categories 
119 
from a transcendental perspective; in the second section, 
Kant establishes the legitimacy of the categories by showing 
how empirical experience necessarily depends upon the 
categories for our knowledge of objects. 68 
Starting from his findings in the subjective 
deduction, Kant takes transcendental apperception as his 
starting point in the first section of the objective 
deduction. Pure apperception is the understanding of 
ourselves as self-consciousness. Experience would not be 
possible unless I remained the same throughout all changes 
in appearances. I could not even know that appearances 
change unless I remained the same throughout my experience. 
My empirical consciousness supplies unity to an experience 
given at the time, but the unity of empirical c9nsciousness 
is not necessary. Empirical consciousness is only an 
awareness of myself in a given experience, and is always 
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undergoing change. In other words, there is a unity to my 
experience that supersedes empirical consciousness. As we 
saw in the subjective deduction, experience is only possible 
if there is a synthesis of the manifold, and pure 
apperception supplies the unity to the synthesis. As Kant 
68 The first section of the objective deduction goes 
from A115-A119. The second section of the objective 
deduction goes from All9-Al28. 
69 In the subjective deduction of the A edition, Kant 
calls empirical consciousness 11 inner sense" or "empirical 
apperception" (Al07). I know myself only as an appearance in 
inner sense, so the necessity of thought is lacking in 
empirical consciousness. 
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says, "pure apperception supplies a principle of synthetic 
unity of the manifold in all possible intuition" (A117). 
In order for there to be a synthetic unity, a 
synthesis must be present so that unification of the 
synthesis can take place. Pure apperception provides only a 
unity to the synthesis and does not yield a synthesis 
itself. Therefore, apperception must be related to the 
imagination, since the imagination is the power of 
synthesis. The imagination has the power to reproduce past 
images with the present image and thus makes the continuity 
of experience possible. However, we saw that a productive 
imagination founded the reproductive imagination. There is 
no experience at all without the productive imagination, 
since there would not be any synthesis of the manifold to 
unify. If there is no experience without the synthesis of 
the productive imagination, and if apperception unifies only 
what the productive imagination can provide to it, then 
imagination stands as the "ground of the possibility of all 
knowledge, especially of experience" (A118). 
For the synthetic unity to be pure, apperception must 
be directed towards the productive imagination and its 
synthesis. The understanding is a result of the interaction 
between the unity of apperception and the synthesis of 
imagination. As we saw in the metaphysical deduction, the 
understanding operates according to categories. Since the 
understanding is a result of the interaction of apperception 
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and imagination, the categories become the modes of unity 
for the manifold of intuition that is synthesized by the 
imagination. If the imagination is synthesizing the manifold 
of intuition in general, then categories are modes of unity 
for "all possible appearances" (A119). Knowledge of objects 
is only possible if all appearances stand in "a necessary 
relationship to the understanding" (A119). 
The second section of the pbjective deduction begins 
at this point. Having shown how the knowledge of objects is 
possible, Kant proposes to lay before our eyes how all 
appearances stand in a necessary relationship to the 
understanding and its categories. 70 We need to see how this 
necessity shows itself starting from appearances. In other 
words, we are seeing how the essence shows itself within the 
existent. In this sense, the phenomenological character of 
the deduction arises again in the second section of the 
objective deduction. 
The movement in the second section of the objective 
deduction goes from dispersion to unity. Beginning with the 
lowest member of the hierarchy, sensibility, we first 
experience appearances, and appearances contain a manifold 
of sensations. Second, we have perceptions, which are our 
consciousness of appearances. The distinction between 
appearances and perceptions lies in their relationship to 
70 In the KrV, Kant literally says he wants "vor Augen 
legen, 11 to lay before our eyes, the necessity of the 
categories by starting with the empirical (A119). 
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consciousness. Kant points out that appearances cannot exist 
without a "relation to a consciousness that is at least 
possible" (Al20). Appearances are not things in themselves 
but only an influx of sensation that must appear for a 
consciousness. Appearances require the possibility of 
consciousness. Perceptions move a step beyond appearances. 
Perception is a gathering of appearances, where the form of 
something emerges out of the influx of sensation. In 
perception, consciousness stands actually in the face of 
something and represents the thing in an image. Perceptions 
move beyond the givenness of sensation and depict unique 
forms within experience. From this brief description, we can 
already see that perception possesses a unity that 
appearances do not possess. 
In order to combine the manifold of sensation given in 
appearance, the perceiving subject must synthesize the 
manifold. Since imagination is the power of synthesis, we 
need the imagination in order to perceive. Apprehension is 
the synthetic act of the imagination in combination with 
perception. The image of the thing obtains its singular 
character in the present moment through apprehension. 
However, the synthesis of apprehension does not exhaust the 
synthetic activity of the imagination. As we saw in the 
subjective deduction, the synthesis of apprehension only 
presents us with the present. Apprehension is in need of 
synthesis of reproduction in order to connect past 
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perceptions with the present perceptions. The synthesis of 
reproduction gives rise to our continuity of experience, 
since reproduction connects our past and our present. 
Reproduction is not a haphazard activity. In other 
words, the sequence of before and after does not occur 
chaotically. Thus the synthesis of reproduction is subject 
to a rule that associates the past and the present 
representations in an order that does not change. As we have 
seen, association is a synthesis of our time order according 
to a rule. As a mode of synthesis, association is an 
empirical act of the imagination. 
The problem is how to institute an objective ground 
for what we know to be a subjective operation of the mind. 
In other words, if association is a "subjective and 
empirical ground of reproduction according to rules," then 
we need to establish the necessity of the rules for 
experience (A121). We need to locate the "objective ground" 
(Al22). The necessity for the rules lies within 
consciousness itself. I recognize perceptions only because 
they are mine. As Kant says, 11 it is only because I ascribe 
all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) 
that I can say of al~ perceptions that I am conscious of 
them" (Al22). 
The unity of consciousness cannot arise after I have 
perceived images. If the unity of consciousness was only an 
amalgamation of perceptions, then there could be no unity to 
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experience. Consciousness would be changing with each new 
perception. Since consciousness remains the same through the 
diversity of perceptions and since all perceptions find 
their place in the selfsame consciousness, consciousness 
must be prior to the influx of sensation and perceptions. 
Kant calls the ability to unify the synthesis "affinity." 
Affinity is the "objective ground of all association of 
appearances" and is the function of transcendental 
apperception (A122). A unity of the manifold must be 
possible a priori, or experience would not be possible. Thus 
unity of apperception is not only subjectively necessary; 
transcendental apperception is also objectively necessary, 
since it stands as the condition of the possibility of 
having objects. If there is no unity, then there is no 
perception and no objects. 
Pure apperception provides the possibility for a 
unification of the synthesis. However, affinity is a mode of 
synthesis and thus belongs to the imagination. Kant ascribes 
a "transcendental function" to the imagination (A123). Since 
Kant understands the notion of function as bringing 
representations to a unity, the productive imagination 
allows for the possibility of bringing the manifold to a 
unity in apperception. Without imagination, apperception 
would not be able to be in accord with sensibility. Thus 
apperception provides a necessary unity to experience, but 
the transcendental imagination makes experience itself 
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possible (Al 23) . 
As we saw in the subjective deduction, the imagination 
is temporal in its synthetic function. Thus there is a 
sensible character to the imagination. However, the 
imagination is also intellectual in its interaction with 
apperception. Since the imagination plays the mediating role 
within the sensible/intelligible opposition, the imagination 
is both receptive and spontaneous. The imagination as the 
'between' of the sensible/intelligible opposition makes 
experience possible. 
The categories are the content of the understanding, 
i.e., they are the forms of unity. Through the synthesis of 
the imagination, the categories provide the possible modes 
that can unify the manifold of intuition. 71 Only through 
their necessary connection with the transcendental 
imagination are the categories legitimate, since they find 
their necessary connection with sensibility through the 
imagination. 72 Thus synthesis is the force that legitimates 
the employment of the categories. 
Kant's conclusions in the A Deduction are very radical 
and effect the way metaphysics itself comes to be thought. 
71 Heidegger is correct when he calls the 'I think' an 
'I can', or an 'I am able'. The categories become the ways 
we are able to provide unity to our experience. 
72 Kant finishes the A Deduction with a discussion of 
the categories as being a faculty of rules and as being laws 
of nature. This is not important for what we are 
investigating. 
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While the opposition between the sensible and the 
intelligible remains intact, Kant redefines the limits of 
their interaction. Knowledge remains a matter of 
intelligibility, i.e., our knowledge is discursive and not 
simply intuitive, but the categories are only applicable to 
sensibility. There is no knowledge of intelligible things. 
This conclusion is true for Kant's project in general. 
However, the deductions reinforce the point, since Kant 
defines the limits of the intelligible realm through the 
deductions. 
Even more radical than Kant's redefinition of the 
sensible/intelligible opposition is Kant's findings 
concerning the imagination. In the A Deduction, Kant has 
shown that the imagination makes experience possible, or, in 
other words, that the imagination functions as the ground of 
experience. I want to draw out two consequences from this 
conclusion. First, if the imagination emerges as the 
possibility of experience and if we understand experience in 
a Kantian sense as objectivity, then the imagination becomes 
the basis of objectivity. If objectivity is the being of 
objects, then the imagination is making an µnderstanding of 
being possible. If the understanding of an entity is only 
possible through an understanding of being, then the 
understanding of being cannot emerge from an entity. To say 
that an understanding of the being of an entity could emerge 
from another entity would place us within a vicious circle, 
127 
since we would be presupposing what we are trying to 
explain. Thus an understanding of being requires the 
difference between being and entities. If the imagination 
makes the understanding of being possible, then the 
imagination cannot be thought of as an entity. In other 
words, the emergence of the imagination as the understanding 
of being brings Kant to the ontological difference. Through 
his analysis of the imagination in the CPR, Kant exposes a 
sense of the imagination that is not interpretable merely as 
a faculty of the subject, i.e., as an entity. Further, the 
imagination is not the same as being, because the 
imagination is what makes the understanding of being 
possible. Thus the imagination is irreducible either to an 
entity or to being. The problem is that the possibility of 
the ontological difference that Kant exposes cannot be 
thought within the onto-theological framework .of 
metaphysics, since the understanding of the imagination as 
the understanding of being takes us to the limits of 
metaphysics. The question arises: What does it mean to make 
imagination the possibility of experience? In other words, 
what does it mean to make imagination a ground? 
Second, the emergence of the imagination as the ground 
of experience not only raises the issue of the ontological 
difference, but also begins to bring the project of 
metaphysics itself into question. In essence, the 
imagination does not really appear within the sensible-
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/intelligible opposition. We see this in Kant's ambiguity 
regarding how to define the imagination. By showing that the 
imagination is the basis of experience, Kant has supplanted 
the traditional role of the priority of the intelligible 
within metaphysics. However, the displacement of the 
intelligible does not place the imagination simply on the 
other side of the opposition. 73 The implication is that the 
imagination is making the opposition possible, while 
simultaneously not being accounted for within the 
opposition. The ~magination functions as a trace within 
metaphysics, and I contend the trace of the imagination 
disrupts the metaphysical project. The question arises: how 
can we conceive of the imagination as a trace that disrupts 
the metaphysical project? I must defer a response to both of 
these questions until the next chapter. We must first 
complete our examination of Kant through an examination of 
the B Deduction. 
D. THE SECOND EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
My purpose in this section is to examine the 
difference between the A and B Deductions and to show how 
the imagination maintains its place of priority within 
Kantian thought. I proceed in the following way: first I 
address the differences between the first and second edition 
deductions by examining Kant's introduction to the B 
73 Recall the discussion of Nietzsche in Chapter One. 
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Deduction. Second I examine the B Deduction and show how we 
can understand Kant's argument as a transcendental argument. 
In order to explain the B Deduction in this manner, I have 
to explain the difference between a Kantian transcendental 
argument and a phenomenological argument. Third I examine 
the role of the imagination in the B Deduction and show how 
the A Deduction arises within the B Deduction. 
Kant sees a need to rewrite the entire transcendental 
deduction in the second edition of the CPR. Kant does not 
rewrite the deduction because he conceived of a new purpose 
for the deduction. The purpose of the transcendental 
deduction does not change in either the A or B edition of 
the CPR, and thus the difference between the A and B 
Deduction does not lie within their purpose. Kant's issue in 
the transcendental deductions remains the issue of quid 
juris, i.e., both the A and the B Deduction attempt to prove 
the legitimate employment of the categories. So the 
difference between two deductions lies somewhere else. 
Kant's reason for rewriting the transcendental 
deduction is that the deduction in the first edition is too 
obscure. However, Kant himself does not specify where the 
obscurity lies. Instead, he leaves it up to his readers to 
discover the reason he rewrote the transcendental deduction. 
I do not find the obscurity of the A Deduction to lie 
within Kant's execution of the deduction. The actual 
undertaking of the A Deduction is very methodical and 
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organized. Instead I find the obscurity to lie within the 
subject matter itself. Kant's investigation in the A 
Deduction is new within the context of metaphysical thought. 
As I said in the section on the A Deduction, the 
transcendental deduction redefines the basic opposition of 
metaphysics, and thus Kant's undertaking disrupts 
metaphysics. The obscure nature of the deduction arises by 
necessity, since Kant is breaking new ground within 
metaphysical thought. 
Specifically, Kant sees the obscurity of the A 
Deduction in terms of the way he approaches the subject 
matter itself. Kant enacts the deduction through an 
investigation into the capacities of the subject. The 
capacities Kant examines are the imagination and the 
understanding. The difference between the two deductions 
. lies within Kant's different starting points for the 
deductions. In the A Deduction, Kant chooses the phenomenon 
of synthesis as his mode of access to the legitimation of 
the categories. In the B Deduction, Kant chooses the 
phenomenon of unity as his mode of access. In other words, 
Kant approaches the A Deduction through an investigation 
into the imagination, while he approaches the B Deduction 
through an investigation into the understanding. 74 
74 For the most part, the metaphysical deduction does 
not change and remains applicable to the B Deduction~ The 
only changes Kant makes in the metaphysical deduction are 
additions to his explanation of the table of categories. 
(continued ... ) 
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The basic difference between the two deductions 
emerges at the end of Kant's introduction to the 
transcendental deduction. 75 In the A edition, Kant makes the 
transition from the examination of the basic principles of a 
transcendental deduction in general to the subjective 
deduction through a discussion of the three sources of 
representation that make experience possible. Kant removes 
this introductory passage in the second edition of the CPR, 
and instead he introduces the B Deduction through a 
discussion of Locke and Hume. None of the commentators I 
have read have addressed Kant's reason for this substitution 
of passages. I contend that the substitution is not 
innocent. Instead the passage provides the reason for the 
rewrite of the second edition deduction. 
The discussion of Locke and Hume centers around the 
.categories of the understanding. Both Locke and Hume are 
empiricists, and both discussed the categories of the 
understanding. Kant sees Locke as the person who recognized 
the categories of the understanding and attempted to justify 
them. However, Locke tried to deduce the categories from 
experience. According to Kant, Locke's undertaking did not 
succeed because he failed to realize that the categories are 
74 ( ••• continued) 
These addenda do not alter the metaphysical deduction. They 
are interesting but not applicable to our discussion. 
75 B127 - B129 substituted for A94 - A95 in the B 
edition. 
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not experiential, i.e., they are not empirical. Hume 
recognized that the categories were not empirical, and thus 
saw that the necessity of the categories could not lie 
within the empirical realm. Yet he could not locate an~ 
Eriori realm for the categories, and hence saw the 
categories as merely contingent possibilities of the 
structure of experience. In other words, Hume contended the 
categories were fictions generated by the habit of repeated 
experiences, and thus saw only a subjective genesis to the 
categories. For Kant, both Locke's and Hume's problem lies 
in their empiricism. They did not realize that the 
understanding possessed a content that could make the 
objects of expe.~ence possible. While Locke did not realize 
the impossibility of an "empirical derivation'' of the 
categories, Hume could not raise himself out of his 
empiricistic viewpoint and did not realize that necessity 
lay within an a priori realm (8127). 
Kant takes his impetus from these findings. On the one 
hand, Kant agrees with Locke that there is a need to justify 
the categories of the understanding. On the other hand, Kant 
agrees with Hume that the deduction cannot be empirical. 
Thus, the categories of the understanding have been revealed 
and stand in need of justification. If Hume has shown that 
we cannot derive the categories empirically, then Kant 
conjectures that there must be a transcendental way to show 
their legitimacy. 
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Kant's problem with the A Deduction arises within the 
context of his discussion of Locke and Hume. For Kant, the 
obscurity of the A Deduction lies in its admixture of 
empirical and transcendental elements. There was a back and 
forth movement in the A Deduction between the empirical and 
transcendental roles of synthesis. I explained the admixture 
of the empirical and the transcendental elements within a 
phenomenological context. However, the admixture installs an 
element of impurity for Kant. Simply stated, Kant sees that 
a transcendental deduction should have no empirical 
admixture but should be transcendental. Kant maintains that 
empirical experience cannot legitimate the categories and 
should not be used in a deduction. Instead, Kant thinks he 
must show the legitimacy of the categories in an a priori 
fashion, and the B Deduction is an attempt to legitimate the 
categories from a strictly transcendental perspective. As we 
shall see, any time Kant allows an empirical element to 
enter into the B Deduction, he relates the empirical element 
immediately to its transcendental possibility. 76 
Another way of saying this is that Kant failed to 
follow his own rules in the A Deduction. According to Kant's 
own understanding of the rules of a transcendental 
76 As we shall see, Kant's only discussion of the 
empirical dimension in the B deduction is in Section 26. In 
this section, Kant refers the empirical synthesis of 
apprehension in perception immediately to the a priori 
intuitions of space and time, and he does not examine the 
empirical character of perception's apprehensive synthesis 
beyond the mention of it. 
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deduction, a transcendental deduction must proceed according 
to a principle. The purpose of the deductions is to deduce 
from the principle the right of the employment of the 
categories of the understanding. Once the deduction shows 
how everything follows from the one principle, the deduction 
must proceed to show how everything in question refers back 
to the principle. Kant does not show this in the A 
Deduction. Instead, he attempts to prove the validity of 
apperception through its connection to the other faculties. 
The A Deduction does show how unity is not possible without 
apperception, but Kant does not expose the necessity from 
apperception itself. The problem with the A Deduction arises 
through its emphasis upon synthesis and its lack of emphasis 
upon unity. For a deduction to be strictly transcendental, 
the deduction must begin from apperception itself. Thus the 
need to rewrite the transcendental deduction arose. 
As the metaphysical deduction provided a mode of 
access for Kant in the A Deduction, the metaphysical 
deduction provides Kant with a mode of access in the B 
Deduction. Two phenomena arose in the metaphysical deduction 
that Kant must account for in the transcendental deduction, 
viz., synthesis and unity. Kant entered the A Deduction 
through an analysis of the phenomenon of synthesis. The 
analysis of synthesis led Kant into an investigation of the 
imagination and its modes of synthesis, which finally led 
Kant into an investigation of the unity found within the 
understanding. The analysis of the A Deduction proceeded 
through the subjective sources of knowledge into the 
objective possibility of the categories. As we saw, Kant 
carried out the deduction by showing how the empirical 
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character of synthesis concealed a transcendental component 
that made the empirical synthesis possible. As I said above, 
the admixture of the empirical and the transcendental 
elements that arose in the analysis of synthesis made the A 
Deduction impure, i.e., the back and forth movement removed 
77 the argument from its transcendental mooring. Reason is 
still adrift, and Kant wants to see if he can "find for 
human reason safe conduct" into the harbor (B128). 
If synthesis does not provide us with a safe mode of 
access into the harbor, then the only other mode of access 
available to us is through the phenomenon of unity. The 
modes of judgments are modes of the understanding that grant 
unity to our experience. Kant wants to see how the unity of 
our experience is possible, and thus he begins to 
investigate where unity arises, viz., the understanding. 
The B Deduction encompasses pages B129-B169, comprises 
twelve sections of the CPR, and has two main divisions. The 
first division encompasses sections 15-21, and the second 
77 The word "moor" is polysemic in English. It means to 
hold something. Thus we moor ships, i.e, we anchor them or 
bring them to a safe harbor. Yet it also means sea and 
wasteland. A moor is a bog where there is no harbor or point 
of safety. Symbolically, a moor has no bottom, i.e., it is 
an abyss. 
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division encompasses sections 22-27. 78 The division suggests 
that the deduction has two parts. On the one hand, there is 
a general agreement among Kantian scholars regarding the 
sections of the main divisions of the B Deduction. On the 
other hand, there is a general disagreement about the way to 
understand the two main divisions. 
The two main divisions have been considered either as 
two separate proofs or as two parts of one basic proof. I 
view the B Deduction in the latter sense. The purpose of the 
B Deduction in general is to show how the objects of 
experience are possible, i.e., how objectivity is possible. 
The first step of the proof reveals to us the a priori 
legitimacy of the categories and reaches its climax in 
section 20 and has its transition point in section 21; the 
second step of the proof shows us the proper applicability 
of the categories and reaches its climax in section 26. 
The classification of the two divisions is a topic of 
debate. I cannot agree with Paton that Kant continues to 
classify the two sections of the B Deduction as a subjective 
and objective deduction. This classification is precisely 
what Kant drops in the B Deduction. The subjective deduction 
78 In sections 21 and 26 of the B deduction, Kant 
discusses the divisions. In effect there are three steps to 
the B deduction. The first step is the metaphysical 
deduction, the second step is the transcendental deduction 
of the applicability of the categories to intuition in 
general, and the third step shows how the unity of empirical 
intuition presupposes the unity supplied by apperception and 
the categories of the understanding. 
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led Kant into the admixture of the empirical and the 
transcendental, and he wants to avoid this problem in the B 
Deduction. Kant deletes the objective/subjective division 
when he rewrites the preface to the B edition of the CPR, 
and when he removes the introductory discussion of the three 
subjective sources of knowledge. The idea of a subjective 
deduction is seen as being too psychological in its 
orientation. 
I find that I have some affinity with Henry Allison's 
division of the B Deduction, and I agree with his 
classifications of the two divisions. He says that the first 
section of the B Deduction deals with the "objective 
validity" of th~ categories, while the second part deals 
79 
with the "objective reality" of the categories. The first 
part of the B Deduction is about the issue of the objective 
validity of the categories, while the second part of the B 
Deduction is about the objective reality of the categories. 
However, I extend Allison's meaning of objective reality 
beyond his own intended meaning. 
For Allison, objective reality means that a concept 
"refers or is applicable to an actual object. 1180 Since the 
framework of conceptualization lies within the categories, 
Allison says that "the claim of objective reality is 
79 Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p.134. 
80 Allison, p.135. Allison takes the term "objective 
reality" from section 26 of the B Deduction. 
138 
equivalent to the claim that they have a reference or 
applicability to whatever objects are given to us in 
intuition (objects of possible experience) . 1181 However, Kant 
does not simply claim that concepts and hence the categories 
have a reference to the objects given in our experience. 
Instead, Kant claims that the categories stand as the 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of our 
experience. In other words, the categories are our 
82 possibility of having any objects whatsoever. Allison's 
use of the term objective reality suggests this possibility, 
but Allison does not see all of the ramifications within the 
ontological context of Kant's discussion in the second 
section of the B Deduction. I see the second section of the 
B Deduction as an investigation into our understanding of 
objectivity. While I agree with Allison that the first part 
of the deduction is an investigation into the pbjective 
validity of the categories, i.e., an investigation into the 
right of their employment, I consider the second part of the 
B Deduction to be an investigation into our understanding of 
the being of objectivity. In other words, once Kant shows 
that the categories are applicable to experience, he can 
then show how objects themselves are possible. 
The paragraph immediately preceding section 15 
81 Allison, p. 135. 
82 We must remember that the object for us is an object 
of representations and not a Ding an sich. 
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provides the starting point for the B Deduction. In this 
paragraph, Kant focuses on the categories themselves. Kant 
says the categories are "concepts of an object in general, 
by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as 
determined in respect of one of the logical functions of 
judgment" (~128). This statement is a repetition of what 
Kant revealed in the metaphysical deduction. However, the 
purpose for the repetition is not one of summary. Kant 
repeats what he exposed in the metaphysical deduction for 
two reasons. First he wants to introduce the B Deduction by 
mentioning the necessity of the categories for experience. 
The categories are the logical functions of judgment 
directed toward sensibility. As categories of the 
understanding, the judgments that result from their use in 
experience lose some of the flexibility they possessed as 
mere logical propositions. Kant illustrates the loss of 
flexibility through an example of a categorical proposition. 
In logic, the subject and the predicate of a categorical 
proposition are interchangeable according to the rules of 
inference. However, experience does not allow the 
interchange of subject and predicate, since experience gives 
us a substantial reference. For example, when I claim that 
all dogs are mammals, I am not referring to the concept of 
dog merely as the subject of a sentence. I am referring to 
the concept dog as the substance to which a mammalian 
attribute inheres. As an universal claim about something in 
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experience, this proposition could not be logically 
converted without changing the whole referential structure 
of the sentence and thereby shifting the meaning of the 
intention in the proposition. 83 The categories have a 
necessity to them in terms of order and sequence that the 
logical functions of judgment alone do not possess. From 
what Kant has said in the transition to the B Deduction, we 
know that the argument of the B Deduction must be strictly 
transcendental and must show how the categories are 
necessary for an understanding of the objects of experience. 
Second, Kant's strategy in the first division of the B 
Deduction is to show how the categories are concepts of an 
object in general prior to their reference to determinate 
intuition. In other words, Kant wants to show how the 
categories are valid for sensible intuition in general, 
before he shows how they are applicable to our mode of 
intuition. Thus Kant sets up his argument transcendentally 
by showing the validity of the categories from themselves 
prior to developing their connection with intuition. 
However, we must keep in mind that the real validity of the 
applicability of the categories arises only through the 
exposure of their connection with intuition. 
Kant begins his argument for the objective validity of 
83 In Aristotelian logic, the valid conversion of the 
proposition "all dogs are mammals" is "some mammals are 
dogs." In this context, both the quantity and the subject of 
the proposition would change, thus altering the experience 
and intention within the sentence. 
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the categories in section 15 of the B Deduction by 
attempting to show where and how unity arises within 
experience. In order to show where unity arises, Kant looks 
at the difference between sensibility and understanding. On 
the one hand, our sensible capacity makes it possible for us 
to receive a manifold of representation in intuition. 
However, sensibility does not unify the manifold. What we 
sensibly receive would remain a chaotic morass without an 
act of unification, i.e., there would be a flow of 
sensations without connection. On the other hand, our 
cognitive capacity makes it possible to bring a manifold to 
concepts. This requires an act of unification, and the act 
of unification belongs to the understanding. Kant calls this 
act of unification combination. 
If unity arises in the understanding and is an act of 
combination, then Kant must examine how the combined unity 
is possible. Kant focuses his argument for the validity of 
the categories in the B Deduction initially on the concept 
of combination, so that he can gain access into the place 
that unity arises. As I stated above, we have the ability to 
receive the manifold of intuition through our senses, but we 
cannot unify the manifold through our sensible capacities. 
Instead, we combine the manifold through our cognitive 
capacity and represent the manifold to ourselves as a 
gathered unity. Combination is not receptive. Instead, 
combination is a spontaneous act of the understanding that 
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allows us to represent "the synthetic unity of the manifoldn 
(B131}. Hence, combination is a representation of a 
synthesized unity in experience. 
As a mode of gathering, Kant says that the act of the 
understanding called combination is a mode of synthesis, but 
it is not synthesis per se. Combination is the 
representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. As 
Kant says, combination contains the givenness of the 
manifold and its reproductive/productive synthesis. 
combination can generate neither the manifold nor the 
synthesis of the manifold. On the contrary, combination 
represents only the unity of the two. I have problems with 
Kant scholars who negate the role of the imagination in the 
B Deduction. Kant does not equate synthesis and combination. 
In light of the findings of the metaphysical deduction, 
combination cannot be synthesis itself. 84 Synthesis is and 
remains the function of the imagination. If Kant is not 
going to contradict himself, then combination cannot be 
identical with synthesis. 
Kant raises the issue of combination because 
combination is the act of the understanding that represents 
84 In the B deduction, Kant does not alter the 
metaphysical deduction, and the imagination retains its 
synthetic role within the context of the metaphysical 
deduction. Further, the imagination retains its synthetic 
function in the APP. If Kant considers the understanding to 
be synthetic in and of itself, then Kant is contradicting. 
himself. However, I do not see Kant contradicting himself in 
this context. 
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the unity of our experience, i.e., combination is only a 
representation of the synthetic unity. As a representation, 
combination presupposes a condition that makes the 
representation possible. Since combination is a 
representation of synthetic unity, a unifying capacity must 
make combination possible. Kant's argument proceeds along 
the path that similar things produce similar things, or like 
produces like. If we have a representation of unity, then 
something that generates unity should make the 
representation possible. Thus Kant needs to show the 
condition of the possibility of the representation of the 
synthetic unity. 
If the possibility of unity does not lie within 
sensibility, then the possibility of unity must lie within 
the understanding. In this context, Kant is not referring to 
the type of unity we find in a judgment. As he. says, the 
unity found in judgment is only quantitative and presupposes 
a combination of the manifold. In other words, the unity in 
judgment is only a representation of the unity in 
combination, which is only a representation of a primordial 
unity. 85 Thus judgment is twice removed from the primordial 
85 Kant makes a distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative unity. Quantitative unity is the type of unity 
found in an universal judgment, where we predicate an 
attribute to the entire class of entities contained in the 
subject term. Qualitative unity represents the unity of a 
whole. The plot of a novel is an example of qualitative 
unity. The plot runs throughout the text and holds the text 
together as an unity. In fact, the term qualitative does not 
(continued ... ) 
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unity. The primordial unity Kant is referring to is a unity 
that makes our experience of entities possible. The 
primordial unity "precedes a priori all concepts of 
combination" (B131}. 86 
The possibility of having representations requires 
that I am able to remain the same throughout all changes in 
my representations of entities. Otherwise, I could not 
retain what comes to me, and I would represent nothing. In 
other words, experience is only possible if there is a self-
identity underlying the changes in appearances. Kant calls 
this mode of self-identity "pure apperception" (B132). Pure 
apperception is Kant's name for self-consciousness. If I did 
not have the capability of remaining the same throughout the 
changes in appearances that I receive, I would have no 
experience. Further, mere consciousness of appearances is 
not enough to make experience possible. I must be conscious 
of my consciousness of appearances. Metaphorically, 
apperception is the theme of experience as the plot is the 
theme in a novel. If the theme is not present, the text does 
85 ( .•. continued) 
fit the unity of experience, since the type of unity Kant is 
referring to in the deduction makes the distinction between 
quantity and quality possible. Kant makes the distinction so 
that the category of the understanding will not be confused 
with the condition of the possibility of the categories. 
86 Kant says the primordial unity "vorhergeht" the 
unity of conceptualization in an a priori manner (Bl31). The 
idea of "going before" and "prior to" all point to a 
temporal meaning. A notion of futurity arises in this 
context. 
not hang together and falls apart. If apperception is not 
present, experience lacks cohesion. As the intelligible 
framework of experience, apperception interweaves itself 
throughout experience and makes the unity of experience 
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possible. Self-consciousness and its ability to apperceive 
the manifold grants a unity to the whole of our experience 
and is "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human 
knowledge" ( Bl35) . 
Since apperception relates to the understanding, Kant 
calls apperception the "I think" (B131). In other words, 
apperception is the Cartesian cogito accounted for 
transcendentally. In itself, the cogito is an "analytic" 
judgment, i.e., the cogito only represents what belongs to 
the self in and of itself. Knowing that I am a thinking 
entity does not enlarge my conception of myself. The 'I 
think' only represents an attribute that belongs to me and 
contains no empirical admixture. In other words, the cogito 
is an explicative and not an ampliative judgment. 
Nonetheless, the analytic nature of the 'I think' 
plays an important role within synthesis. On the one hand, 
the cogito itself is impenetrable for Kant in its analytic 
87 
character. On the other hand, the cogito synthetically 
unifies the manifold. The cogito combines and unifies the 
manifold, thus making a representation of the unity of the 
87 Heidegger takes issue with Kant on this point~ For 
Heidegger, the 'I think' is penetrable. The being of the 
'subject' is precisely what Heidegger undertakes in BT. 
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manifold possible. The cogito combines intuitively given 
representations and brings them to a unity. At this point, 
we have an object. As Kant says, "an object is that in the 
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
~nited" (8137). In other words, intuitive representations 
are not objective until they are unified by the 
understanding, i.e., unified by apperception. Since the 
unity provided by self-consciousness makes the object 
possible, self-consciousness has objective validity, i.e., 
it is the "objective condition of all knowledge" (8138). 
Once Kant establishes the pure apperception as the 
basis for knowledge, he begins to show how we represent the 
. t . d t d. 88 un1 y ln un ers an ing. As we saw in the metaphysical 
deduction, the logical forms of judgment make up the content 
of the understanding, and Kant calls the forms of judgment 
categories when they are employed experientially. In the B 
Deduction, Kant defines judgment as "the manner in which 
given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity 
of apperception" (8141). Kant claims that when I make a 
judgment about something, I am not expressing merely my 
subjective impressions about the thing. Instead I am 
asserting something about the object itself, viz., something 
about the way the object is regardless of how I perceive the 
object. A judgment expresses something about the being of 
the object. Thus Kant focuses upon the copula in judgments. 
88 Understanding is the "faculty of knowledge" (8137). 
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When I say 'the chalk is white, 1 I am not saying something 
about my impression of the chalk. I am claiming that this is 
the way the chalk actually is. The judgment receives an 
objective character through the copula, i.e., the judgment 
becomes object-related. 
From these investigations, Kant gives the proof for 
the objective validity of the categories in section 20. 89 
The argument is: 1. apperception is the condition for the 
unity of the manifold of intuition; 2. understanding is the 
faculty that makes objects possible; 3. we determine the 
manifold of intuition objectively through judgment; 4. we 
call the logical functions of judgment categories when we 
employ them in the manifold of intuition; 5. therefore, the 
categories are object-related and determine what we receive 
intuitively. In Kant's terms, "the manifold of intuition is 
necessarily subject to the categories 11 (8143). 
Kant's remarks in section 21 of the B Deduction 
complete the first division and provide a transition to the 
second division of the transcendental deduction. In the 
beginning of section 21, Kant repeats summarily the argument 
of section 20 regarding the objective vali~ity of the 
categories. The argument is simply that I combine 
necessarily the manifold of intuition through self-
consciousness, or pure apperception, and thereby I provide a 
89 The deduction itself is in fact only made up of 
three sections of the CPR. These sections are 17, 19 and 13. 
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necessary unity to experience by means of the content of 
self-consciousness. Since the categories of the 
understanding are the content of apperception, they provide 
the means through which we unify our experience. It follows 
from this that if self-consciousness provides a necessary 
unity for the manifold of intuition, then any empirical 
unity finds its necessity within the transcendental unity. 
From this conclusion, Kant points out that pure 
apperception, or self-consciousness, is the ground of any 
particular "empirical consciousness of a given manifold," 
i.e., the necessity of the categories for experience 
underlies our empirical possibility of categorization 
(B144). Kant has shown in the first part of the deduction 
how unity arises out of the understanding itself, and he has 
shown this without moving through the empirical realm. Thus 
we can see the professed transcendental character of the 
deduction. There is no back and forth movement to the B 
Deduction as there was in the A Deduction. Apperception 
shows forth the necessary unity within experience, since 
experience is not possible without self-consciousness and 
the identity of the self that issues from apperception. 
However, Kant has only shown that the categories 
possess a necessary applicability to intuition in general, 
but he has not shown how the applicability occurs. In other 
words, Kant has proven that the categories are the 
conditions through which we determine the manifold of 
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intuition, but he has not established the connection between 
the understanding and sensibility. This omission in the 
first division of B Deduction results from the 
transcendental nature of the deduction itself. Kant shows in 
the first division how the understanding unifies intuition 
in general, but he does not show how understanding unifies 
our empirical intuition. Kant's contention in the first 
division of the B Deduction is that understanding is 
applicable to any mode of sensible intuition. In other 
words, apperception is a requirement for any entity 
possessing a mode of intuition that is sensibly receptive. 
Apperception is there only to unify the manifold and not to 
create a manifold. Kant sees apperception as a necessary 
component for any finite entity. 90 
However, the fact that apperception is necessary for a 
finite entity does not establish how the categories function 
for our mode of sensibility. The true proof of the 
legitimate employment of the categories involves showing how 
the connection between understanding and sensibility occurs 
9° Kant is arguing that any sensibly intuitive entity 
requires apperception for its unity of experience. This does 
not mean that the entity must have the same exterior senses 
that we have, but only that the entity must be finite. Thus 
an intellectual understanding is not apperceptive, since it 
is not finite. When Kant speaks about apperception belonging 
to finite entities in general, I assume Kant has in mind 
extra-terrestrial entities, cherubim, angels and other such 
entities that could possibly exist. Animals would not fit 
this category, since an essential component of finitude is 
apperception. However, I do not know what this does for an 
argument except bring in imaginary entities. 
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for us. Kant must show empirical intuition stands in need of 
apperception. Kant addresses the issue of the connection 
between understanding and sensibility in the second part of 
the B Deduction. Further, the examination of the connection 
between understanding and sensibility is also an examination 
of our conception of objectivity. 
Kant begins the second division of the deduction with 
a discussion of the difference between thinking and knowing. 
I can think of numerous objects, but this does not mean that 
I know these objects of thought. If the object is not given 
intuitively, i.e., given in space and/or time, then the 
object is unknowable. Intuition is the material of the 
categories and the condition of the possibility of 
91 knowledge. However, the same problem exists for Kant in 
the B Deduction as in the A Deduction, viz., if we cannot 
conflate intuition and understanding, then how do intuition 
and understanding come together in order to obtain 
knowledge? 
Kant addresses the question of the connection between 
intuition and sensibility in sections 24-26 of the B 
Deduction. Sections 24-26 of the B Deduction are a 
condensation of the discussion of synthesis and the 
transcendental deduction in the A Deduction. The first part 
91 This conclusion has important consequences for the 
Transcendental Dialectic. Due to the lack of intuition, the 
area of special metaphysics comes to be excluded from the 
area of knowledge. 
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of section 24 is an investigation into the type of synthesis 
needed to connect understanding and intuition. The second 
part of section 24 and the entirety of section 25 follows 
with an examination of the different conceptions of the 
self, i.e., Kant examines the difference between inner sense 
and apperception. Section 26 is the presentation of the 
transcendental deduction in terms of synthesis and the need 
for unity in experience. 
In section 24, Kant distinguishes between two types of 
synthesis. On the one hand, he discusses and has discussed 
in the B Deduction "intellectual synthesis" (B151). On the 
other hand, he discusses for the first time in the B 
Deduction "figurative synthesis" (B151). Intellectual 
synthesis is the same as the notion of combination that Kant 
introduced in the beginning of the B Deduction. Intellectual 
synthesis is the synthetic unity of the manifold of 
intuition in general made possible by apperception and the 
categories. As Kant showed in the first part of the B 
Deduction, an intellectual synthesis is necessary for any 
sensibly intuitive entity and provides the necessary unity 
of experience. 
In intellectual synthesis, we can see that 
apperception is necessary for the unity of intuition. 
However, the categories are empty until they connected with 
intuition. Apperception and the categories cannot perform 
the connective synthesis, since they only provide unity to 
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experience. Instead, Kant sees that a figurative synthesis 
is necessary for the connection of understanding and 
intuition. The figurative synthesis is able to take up the 
manifold of intuition in inner sense and connect it with the 
understanding. Only through the figurative synthesis do the 
categories "obtain objective reality, that is, application 
to objects which can be given to us in intuition'' (B150). In 
other words, only through the figurative synthesis is the 
objectivity of the object possible. 
The figurative synthesis is a result of the 
transcendental imagination. Kant justifies the place of the 
imagination in making objectivity possible by describing the 
imagination as both a receptive and spontaneous capacity of 
the subject. As we saw in our discussion of the imagination 
in the APP, the imagination is sensible, since the 
imagination can present an image of an object without the 
object being present. In this sense, the imagination pushes 
us beyond our sensible mooring, while still keeping us tied 
to the sensible for the material of the imagination. 
Nonetheless, the imagination has a spontaneous character to 
it. The imagination functions without the mediation of our 
sensible capacity. As an act of spontaneity, the imagination 
and the understanding interact with one another and generate 
the possibility of the categories being applicable to 
sensible intuition. The act of figurative synthesis as an 
act of spontaneity is a function of the productive 
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imagination. 92 The transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination creates a space where the understanding and the 
imagination can come together. Kant says the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination stands as the ••ground" of all 
the ways in which the categories are applicable "to the 
objects of our possible intuition•• (5152). 
Even though Kant did not refer to the imagination as 
figurative synthesis in the A Deduction, a trace of the A 
Deduction arises in the B Deduction through Kant's analysis 
of figurative synthesis in the first paragraph. The first 
paragraph of section 24 is somewhat confusing. In the first 
half of the paragraph, Kant repeats his conclusions 
regarding combination, or what he now calls intellectual 
synthesis. In the second half of the paragraph, Kant 
discusses figurative synthesis. However, he does not inform 
us that he is discussing figurative synthesis until he has 
completed the initial description of it. The discussion of 
figurative synthesis involves a discussion of the phenomenon 
of inner sense. Since time is the "form of inner sense," a 
temporal element enters covertly into the discussion of 
figurative synthesis (A43,B49). Through inner sense, we have 
an intuitive awareness of ourselves as we are at any given 
92 Kant is very careful here to point out that the 
reproductive imagination only applies to the empirical law 
of association and "contributes nothing to the explanation 
of the possibility of a priori knowledge" (5152). This is an 
explicit instance of Kant trying to distance himself from 
the analysis of the A deduction and its empirical admixture. 
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moment. In other words, I appear to myself in inner sense. 
As an appearance, inner sense occurs in the present moment. 
Thus, inner sense is my awareness of the present. Figurative 
synthesis creates an interplay between inner sense and 
apperception. Imagination's ability to determine inner sense 
and connect inner sense with intuition is the ability of 
imagination to grasp the flow of time and offer it to 
apperception for unification. Apperception has no intuitive 
content and thus supplies nothing sensuous to experience. 
Apperception is dependent upon intuition for its content. 
Nonetheless, the unity provided in apperception is already 
operative so that the received intuition can be taken up and 
unified. Apperception reveals itself not merely as an "I 
think," but also as an "I can. 1193 In effect, Kant has 
maintained the character of futurity in apperception. The 
categories are what lie ahead of intuition and anticipate 
the unity in experience. The categories are prescriptive of 
the unity of an intuition in general. Further, apperception 
is a unity that is expectant of what is offered to it. 
Figurative synthesis reveals the temporal interplay. 
The difference between the A and B Deduction is the 
lack of the empirical analysis of synthesis in the B 
Deduction, and hence Kant omits the subjective deduction in 
the B edition. The B Deduction suffers from this omission, 
93 This is reminiscent of what we saw in the A 
deduction. 
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because Kant seems to think he cannot explicitly raise the 
issue of time in the analysis of the B Deduction. What comes 
to take the place of the discussion of synthesis is a 
discussion of the relationship between inner sense and 
apperception. 
Kant begins this discussion in the first paragraph of 
section 24, continues the discussion in the second half of 
section 24, and completes the discussion in section 25. In 
these later sections, the discussion occurs within the 
context of self-knowledge, i.e., how we know ourselves. 
Further, the discussion of the relationship between inner 
sense and apperception is about the limits of knowledge. 
Kant pointed out in sections 21 and 22 of the B 
Deduction that all our knowledge is subject to time, and 
this condition extends even to the possibility of knowing 
ourselves. Kant defines time as the form of inner sense, 
i.e., 11 the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" 
(A33,B49). In other words, inner sense is a mode of self-
affection. We can only know ourselves as we are affected by 
ourselves, i.e., as we intuit ourselves. Apperception grants 
my existence. In other words, my thinking and my existence 
94 
are given simultaneously with each other. However, since 
apperception possesses no intuitive character, no self-
94 Apperception is the cogito ergo sum, where my 
thinking implies my existence. However, there is in fact no 
act of inference in apperception, since the act of thinking 
is immediately bound to existence. 
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knowledge arises in apperception. 
The pertinence of the connection of the inner sense 
and apperception lies in Kant's discussion of what each 
contains. As we have seen, apperception makes combination 
possible, and apperception is the possibility of "object in 
general" through its categorical usage (B154). Inner sense 
is only the formal intuition of time. Inner sense allows us 
to be receptive of external and internal appearances, but 
inner sense ''contains no determinate intuition" (8154). On 
the one hand, apperception stands out ahead of itself as the 
possibility of unifying intuitions. On the other hand, inner 
sense is the condition of receiving intuitions, while 
possessing no determinate intuition itself. Intuition makes 
the presence of the object possible, understanding 
represents the present object. However, inner sense only 
makes the presence of the object possible in each moment the 
object is present. This is why inner sense has no 
determinate intuition, since inner sense, as the form of 
time, has no retentive capabilities. The possibility of a 
determinate intuition lies within the retentive character of 
the transcendental imagination, which Kant calls figurative 
synthesis. Without the retentive character of the figurative 
synthesis, which Kant calls productive synthesis, there is 
no connection of the categories with our intuition. The 
temporal character arises in the B Deduction, and thus the 
ideas of the A Deduction are present in the B Deduction, 
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onlY Kant does not develop the findings of the B Deduction 
as well as he does the findings of the A Deduction. 
The final step of the B Deduction arises in section 
26. Kant's purpose in this section is to show that the 
categories necessarily determine the objects we intuit. In 
this sectio~. Kant intends to show how the categories are 
"laws, 11 i.e., necessary ways of understanding objects. 
Further, these laws are the ways we come to understand 
objectivity. 
This is the one place in the B Deduction where Kant 
begins his argument with an empirical element. Kant begins 
with a brief discussion of the synthesis of apprehension. 
Kant describes the synthesis of apprehension as perception, 
i.e., as a conscious synthesis of the manifold wherein 
something empirically appears to us. Instead of describing 
the synthesis of apprehension in terms of the imagination as 
Kant does in the A Deduction, Kant describes the synthesis 
of apprehension in terms of the pure forms of intuition. The 
pure intuitions of space and time are the possibilities of 
having appearances, thus we would not have any perception of 
appearances without these conditions. Further, perception 
presupposes a unity of the manifold of intuition, since 
perception must be able to perceive something determinate. 
The pure intuitions are not concepts. They are intuitions, 
and thus they require a unity of the manifold if they are to 
be grasped. Since perceptual experience presupposes the 
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forms of intuitions for its appearances, and since intuition 
in general needs apperception for its unity, therefore 
apperception and its categories are conditions of the 
possibility for the unity of experience. Thus the categories 
make experience possible and are applicable to experience. 
I can use Descartes' wax example to illustrate Kant's 
argument. When Descartes put the wax by the fire, the wax 
underwent an alteration. The wax went from a solid to a 
fluid state. 95 I perceive two different states of the same 
object. The change of states occurs through a change in 
time, i.e., the one state follows upon the other state. Thus 
a temporal relationship emerges between the two events that 
is determined sequentially. Time itself does not appear in 
the experience. Rather I intuit the events temporally. My 
mode of intuition is at work in the way I perceive the 
event. The unity of the experience does not arise out of my 
intuition. Instead, the sequence of before and after is a 
result of the category of causality. The category of 
causality determines the way I understand the temporal flow 
and brings the flow to a unity. Kant says I can see this if 
I abstract from the form of time and realize that I am 
96 determining time by prescribing a rule to it. 
95 Other changes occurred, but I want to concentrate on 
this change. 
96 Descartes• problem with his description of the wax 
example is that he conflates sensing and thinking. Thus 
Descartes cannot see the intuitive character of the subject 
(continued ... ) 
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The categories do not simply give unity to our 
experience. Kant says they provide a priori "laws" to 
experience (8163). The categories can provide this function 
because what we know are our appearances and not the thing 
in itself. As such, the categories are the a priori modes of 
legislation for our appearances. Through their unity, the 
categories allow the object to appear for us and grant us 
our understanding of the object as object. The activity of a 
receptive-synthetic unity is how Kant understands 
objectivity, viz., these are the conditions of the 
possibility of the presence of the object. 
For the most part, Kant gives this argument without 
mentioning the imagination. Still, Kant cannot ignore the 
role of figurative synthesis and the findings of the A 
Deduction. Kant does finally retrieve the imagination in 
section 26, and Kant's remark at the end of this section is 
important to our discussion. Kant says, 
Now it is the imagination that connects the manifold of 
sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the 
unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the 
understanding, and for the manifoldness of its 
apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception 
is thus dependent upon ·the synthesis of apprehension, 
and this in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and 
therefore upon the categories. (8164) 
This quotation represents the entire argument of the A 
Deduction condensed into two sentences. Kant presents the 
96 ( ••• continued) 
offering material up for unification through the categories 
of the understanding. 
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imagination precisely as the capacity that connects the 
manifold of intuition and offers the manifold up to the 
understanding. The understanding can then perform its 
intellectual synthesis upon the imagination and provide 
experience with its necessary unity. Since perception is an 
empirical synthesis, and the empirical synthesis presupposes 
a transcendental synthesis, therefore the productively 
synthetic power of the imagination makes perception 
possible. Through the imagination, the categories become 
applicable. If the imagination make the applicability of the 
categories possible, then the imagination is responsible for 
the presence of the object. Only through the imagination 
does the objectivity of the object become possible. Without 
synthesis, the understanding could not connect up with 
intuition. In this sense, the imagination retains its place 
of priority in the B Deduction. However, I must admit that 
Kant does not explicitly draw out the imagination's 
ontological priority as well in the B Deduction as he does 
in the A Deduction. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DOUBLE READINGS OF THE KANTIAN IMAGINATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Kant's investigation of the imagination in the CPR 
gives rise to diverse possibilities that take thought down 
different paths. On the one hand, Kantian metaphysics 
disrupts the older dogmatic metaphysics and recenters 
metaphysics around the ground established by the subject. 97 
In other words, Kant's thought decenters metaphysics by 
redefining the sensible/intelligible opposition and 
recenters metaphysics in terms of the new definition. On the 
other hand, Kant's thought gives rise to possibilities that 
extend beyond the confines and intentions of his own 
project, i.e., gives rise to possibilities that extend 
beyond the metaphysical project in general. In other words, 
Kant's investigation of the imagination gives rise to the 
possibility of the displacement of metaphysics and 
correspondingly to the displacement of concept of 
97 For example, the Kantian recentering of metaphysics 





In this chapter, I examine the latter possibility and 
see how Kant's conception of the imagination decenters 
metaphysical thought and displaces the concept of 
subjectivity. Unlike metaphysical thought, which replaces 
the decentered ground with a new ground, the latter 
possibility of displacement does not give rise to 
replacement. In other words, the displacement of the subject 
as the ground of metaphysics does not give rise to a new 
ground. Instead, the thinking that arises in the 
displacement brings the very concept of ground into 
98 question. Since I contend that the imagination is the 
place where the displacement occurs in Kant's thought, and 
since the imagination is essentially linked to synthesis, 
98 I call the type of investigation that examines 
metaphysical displacement a double reading. A double reading 
is an act performed upon a text, but a text is not simply a 
book. A text is a play of differential forces that give rise 
to meaning. Further, a text is structured according to 
theories and practices that surround the situation of the 
given text. However, there are elements within any text that 
structure the text and yet are not accounted for within the 
text. In other words, no text is completely self-contained. 
In terms of metaphysical thought, no text is self-present. 
A double reading examines the text in terms of 
unaccountable elements within the text. As its name implies, 
a double reading has two components. First a double reading 
must allow the text to have its play. In other words, the 
reading must make the intentions, arguments and purposes of 
the text manifest. Second the reading must show from the 
text itself how elements arise that disrupt the project of 
the text. These unaccounted elements cannot be incorporated 
into the text and thus disrupt the intended project. The 
disruption of the original project of the text points to 
other possibilities that cannot be thought within the 
confines of the text itself. 
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then the synthetic character of the imagination is the place 
to investigate the displacement of the subject. 
This chapter has three sections. First I examine 
Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination in terms of 
the phenomenon of transcendence. Specifically, I want to 
show how Heidegger's interpretation of the imagination 
exposes a need to rethink the phenomenon of the self outside 
of the context of the metaphysics of subjectivity. Second I 
explore the possibility of imaginative displacement by 
examining Heidegger's destructive retrieval of the 
imagination in KPM. Particularly, I want to show how the 
retrieval of the imagination in terms of transcendence 
brings the very concepts of subjectivity and ground into 
question and leads to the f initude of Dasein. In this 
section, I am also going to develop Heidegger's 
understanding of self as the questioner. Third I perform a 
deconstructive reading upon the Kantian investigation of the 
imagination and see how the imagination functions as a trace 
within Kant's metaphysics. In other words, I examine the 
effect of the imagination upon the conception of subject and 
show how the imagination introduces an irreducible absence 
into the project of the metaphysics of presence. The 
introduction of a irreducible absence into the project of 
metaphysics disrupts metaphysics and brings the metaphysical 
project itself into question. 
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B. IMAGINATION AND TRANSCENDENCE 
In this section, I investigate Heidegger's 
interpretation of the imagination in terms of transcendence. 
In order to understand the relationship between 
transcendence and the imagination, I must first discuss 
Heidegger's thesis in KPM. Here I discuss Heidegger's 
conception of retrieval and the reason he reads Kant in 
terms of transcendence. Second I investigate explicitly the 
relationship between the imagination and transcendence. Here 
I examine the relationship between the imagination and 
temporality. This examination focuses on Heidegger's reading 
of the Kantian analysis of the imagination's three-fold 
synthesis and the phenomenon of self-affection. Third I show 
how Heidegger's examination of the imagination in the 
Critique of Pure Reason displaces the conception of a 
rational self-grounding subject and calls for an 
understanding of the self outside of the conception of self-
consciousness. The third part of this section provides the 
transition to Heidegger's retrieval of Dasein and the 
project of fundamental ont9logy from his interpretation of 
the imagination. 
In KPM, Heidegger undertakes a retrieval of Kant's 
thought. The purpose of the retrieval is to uncover the 
latent possibilities within Kant's philosophy that relate to 
Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology in Being and 
Time. Heidegger says that the project of KPM is to interpret 
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Kant's analysis of pure reason as a ''Qrundlegung der 
Metaphysik," i.e., to interpret Kant's project as 
establishing a foundation for metaphysics in general, or as 
a meta-metaphysics. 99 However, Heidegger's project does not 
end with the exposure of the Kantian ontology. For the first 
time in the history of philosophy, Heidegger makes 
metaphysics itself a problem by showing that metaphysics has 
not accounted for its own possibility, i.e., has not 
accounted for its own ground. Thus Heidegger radicalizes the 
project of metaphysics. 
By claiming that Heidegger radicalizes the project of 
metaphysics, I am claiming that there is a difference 
between setting up a foundation and questioning the act of 
foundation setting. Even though we can interpret Kant's 
project in the CPR as a meta-metaphysics, Kant remains 
entrenched within the problematic of his philosophical era. 
Within his era, the questioning of the possibility of 
metaphysics itself, i.e., the very happening of metaphysics, 
is not what is questioned. Instead, Kant presupposes the 
metaphysical project and only shows us how to set 
metaphysics on its proper ground. Kant informs us of what 
the ground is, but he does not question the phenomenon of 
99 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.l. Heidegger 
points out that Kant was aware that his own project was a 
meta-metaphysics. See KPM, p.238, and Immanuel Kant, "Letter 
to Marcus Herz [about May 11, 1781]," in Philosophical 
Correspondence, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967), p.95. 
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ground and thus is not able to account for the possibility 
of metaphysics itself. 
In order to account for the possibility of metaphysics 
itself, Heidegger brings the phenomenon of ground into 
question. In other words, Heidegger questions the act of 
foundation setting. Questioning the act of foundation 
setting requires the questioner to step back from the 
unquestioned condition and to turn it into a problem. By 
turning the act of foundation setting into a problem, 
Heidegger shows how a conception of f initude makes our 
comportment to being possible, and from this shows how 
finitude leads to a fundamental ontology that underlies and 
ultimately disrupts the metaphysical project. 100 
Since the projects of Kant and Heidegger are 
different, Heidegger's retrieval cannot simply be a 
duplicating of the Kantian philosophy. Instead, the purpose 
of the retrieval is to uncover latent possibilities within 
Kant's thought that extend beyond the limits of the Kantian 
philosophy. Since the project of fundamental ontology is the 
disclosure of time as the meaning of being, Heidegger seeks 
too I can specify the difference between Kant's and 
Heidegger' projects in terms of the ontological difference. 
Kant places the ground, or sets up the foundation, of 
metaphysics in the subject. Thus he conflates being with an 
entity. Heidegger recognizes that being cannot be an entity, 
even though our access to being occurs through Dasein. For 
Heidegger, being is neither reducible to nor founded upon an 
entity. Thus the onto-theological condition of metaphysics, 
which Kant stands within, becomes questionable through the 
recognition of the ontological difference. 
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for the meaning of being within Kant's thought and finds a 
sense of the meaning of being within Kant's analysis of the 
fundamental relationship between the imagination and time. 
In other words, Heidegger shows in KPM how the finitude of 
our existence makes metaphysics possible. 
In KPM, Kant serves as a "Ftirsprecher" for 
lOl Wh' l K t d t li i 1 th Heidegger. i e an oes no exp c t y express e 
possibility of fundamental ontology in CPR, i.e., does not 
thematize human finitude as such, Kant does give a temporal 
analysis of perception and hence gives a temporal analysis 
of the being of the object, or objectivity. Thus Kant 
glimpses the temporal horizon underlying being and entities, 
and Heidegger exploits this Kantian insight. Heidegger 
creates an affinity with Kant and uses the Kantian project 
as a place of refuge for his own project of fundamental 
102 
ontology. 
As a refuge, Heidegger reads Kant in terms of the 
issue of transcendence. Heidegger presents the issue of 
transcendence in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
Heidegger's interpretation of transcendence centers around 
his retrieved conception of the Platonic "epekeina tes 
101 Ibid., p.xiv. 
102 The use of a thinker as a Ftirsprecher is very 
prevalent in Heidegger's early thought. For example, 
Heidegger uses Aristotle as a speaker for his thought in BP 
and "On the Being and Conception of Physis in Aristotle's 
Physics B,1." 
~sias", or that which is beyond being. 103 In Platonic 
metaphysics, the sun stands as the image of that which is 
beyond being, viz., the good. Heidegger understands the 
104 beyond as "transcendence." Transcendence is what makes 
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being itself comprehensible, and Heidegger understands the 
beyond, or transcendence, as temporality. Temporality is the 
horizon through which we understand being. As the horizon, 
temporality stands as the limit that allows for being to be 
understood. Since being is always the being of entities in 
general or a particular region of entities, temporality 
stands as the possibility of understanding entities in terms 
of their being. In other words, temporality makes an 
ontological understanding possible. For example, if we have 
an understanding of entities as present things and being is 
an understanding of entities, then we understand being as 
105 presence. Through our understanding of being as presence, 
an entity comes to emerge for us as a present thing. 106 
103 BP, p.283. I present the Greek in a transliteration 
because that is the way the Greek passages are presented in 
the English text. 
104 BP,p.285. 
105 Presence is an interpretation of the word 
Anwesenheit. 
106 Understanding and cognition are two different acts 
in Heidegger's thought. On the one hand, understanding is a 
mode of our being, i.e., we exist as being out in our world 
already amongst entities. Without our projection into the 
world, entities would not appear for us. The fact that we 
are in the midst of entities shows us that we understand 
being. Further, we understand being for the most part 
unthematically. On the other hand, cognition is always 
(continued ... ) 
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107 For Heidegger, transcendence is world-understanding. 
since Dasein understands him/herself as being-in-the-world, 
transcendence is a mode of self-understanding for Dasein. 108 
In existing, Dasein is out beyond him/herself already in a 
world and understanding him/herself from out of that world. 
This is possible only on the basis of the ecstatic-
horizonal unity of temporality that allows Dasein to be open 
to his/her world. 109 The temporal understanding allows 
entities to appear and to be understood in terms of their 
being. 
The issue of transcendence is the issue that Heidegger 
takes up with Kant. Heidegger is seeking the mode of 
transcendence in Kant's philosophy. Since a retrieval is a 
gathering of what is unthought within a thinker's thought, 
106 ( ••• continued) 
entity-related for Heidegger. We know things. However, we 
know things only because we possess a pre-understanding of 
being. 
107 The world is neither an entity nor a collection of 
entities for Heidegger. The world is the contextual horizon 
through which we have entities. Heidegger calls world 
"being" in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. 
Michael Heim, (Bloomington! IN: Indiana University, 1984), 
p.218. 
108 Dase1·n 1·s H id 1 f th 1 ti hi e egger s name or e re a ons p 
between ourselves and our comportment to being. What is 
unique about the human being is that the human being directs 
him/herself toward entities in their being and never simply 
comports him/herself toward entities. Dasein·is not a 
subject, since the understanding of ourselves as subjects 
arises in opposition to an object. This is why Heidegger 
does not use the term subject in his philosophical analyses. 
109 The term ecstatic means to be outside or displaced. 
Heidegger refers to the dimensions of time as ecstases. 
170 
Heidegger is seeking for the place in Kant's thought where 
transcendence manifests itself. Heidegger finds 
transcendence within Kant's analysis of imagination. Since 
transcendence is the unthought element within Kant's 
thought, Kant could only glance at the beyond and thus could 
only hint at the possibility of transcendence. In seeking 
for the element of transcendence in Kant's thought, 
Heidegger reads Kant as seeking for what makes metaphysics 
itself possible. 
In order to move to the core of Heidegger's analysis 
of Kant, I focus on Heidegger's analysis of the three modes 
of synthesis in the CPR and on Heidegger's analysis of self-
affection. I analyze the syntheses of the imagination and 
self-affection because both phenomena lead Heidegger into a 
retrieval of fundamental ontology. Heidegger finds a mode of 
transcendence in Kant's conception of the imagination, and 
he finds a radical sense of finitude in self-affection. Thus 
the analysis of the imagination moves us into Heidegger's 
retrieval of fundamental ontology. Keeping within 
Heidegger's purpose, I investigate only the analysis of the 
imagination in the subjective deduction of the A edition. 110 
llO Since I have shown that the A Deduction arises in 
the B Deduction, I can legitimately combine the insights 
from both Deductions together. On the one hand, Kant's 
investigation into the imagination is developed better in 
the A Deduction than in the B deduction. On the other hand, 
the relationship between self-affection and apperception is 
developed better in the B Deduction than in the A Deduction. 
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However, the analysis of self-affection in the B edition of 
the CPR assists us in our understanding of Heidegger's 
account of self-affection. 
My investigation of the A and B Deductions in the CPR 
has shown that the imagination has an ontological function 
within Kant's thought. Further, the imagination does not 
lose its place of priority in the Kantian project. Without 
the synthetic character of the imagination, there would not 
be any experience. Since the place of the imagination in the 
B Deduction does not change, the same issues arise for the B 
Deduction as they do in the A Deduction. 
In my analysis in this section, I must repeat the 
analysis of Kant given in the preceding chapter. However, I 
am not simply reiterating what I examined previously. The 
repetition must bring out the possibilities suggested by 
Kant's text itself. In other words, the analysis of the 
imagination and self-affection must turn metaphysics into a 
problem. Since Heidegger is reading Kant's text from the 
horizon of time as the understanding of being, we must see 
111 
where the temporal understanding of being arises. Once I 
expose the problematic character of metaphysics, I can turn 
111 The horizon is also a margin, since the horizon 
demarcates the text and exposes "latent" possibilities 
within the text. Prior to the actual retrieval in KPM, 
Heidegger is bringing the horizon to the forefront and thus 
incorporating the margin into the text. The act of 
incorporation is disruptive to the metaphysical text. I will 
examine the disruptive character of incorporation when I 
examine the retrieval. 
mY attention to the retrieval. 
Heidegger's thesis in KPM regarding the Kantian 
conception of the imagination is that the transcendental 
imagination is the "common root" out of which spring the 
"two stems" of intuition and understanding. 112 Heidegger's 
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thesis of the common root has been contested, but it 
presents a fascinating reading of Kant. 113 If the imagination 
is the common root of the other faculties, then the issue of 
synthesis is a key element in understanding the role of the 
imagination. 
If Kant is seeking for the conditions of the 
possibility of the ground of experience in a priori 
synthetic judgments, then the place we find synthesis should 
provide us with the account of the ground. Imagination is 
the place where synthesis takes place. Kant says that: 
synthesis in general ... is the mere result of the power 
of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of 
the soul, without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever 
conscious (A78, B103). 
The imagination synthesizes the content of the 
faculties of the subject that need to come together in order 
to have knowledge. These faculties are sensibility and 
understanding. On the one hand, sensibility provides us 
112 KPM, p.41. Also pp. 144-176. 
113 An interesting variation on Heidegger's thesis is 
Deleuze's reading of Kant in Kant's Critical Philosophy. 
Deleuze reads the three Critiques around the idea of common 
sense, which involves the imagination in each Critique. 
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either with appearances in the empirical realm or with the 
possibility of appearances on the transcendental level. In 
other words, sensibility provides the subject with a 
manifold of intuition that is in need of unification. On the 
other hand, understanding provides us with a way to grasp 
the appearances as an unity or a whole. The understanding 
supplies modes of unity to sensibility. 
The imagination brings the content of sensibility and 
understanding together. Without the ability to bring the 
modes of representation of the two together, knowledge would 
not be possible. We have seen this in the investigation of 
the transcendental deductions. The synthetic function of the 
imagination illuminates being and entities and thus makes 
knowledge possible. If entities are what is known in terms 
of their Being, then the imagination is the condition making 
this possible. As an illuminating power, the imagination 
must be beyond being and entities, since imagination opens 
up the space within which the two can be understood. We can 
already see an element of transcendence arise in the 
imagination. 
If presence is our understanding of being, then the 
element of temporality that emerges in the imagination 
should reflect this understanding of being. The 
understanding of being as presence arises in the CPR. Kant's 
analysis of a priori synthetic knowledge is not only an 
analysis of pure mathematics or pure natural science. The 
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project of the CPR is also an investigation into the 
possibility of objectivity, i.e., an investigation into the 
possibility of the presence of the object. Since the 
presence of the object happens for a subject, the 
investigation into objectivity is an investigation into 
perception. Specifically, the CPR is an investigation into 
the conditions of the possibility of perception. 
Since the act of perception is always a perception of 
the perceived object, perception takes place in the presence 
of the object. Within a temporal framework, perception 
encounters the perceived object as the object is given at 
114 the moment, i.e., as the object is given now. If the CPR 
is an investigation into the conditions of the possibility 
of the object, then the CPR is an investigation into the 
presence of the object. In other words, the CPR is an 
investigation into the mode of temporality we call the 
present and its mode of constitution. As Kant goes on to 
show, the constitution of the present is a result of 
synthesis. 
In the A Deduction, Kant attempts to show how a 
synthesis is present in each of the subject's faculties. In 
114 The Kantian project in the CPR is an investigation 
into the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. ! 
priori synthetic knowledge comprises theoretical physics, 
formal mathematics and metaphysics. However, empirical 
knowledge presupposes our a priori capacities. Without pure 
intuitions and the categories, there would be no perception. 
Thus the CPR becomes an analysis of the possibility of 
perception. 
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other words intuition, imagination and understanding utilize 
a mode of synthesis. The three modes of synthesis correspond 
to different modes of time. Intuition has a mode of 
synthesis that uncovers the present, imagination has a mode 
of synthesis that uncovers the past, and understanding has a 
mode of synthesis that uncovers the future. 
Kant calls the synthesis operative in intuition the 
"synthesis of apprehension 11 (A99). The problem that Kant 
considers in this context is how the present moment is 
possible. On an experiential and intuitive level, a manifold 
is given. However, the appearance of a thing requires that 
the manifold of intuition congeals into whole. In order to 
have an appearance, the manifold has to be held together so 
that the given impressions are 11 distinguished in timen and 
"contained in a single moment." (A99). The single moment is 
the present. In other words, the present is synthesized out 
of the manifold of intuition. The present moment occurs 
because the manifold can appear in time and is held 
together. The present is the result of a synthesis that 
occurs a priori in intuition. 
Without synthesis, the manifold would have no cohesion 
and experience would not occur. Sensibility itself does not 
synthesize, only imagination synthesizes. For a thing to 
appear and be held in the now, imagination must be at work. 
The imaginative synthesis makes the empirical apprehension 
of something possible because it makes the present moment 
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itself possible. Further, if imagination is making the 
present possible and we conceive of time as a succession of 
now points, then the imagination actually takes on the 
115 
character of time. 
The second synthesis that occurs is on the level of 
the imagination, and Kant calls the imaginative synthesis 
"reproduction" (AlOO). We can only understand the synthesis 
of reproduction in reference to synthesis of apprehension. 
If there were no way to connect the present moment with the 
moment that preceded it, then there would be a disconnected 
bundle of appearances. In other words, if I were always "to 
lose" what preceded my present thought or experience, then I 
would not have any continuity to my thoughts or experience 
( A102). 116 However, experience is not a bundle of random, 
disconnected perceptions. Experience is only possible if 
what is given in the past moment is brought along in the 
present moment, i.e., reproduced. Empirically, this is a 
result of the imagination's ability to associate various 
images and hold them together. In other words a synthesis 
connects the past images of the thing to the present 
115 1n light of this, one can see why Heidegger entitles 
this section in KPM "Pure Synthesis as Pure Imagination," 
because time and imagination are joined together. 
116 Norman Kemp Smith translates "verlieren" as "to 
drop," and I am translating it as "to lose." Smith makes it 
sound as if the loss of preceding representations were an 
intentional act, which could not be the case. Moreover, 




As reproductive, the imagination is in need of a 
productive power that allows for the empirical gathering to 
occur. Thus an a priori imagination arises for Kant that 
makes possible the continuity of the past with the present. 
on the a priori level, the imagination's synthetic activity 
is not one of associating or reproducing images. Instead the 
imagination becomes the synthesis of the time-series itself. 
The past is kept with the present. Thus the synthesis is 
temporal, i.e., the imagination's synthetic activity 
constitutes time. 117 Imagination takes on a retentive 
character that holds the temporal flow together. This makes 
empirical experience possible, since we retain the past with 
the present. 
Having shown the temporal character of synthesis and 
the emergence of the past and the present, we are left with 
one mode of time, viz., the future. If the present emerges 
intuitively and the past emerges productively in 
imagination, then the future should emerge from the 
understanding. However, a problem arises regarding the 
traditional interpretation of both the und~rstanding and of 
Kant's philosophy in general. We do not generally consider 
understanding and apperception, or self-consciousness, to be 
117 The empirical association of representations takes 
place in time. However, the possibility of association does 
not take place in time, since the possibility of association 
occurs as the constitution of time. 
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118 temporal. The general interpretation of the understanding 
119 Js that it is atemporal. Thus the question arises: is it 
possible to interpret the understanding temporally? 
The third sense of synthesis that Kant discusses is 
the "synthesis of recognition in a concept" (A103). If a 
sense of the future is to arise in the understanding, then 
the future should appear in the synthesis of recognition. 
Kant introduces this section through a reference to time. He 
states that reproduction is "useless" without the ability of 
consciousness to generate a sense of sameness to the 
reproduced moments ( Al03) . 120 Thus there must be an act of 
consciousness that provides a unity to what is apprehended 
and reproduced. Based upon what I show regarding the 
temporal interpretation of the syntheses of apprehension and 
reproduction, I can say there must be an act of 
consciousness that provides a unity to the pa~t and the 
present. Kant calls this act of consciousness "recognition." 
The synthetic act of recognition takes place in the 
understanding through the act of concept formation. In order 
to be able to represent the thing I perceive as the self-
118 KPM, p.189. 
119 Heidegger takes issue with the interpretation of the 
atemporal character of the understanding by showing how the 
future emerges in the understanding. 
120 The German reads: "Ohne Bewusstsein, dass das, was 
wir denken, eben dasselbe sei, was wir einen Augenblick 
zuvor dachten, wiirde alle Reproduktion in der Reihe der 
Vorstellungen vergeblich sein" (A103). 
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same thing, I must be aware that what I am perceiving is 
what I perceived previously and am continuing to perceive. 121 
For Kant, I can only maintain this awareness if the unity 
stands out ahead of me and generates the possibility of the 
unity. The way unity arises in consciousness is through the 
concept. Through the concept, the understanding unifies the 
past and the present, since the understanding possesses a 
mode of unity that stands in advance of the other two 
temporal modes. 
As standing in advance of the past and the present, 
the understanding is anticipatory. Without the anticipatory 
character of the understanding, I would never know that the 
thing I see before me right now is the thing that was there 
a moment ago. The anticipatory character of the 
understanding exposes the role of the future and completes 
the circuit of time. The purpose of the synthesis of 
recognition is to move beyond the present perception of the 
object and the retained images by forming a unity that 
allows us to recognize the experienced thing as the self-
same thing. The recognition occurs only if that which is 
being cognized anticipates the connection of the past and 
121 Since I am describing an act of perception, I must 
assume that I only continue to re-cognize the thing as I am 
perceiving it. However, the act of recognition extends 
beyond the act of perception. All acts dealing with entities 
involve recognition. For example, recognition must be 
operative in memory. If I were not able generate a sense of 
sameness, then I could not recall and recognize what I 
remember. 
present. The a priori unity is futural, in the sense that 
apperception precedes the empirical experience and gives 
unity to the experience. 122 This unity rendered by the 
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concept in apperception must already be given in advance, or 
the unity is only haphazard. As a projection of unity, the 
understanding has the ability to project the possibility of 
unity in advance. The understanding finds itself in the 
temporal structure as being "Vorbildung" i.e., pre-
123 formative. If we interpret understanding in terms of 
apperception, then the unity of apperception serves as that 
which grants in advance the possibility of unity. Since 
unity is a result of synthesis, the imagination operates in 
the gathering. As such, the three-fold structure of time 
emerges within a unified horizon made possible by the 
imagination. 
If we direct our attention to what Heidegger has 
exposed in these sections, we see that the three ecstases, 
or modes, of time, viz., the past, the present and the 
future, emerge in terms of the syntheses operative in each 
faculty. If time is a whole as Kant says it is, then the 
three ecstases must be connected. Since synthesis is the 
connective power and imagination is the power of synthesis, 
then imagination appears as the whole in which the three 
modes interweave with each other. 
122 Kant says literally vorhergehen, to go ahead of. 
123 KPM, p.191. 
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A problem arises here regarding the imagination. On 
the one hand, imagination plays a specific role within 
knowledge by making the past possible. On the other hand, 
imagination is responsible for the three modes of synthesis, 
since imagination is the power of synthesis in general. The 
two-fold function of the imagination exposes a fundamental 
ambiguity in Kantian thought. On one level of the Kantian 
analysis, imagination is a faculty and has its own place 
within the possibility of knowledge. On another level, 
imagination is a power that opens and holds together the 
temporal horizon where things appear. This ambiguity 
expresses the fact that while on one level imagination can 
be regarded as a faculty of the subject, on another level 
the imagination makes subjectivity itself possible. 124 How 
can the imagination be a synthetic power operative 
throughout each of the faculties and still have its own 
place in one of the modes of time? How is this ambiguity 
reconciled? 
Kant does not reconcile the ambiguity. Since Kant 
operates with a faculty psychology, Kant maintains 
consistently the role of the three faculties in his 
philosophy. Yet, the questionable role of the imagination 
124 We have also seen the ambiguity expressed in Kant 1 s 
inability to assign the imagination a definitive place in 
his works. In the APP, Kant analyzed the imagination in 
terms of sensibility, while he analyzed the imagination in 
terms of the understanding in the CPR. As Heidegger says, 
"the transcendental imagination is homeless." KPM, p.142. 
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keeps arising in the Deductions, particularly in the areas 
where Kant analyzes the self. The strength of Kant's 
analyses brings the ambiguity to the surface, even though 
Kant cannot see that the ambiguity requires moving beyond 
the conceptual framework of metaphysics. 
In order to deal with the ambiguity, Heidegger 
analyzes the sense of the self that emerges in Kant's 
thought. Heidegger's argument is that the self is 
essentially temporal. The argument for the temporal 
character of selfhood does not mean that the self is in 
time. Rather, the argument for the temporal character of 
selfhood means that the understanding of our being and the 
being of objects is temporal. Heidegger calls this mode of 
ontological self-understanding finitude. 
The basis of Heidegger's argument rests upon both the 
conception of the imagination as the common root of 
intuition and understanding and the temporal understanding 
of the imagination that arises in the analysis of synthesis. 
Heidegger understands the conception of the common root in 
terms of the concepts of origin and reduction. As the common 
root, the imagination functions as the origin of intuition 
and understanding. However, the imagination is not the 
origin of the two stems of knowledge in an ontic sense, as 
if the imagination could give birth to intuition and 
understanding. Instead, the origin is a disclosure of the 
ontological possibilities present within the phenomena 
themselves. In the context of Kantian thought, the 
imagination is the disclosure of the ontological 
possibilities of the intuition and the understanding for 
objectivity. 
We must grasp the origin of the understanding and 
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intuition in the imagination as a reduction. The use of the 
concept reduction in this context has an ontological 
signification just as the term origin does. In other words, 
reduction does not mean to shrink or condense in size. 
Instead, an ontological reduction exposes the understanding 
of being operative within a given context. We must 
understand the reduction of intuition and understanding to 
the imagination in the same way as we understand the 
imagination as an origin, i.e., the imagination shows forth 
the inherent possibilities of the two stems of ontological 
knowledge. In terms of the reduction, the imagination is the 
understanding of being for the two stems of ontological 
knowledge. 
The origin and reduction of the two faculties to the 
imagination arises in Heidegger's examination of the Kantian 
conception of the self. Two senses of the ~elf emerge in the 
CPR. The self emerges as self-affection in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, and as apperception or self-
consciousness in the Transcendental Analytic. First 
125 Heidegger analyzes self-affection. Self-affection, or 
125 KPM, p.193. 
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inner sense, is essentially temporal. As Kant says, time is 
"the form of inner sense'' (A33, B50). Unlike the exterior 
senses that function only in proximity to something 
external, inner sense does not possess the requirement of 
external proximity in order to function. I only have to be 
in proximity to myself in order to be affected by myself. 
Since I am always in proximity to myself, the spatial 
character, understood as outer intuition loses its 
126 designation. Pure self-affection is a feeling of myself 
without being affected by my exterior senses. The ability to 
feel myself as existing occurs through the intuitive 
character of time. Time does not affect the self from the 
outside, i.e., time is neither a Ding an sich that contains 
the self nor a perceivable entity. Instead time is the way 
in which the self is able to be affected. I feel myself as 
enduring throughout change, and I feel this sense of 
duration in terms of succession and simultaneity. In other 
words, I feel my presence. This occurs due to time's 
11 formative 11 and "receptive" character. 127 As formative, time 
presents the field, or horizon, in which things can come to 
appear. Yet at the same time the possibility of this field 
126 A character of spatiality emerges in the context of 
being in proximity to myself, but the spatial character 
cannot be accounted for within Kantian philosophy. Kant 
conceives of space only in terms of being directed to things 
outside of me. A sense of spatiality as differing, as 
creating a space where I can appear to myself is something I 
will take up in the deconstructive reading. 
127 KPM, p.194. 
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already being there with me allows the self to be receptive. 
The auto-affective mode of the self is a structure of the 
self's being. 
However, Kant tells us in the CPR that "intuitions 
without concepts are blind", and that 11 concepts without 
intuitions are empty" (A51,B75). Thus along with being self-
affective, we are also apperceptive. Apperception has a 
temporal character. This implies that the sense of the self 
involved in the understanding is a temporal self. The 
possibility of bringing appearances to unity as objects that 
stand over and against the self, which Heidegger calls the 
act of "ob-jectification, 11 depends on the fact that 
128 
apperception also involves a pre-formative act. Thus 
apperception is ready for time, since apperception is always 
already there to give unity to the field. I am ahead of 
myself apperceptively. Apperception is only there to give 
unity to the open field that time creates or forms for 
apperception. 
If self-affection opens up the field where 
apperception can function, then auto-affection and 
apperception are not disparate views of the self merely 
alongside one another. Instead the two are 11 the same. 11129 
This does not mean that the two are identical, for Kant does 
not conflate the two senses of the self. They are the same 
128 KPM, p.195. 
t29 KPM, p.197. 
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because they expose the self in its unified character. The 
unified character of the self arises out of the self's 
temporal character. Only a unified finite self can be a 
knower and receiver. In other words, the self emerges as 
transcendent, i.e., the self emerges as receptive and 
apperceptive due to the self's temporal condition. As Kant 
points out repeatedly, if there is no time then there are no 
objects. 
The imagination emerges in this discussion of selfhood 
as the essence of selfhood. As Kant shows, the imagination 
is that capacity that is both receptive and spontaneous. The 
characteristics of receptivity and spontaneity are precisely 
the characteristics of selfhood that emerge in self-
affection and apperception. The receptive character of the 
self allows the self to be in the present through its 
retention with the past, while the spontaneous character of 
the self maintains the presence of the self by allowing the 
self to be out ahead of itself. Heidegger interprets Kant as 
saying that the self is necessarily finite. This does not 
mean that the self predicates finitude to itself, as if time 
were merely an attribute of the self. Rather the self is 
radically finite, meaning that all understanding proceeds in 
terms of a temporal interpretation. 130 If we recall the 
three-fold synthesis of the imagination, then the temporal 
130 I understand this sense of temporal understanding in 
terms of Heidegger's fore-structure. 
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character of the imagination operates in both the intuitive 
and apperceptive dimensions. Auto-affection and apperception 
are intimately bound to time, hence bound to the 
imagination. If the self "in its innermost essence is time," 
then the unity of the self must emerge in terms of the 
imagination. 131 We do not merely understand ourselves as 
finite entities. We understand ourselves essentially in 
terms of f initude. Our understanding of finitude is an 
understanding of our being. 
If the imagination makes finitude possible and if 
finitude is the meaning of temporality, then imagination and 
time are the same. Since imagination and time are the same, 
we must now view inner sense in terms of the imagination. As 
auto-affective, the self emerges as being radically finite 
in the core of its being. The radical finitude of self-
affection gives rise to two possibilities: the self is 
receptive of what is given to it and apperceptive of its 
temporal condition. The apperceptive condition provides 
unity to what we receive. 
The relationship between self-affection and 
apperception raises the problem of the interpretation of 
apperception as "abiding and unchanging". 132 The problem is 
how to reconcile apperception with the radical finitude of 
the self. We cannot understand apperception either in terms 
131 KPM, p.202. 
132 KPM, p.197. 
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of eternity or in terms of the concept of substance. 
substance is a way the self thinks permanence in experience, 
and the concept of eternity lies beyond our experience and 
133 knowledge. Further, we cannot regard the temporal 
determinations of selfhood as antic characterizations, i.e, 
mere descriptions of an entity. Temporal determinations are 
ontological determinations. The self is neither an entity in 
time, nor an entity outside of time, nor is time itself an 
134 
entity. Rather the self and time are ontologically 
connected to the extent that the "ego is so temporal that it 
is time itself. 11135 
The abiding and unchanging character of apperception 
refers merely to the self in its temporal determination as 
being out ahead of itself, i.e., anticipating unity. The 
spontaneous, anticipatory unity of apperception connects 
itself to receptive self-affection. The past and the future 
intertwine so that the present becomes possible. 
Apperception is always already there to be affected, auto-
133 Kant develops these issues in the Paralogisms, where 
he investigates what we can know about the soul. The self 
is neither eternal nor substantial in its core of being. 
13• . Kant describes time as an a priori intuition, i.e, 
as a condition of the appearance of things. Time is not seen 
but makes the place of visibility possible. Thus time is not 
an entity, i.e., not a receptacle where things appear. If 
time were an entity, then we would have to explain how time 
is itself possible as a present entity that remains absent 
when entities are present. Also, if time were an entity, 
then the problem of how two entities can occupy the same 
space would arise. 
135 KPM, p.198. 
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affection is there to be unified. Both determinations emerge 
in terms of the imagination, since imagination is 
temporality. 
Thus we understand ourselves ontologically as the 
imagination, which manifests itself as a temporal unity. 
Heidegger says that thinking the imagination in this sense 
even makes the "name imagination inadequate", since the 
imagination is "transformed into more original 
136 possibilities.'' The imagination is no longer a mere 
faculty of the subject, but in its temporal and synthetic 
character makes subjectivity itself possible. Imagination 
becomes the name for the temporal horizon and makes 
transcendence possible. As Heidegger says, transcendental 
imagination is ''primordial time," conceived here in terms of 
137 its ecstatic-horizonal unity. The self is thus not simply 
intuitive or rational; the self is imaginative. As temporal, 
the imagination makes an understanding of being possible. If 
imagination is the ground of our understanding of being, 
then an understanding of the being of the self emerges only 
because of the imagination's unified temporal structure. 
Kant sees the temporal horizon only in terms of the 
objectivity of the object. Nonetheless, temporality emerges 
as the ground through which we understand the being of the 
object in Kant's philosophy. If we interpret Kant within the 
136 KPM, p.147. 
137 KPM, p.202. 
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Heideggerian framework, then we see that imagination emerges 
as the temporal horizon. In other words, imagination 
discloses itself as the meaning of the being of the self, 
which Heidegger calls Dasein. Imagination is a way we can 
understand the finitude, or the care structure, of Dasein. 
Imagination as primordial temporality reveals Dasein as 
being 11 ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world)-as-Being-
alongside-( entities-encountered-within-the-world)." 138 The 
imagination presents a unity of the future, the having-been 
and the making-present and is what allows us to be out into 
our world. Heidegger calls being out into the world 
transcendence. Thus the imagination, understood as finitude, 
makes transcendence possible. 
C. THE HEIDEGGERIAN RETRIEVAL OF THE IMAGINATION 
After showing how the imagination is temporal, how 
temporality is an understanding of being, and how an 
understanding of the self emerges in terms of temporality, 
Heidegger undertakes a retrieval of the possibilities that 
emerge in Kant's ontology. The need for the retrieval lies 
in Kant's inability to thematize the temporal horizon that 
emerges in his analysis of selfhood and temporality. Kant 
understands time explicitly in terms of a sequence of now-
points. However, Heidegger's analysis of the· Kantian 
imagination reveals that Kant's analysis gives rise to a 
138 BT, p.237. 
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different possibility of understanding time than as the mere 
succession of now-points. We can to understand time in terms 
of finitude, and we see that finitude gives rise to the 
possibility of transcendence. Since Kant does not thematize 
the phenomenon of transcendence, Heidegger sees a need to 
push Kant's thought beyond the intended limits of the 
Kantian philosophy. 
A retrieval of a thinker's thought is an act that 
wrests from a thinker's thought what the thinker "intended 
to say" but did not say. 139 In other words, the purpose of a 
retrieval is to bring out the unsaid in the explicit saying 
of a thinker's thought. 140 As an explication of the unsaid, a 
retrieval is an act of violence, since the purpose of the 
retrieval is to generate a dissonance within the thought 
being interpreted. I interpret the retrieval of the unsaid 
in a thinker's thought within the Heideggerian framework as 
a thematization of what metaphysical thought leaves 
unthematized, and what metaphysics leaves unthematized is 
the possibility of the metaphysical enterprise itself. 
An explication of the unsaid does not occur 
haphazardly. In other words, the violent retrieval performed 
on the text is not capricious. Instead, the retrieval 
139 KPM, p.206 ... Intended to say" is the translation of 
"haben sagen wollen, 11 pp. 195 and 196 Kant und das Problem 
der Metaphysik. 
uo Heidegger says that a retrieved interpretation 
should reveal "was sie als noch Ungesagtes durch das Gesagte 
vor Augen legt. 11 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.195. 
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operates according to an idea that implicitly guides the 
text and receives its confirmation from the text. 141 Thus the 
possibilities retrieved from a text must be seen within the 
text itself. 
While Heidegger's conception of retrieval is unique to 
his own understanding, a sense of retrieval is not foreign 
to philosophy. The notion of explicating what a thinker 
intended to say is not Heidegger's expression but is 
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actually Kant's expression. Heidegger repeats Kant in the 
context of his discussion in order to show that the notion 
of a retrieval of a thinker's thought is integral to the 
vocation of philosophy. 
141 My problem with this conception of retrieval 
revolves around the conception of intention. This problem 
also extends into the notion of the Kantian recoil. It is 
one thing to derive the unsaid from the said, i.e., to 
derive possibilities from the text. It is another matter to 
say a thinker intended to say something when the thinker did 
not intend to say it. The idea of intention introduces a 
psychological element into the notion of retrieval that 
should not be there. I can see in the CPR a temporal 
understanding of being. However, I cannot see that Kant 
intended to discuss transcendence, just as I cannot see that 
Kant intended to displace the subject. What is uncovered in 
interpretation and intended in analysis are two different 
issues. To some extent, Heidegger conflates these issues. 
142 KPM, p.207. The exact quote in Kant is found 
precisely at the end of his text entitled Uber eine 
Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
durch eine altere entberlich gemacht werden soll. In this 
text, Kant shows how Eberhard's attacks on the Critical 
Philosophy are unjustifiable. Moreover, Kant claims that his 
philosophy is the true defense of the Leibnizian philosophy. 
Thus Kant sees himself as an apologist for Leibniz by 
bringing out what Leibniz intended to say but did not say. 
In the same sense, Heidegger sees himself an apologist for 
Kant. 
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The specific purpose of the retrieval in KPM is to 
expose the possibilities that arise once Heidegger reveals 
143 transcendence as the being of the subject. However, the 
disclosure of transcendence as the being of the 'subject' in 
the Heideggerian retrieval turns metaphysics into a problem. 
Metaphysics becomes a problem because Heidegger thinks what 
metaphysics has left unquestioned, viz., the condition of 
the possibility of metaphysics itself as it arises out of 
the phenomenon of transcendence. Further, if the metaphysics 
of subjectivity bases itself upon reason and if the 
metaphysics of subjectivity expresses the essence of the 
subject in terms of reason, then the conception of 
transcendence discloses a more basic understanding of the 
subject than rationality discloses. In other words, 
subjectivity also becomes a problem. 
The Heideggerian retrieval involves developing an 
understanding of the self beyond the confines of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity. In terms of the retrieval, the 
self does not understand him/herself in relation to 
entities. Instead, the self understands him/herself in 
relationship to being, i.e., the self understands 
143 KPM, p.213. Heidegger also calls the transcendence 
of the subject the "subjectivity of the subject.'' Heidegger 
means by subjectivity of the subject a disclosure of the 
being of the subject and the subject's understanding of 
being. Since the subjectivity of the subject is not 
questioned in metaphysics, the designation of the self in 
terms of subjectivity loses its power. A need arises for a 
term that designates the self in terms of the character of 
transcendence, which Heidegger calls Dasein. 
him/herself as the entity that has an understanding of 
being. Specifically, Heidegger understands the self as an 
144 
entity that asks after the meaning of being. Thus, an 
understanding of the self arises in terms of questioning, 
and, in fact, Heidegger understands the self as a 
questioner. So, I stand in a relationship to being as a 
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self, and my basic question becomes: how am I implicated in 
an understanding of being, or how am I implicated in 
metaphysics? 
In this section, I develop the sense of the self as 
the questioner that emerges in the retrieval and the 
ramifications that emerge in this conception of selfhood. In 
order to develop Heidegger's conception of the self as the 
questioner, I focus on two possibilities that arise in the 
retrieval. First I investigate Heidegger's retrieval of 
Dasein 1 from his analysis of the transcendence.of the 
subject. Second I examine the disruptive effect of the 
retrieval upon the metaphysics of the subject that bases 
itself in reason. In the first part of my investigation of 
tu BT, p.27. I want to make two comments. First, 
Heidegger undertakes an investigation of Dasein in BT. We 
are Dasein, and Dasein is the one who asks the question of 
being.The entirety of BT is a working out of the being of 
the questioner, so that we may arrive at an understanding of 
being in general. 
Second, I maintain the translation of der Sinn des 
Seins as the meaning of being to maintain the continuity 
with the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of BT. I could 
translate the phrase as "the sense of being," but the exact 
translation is not as important in this instance as . 
understanding the meaning of what Heidegger is trying to 
convey. 
the retrieval, I perform an interpretation of Heidegger's 
analysis of Dasein in the fourth section of KPM. In the 
second part of the retrieval, I show why the sense of 
selfhood that arises in the retrieval disrupts the 
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metaphysical conception of subjectivity. For the first part 
of the retrieval, I remain within the confines of KPM. 
However, in order to undertake the second part of the 
retrieval I must move beyond the confines of KPM, since 
Heidegger does not develop the problem of the displacement 
of the subject and the decentering of the ground of 
metaphysics in this text. Instead, Heidegger brings us in 
KPM to the point where the question of the ground arises and 
then ends the text with the question of ground. Thus, I 
extend my analysis into the MFL and the text On the Essence 
of Ground. Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the problem 
of the displacement of the subject and the decentering of 
the ground in these two texts, in order to develop the issue 
regarding the question of the ground and the understanding 
of the self as the questioner.us 
145 I find it interesting that Heidegger raises these 
two possibilities in terms.of questions. The retrieval of 
Dasein from the transcendence of the subject occurs through 
a structure and order of questioning that constantly drives 
Heidegger to the place where the.questioning begins. 
Essentially, the retrieval Heidegger undertakes in KPM moves 
through two basic questions: how does transcendence, which 
leads to f initude, turn metaphysics into a problem; and how 
does finitude disrupt the metaphysical project of rational 
selfhood? The theme of the first question moves from the 
issue of transcendence to the issue of finitude, while the 
theme of the second question shows how an understanding of 
(continued ... ) 
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The retrieval of Dasein in KPM begins with an 
examination of the type of inquiry that arises from 
transcendence. For Heidegger, the transcendence of the 
subject requires an ontological, not an anthropological 
inquiry. A study of the subjectivity of the subject is not 
an anthropological study because the investigation of 
transcendence is not a study of the relationship between 
entities. Instead, a study of the subjectivity of the 
subject is a study of myself in relationship to entities as 
a whole. In other words, the investigation of transcendence 
is an investigation of being. Thus the inquiry that arises 
from transcendence is ontological. 
Heidegger shows how the investigation of transcendence 
is not an antic-anthropological study through an 
interpretation of Kant's understanding of the basic 
interests of the human entity. For Kant, there are three 
essential interests that the human entity possesses and that 
146 
are basic to any other interest that may arise. Kant 
expresses these three interests in terms of questions. These 
145 ( ... continued) 
being arises out of Dasein's finitude and displaces the 
concept of the rational subject from its place of 
prominence. 
146 The word 'interest' literally means 'to be in 
between'. Thus an interest is a mode of being that places us 
in the midst of things or concerns. This no+ion of interest 
fits in very well with Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger, 
an interest places us in the midst of entities and brings 
these entities to show themselves, so that they can be 
questioned in terms of their being. 
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questions are: "what can I know?"; "what ought I to do?": 
and "what may I hope for?" (A805,B833). These questions 
express different modes of being for the human entity: the 
metaphysical, the ethical and the teleological modes of 
being. The three questions express the interests of the 
human entity in terms of an ability, an ought and a 
14 7 permissibility. According to Kant, the three basic 
interests and the questions that arise from them are really 
subdivisions of one question, viz., "what is man?" 148 
In the analysis of the basic questions and their 
reference to the encompassing question of the self, or to 
the subjectivity of the subject, Heidegger shows why 
147 Heidegger turns the auxiliary verbs of konnen, 
sollen and dtirfen into nouns. Sherover translates these as 
power, duty and hope, while I translate them as ability, 
ought and permissibility. I try to maintain the verbal 
quality, since Heidegger concerns himself with the act of 
questioning and what the act of questioning reveals. 
148 KPM, p. 214. The question "what is man?" arises in 
Kant's Logik, Section III, A26. In the actual text of the 
Logik, Kant says that the question "what is man?" is 
11 anthropological, 11 and that the three other questions refer 
to the issue of who I am. In other words, the question of 
who I am is the most basic question and the other three 
questions are derived from it. If Kant intends the question 
of the self to be strictly anthropological, i.e., 
understands anthropology as empirical, then the reference to 
the other questions does not make sense. Instead, since the 
self implicates him/herself in the other three questions, an 
answer to the three questions leads to a sense of a complete 
understanding of the self in Kant's thought. This complete 
sense of the self must have both transcendental and 
empirical ramifications. Thus the question "what is man?" 
must transcendentally encompass the other questions. 
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the interests lead to the basic questions. 149 The interests 
lead to questions because the interests possess a mode of 
compulsion. I find myself situated in the midst of entities, 
and these situations call for me to respond to what is 
around me. In other words, the interests compel me to ask 
basic questions about my existence and to try and understand 
my existence. 
The fact that the interests find their true expression 
as questions reveals something about myself, viz., that I am 
not self-contained, or self-present, in my existence. In 
other words, the act of questioning itself reveals an 
absence that essentially belongs to me. The absence finds 
expression through the act of questioning. 
A mode of absence arises in each of the interests. 
First an absence arises in terms of my knowledge. My ability 
to know something is only possible because I do not know 
what I want to know. A certain sense of ignorance underlies 
the ability to obtain knowledge, and I reveal to myself that 
there are limits to my knowledge. The notion of limitation 
reveals a lack of completion. So my ability to ask what I 
149 Heidegger interprets the last question, "what is 
man?" in terms of the question of selfhood and the 
subjectivity of the subject, or transcendence. In this 
context, another possible formulation of the question "what 
is man?' is "who am I? 11 The later formulation takes into 
account a sense of selfhood and distinguishes the sense of 
the being of the self from the self as a thing. Thinking of 
myself as a who is not the same as thinking of myself as a 
what. The transition from the what to the who shows that I 
implicate myself in the question of being, and that I am not 
simply one entity among other entities. 
can know reveals a non-ability at the same time. The non-
ability is not a lack that we can fill. Instead, the non-
ability expresses a basic sense of finitude, in the sense 
that what I am not able to know is always outstanding, 
stands out ahead of me. within what I am able to know. lSO 
Second an absence arises in terms of actions. When I ask 
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myself what I ought to do, I reveal to myself that I am not 
complete. My actions stand out in front of me as things that 
I ought or ought not to do. In other words, the actions 
stand out in front of me as actions that I have not yet 
performed. The character of the not-yet reveals my finitude. 
Third a sense of absence reveals itself in hope. Nhen I ask 
myself what I may hope for, i.e., what is permissible, I am 
asking for both what I can expect and what I cannot expect. 
The mode of expectation reveals a sense of 11 privation, 11 and 
privation reveals a sense of finitude. 151 I express the 
privation in terms of hoping for what is not yet here, as 
150 Heidegger says that the non-ability that manifests 
itself with the interest of knowledge is a 11 Unbert1hrtheit 11 
from all lack and the nothing. Sherover translates this as 
absence, but distance might be a better translation than 
absence. Heidegger does not conceive of the non-ability as 
an absence of deficiency and the nothing. Instead, Heidegger 
conceives of the non-ability as distance, or a non-contact, 
with deficiency and the nothing. The non-ability opens up 
the place where deficiency and the nothing can be 
experienced, but the non-ability keeps the deficiency and 
the nothing at a distance in the sense that they cannot be 
filled. Thus the non-ability itself is not a deficiency but 
an excess. The non-ability may give rise to a desire for 
knowledge, but the non-ability is not itself a desire. Kant 
und das Problem der Metaphysik, p.210. 
151 KPM, p. 223. 
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well as recognizing that some things that I may hope for can 
never be. 
In each of the interests, there is a reference back to 
the self. In other words, the interests give rise to a mode 
of self-understanding, and, according to Heidegger, finitude 
is the mode of self-understanding that arises in the 
interests. The three interests reveal finitude in two ways. 
First, the ability to ask the questions, i.e., to have an 
interest in such matters, means that we find ourselves 
already in the world in the midst of entities. My ability to 
know something, to decide what I ought to, and to know what 
is allowable in terms of hope expresses the fact that I find 
myself situated in the world. In other words, I find myself 
thrown into the world. Second, the questions are 
projections. The questions show me that I am not complete, 
and that I stand out into my world in various modes of 
expectation. Thus I am equiprimordially situated in my world 
and directed out into my world. This mode of being already 
in a world among entities and being directed out into the 
world as ahead of myself is what Heidegger means by 
finitude, or care. As modes of thrown projection, the three 
interests reveal the finitude of our reason. 
We are only given something to think due to the finite 
character of our existence. 152 Thus another factor besides 
152 Reason itself cannot give rise to the interests. If 
reason could give rise to the interests, then god, 
(continued ... ) 
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reason must give rise to our interests. Heidegger locates 
this other factor in our transcendence and hence in our 
finitude. In Kant, our finitude finds its expression in our 
sensible character, i.e., in our temporal character. In 
other words, our finitude gives rise to the interests that 
reason holds close to the heart. 
Thus the interests are a result of our finite 
transcendence. If we were not transcendent, thrown and 
projected into our world, we would have no interests. The 
interests are only expressions of who we are, i.e., 
expressions of our being, and thus are only expressions of 
our finitude. We do not direct our basic interests towards 
specific entities. Instead, we direct our basic interests 
toward entities as a whole, since the interests are modes of 
our being. 153 However, the fact remains that the direction of 
our interests towards entities as a whole presupposes an 
152 { ... continued) 
understood as the most rational entity, would have 
interests. By definition, however, god cannot have 
interests, since the possession of an interest always 
involves an absence. Since the conception of god includes 
necessarily the concept of completion, god cannot have 
interests and cannot question. The idea of god possessing no 
interests presents a problem for the Jewish and Christian 
conceptions of god, since these conceptions always imbue god 
with human attributes. 
153 For example, the interest I take in my ability to 
know something is not directed toward a specific entity. 
Instead, my interest in my ability to know something is 
directed toward the conditions of the possibility of knowing 
anything. The same is true of my actions and my hopes. 
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understanding of the being of entities as such. 154 Thus our 
basic interests push us back to the question of being and to 
the question of our understanding of being. 
The interests are not initially explicit, 
comprehensive understandings of our being in the world. 
Instead, the interests are initially pre-thematic, i.e., 
they are what make it possible for us to be open to 
entities. Thus, the interests presuppose that we understand 
an entity in terms of its being and that we already find 
ourselves existing in the midst of entities. 155 In other 
words, asking a question about what an entity is presupposes 
a question of the being of the entity. 
Thus the interests allow us to be open to 
possibilities. For Heidegger, one of the most basic 
possibilities we possess is the ability to make a thematic 
study of our basic possibilities. If our basic possibility 
lies within our understanding of being in terms of finitude, 
then we can thematize our understanding of being. Since we 
first understand being prethematically, the need to clarify 
154 I translate the German word Seiendheit as beingness. 
I understand beingness as a particular mode of being of a 
type of entity. I reserve the term being for Sein, and I use 
the word being to designate being as such. 
There are as many types of beingness for Heidegger as 
there are types of entities. Since there are different types 
of entities, there are different conceptions of beingness. 
The question that arises for Heidegger is how to understand 
being in terms of its unity. 
155 Heidegger calls this fact of our existence the 
hermeneutical circle. 
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the meaning of being arises. From this prethematic 
understanding of being, the question arises for Heidegger: 
how does the human entity understand being? In other words, 
the question of being, die Seinsfrage, arises. 
Just as the basic interests and the questions that 
arise from the interests are due to our finitude, so too the 
question of being arises for us because of our f initude. 
Since finitude lies at the basis of the interests, finitude 
lies at the basis of our understanding of being. Moreover, 
since the human entity understands being through finitude, 
the thematization of finitude should result in the explicit 
understanding of being. However, if the thematization of 
finitude becomes the mode of access to an understanding of 
being, then the entity that understands itself as being 
finite becomes the mode of access to being. In other words, 
the entity that asks the question of being becomes the 
central focus of the inquiry into our understanding of 
being. 
Since the entity that asks the question of being is a 
self, Heidegger begins to investigate the being of the 
questioner. 156 This new sense of selfhood H~idegger calls 
Dasein. Heidegger understands Dasein to be the human 
entity's mode of being in his/her relationship to the being 
156 Heidegger understands the being of the human entity 
in terms of questioning. However, I am only introducing 
Dasein at this point. The reason why Heidegger understands 
Dasein this way will not become clear until I deal with the 
issue of ground. 
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of entities. In every encounter with entities, our Dasein is 
also manifest. The understanding of being is there with us 
in any encounter of entities, and thus is there with us at 
all times. Thus the question of being arises out of our very 
existence. 
Heidegger understands existence as always being in the 
midst of entities manifest to ourselves and to other things 
which are not us. Our relationship to these entities shows 
us our 11 dependency 11 upon the entities for their appearance 
or manifestation. 157 As being dependent upon entities, the 
dependency shows that I have power neither over entities nor 
over myself, i.e., I am not creative of entities. My very 
158 
existence is an 11 irruption 11 into entities as a whole. The 
irruption of Dasein into the totality of entities makes 
possible the emergence of entities as entities. This is 
Dasein's existence, i.e., to be given over to entities and 
"of being answerable to oneself as an entity. 11159 The 
irruption is a result of my finitude. I understand my 
existence in terms of my finitude, and my finitude is my 
157 KPM, p.235. 
158 KPM, p. 235. The word translated as irruption is 
Einbruch. The word also means invasion or burglary. Our 
emergence into entities as a whole is an invasion, an act of 
violence that does not result in mastery over entities. My 
irruption into entities as a whole disturbs their 
tranquility, and entities appear as entities for the first 
time. However, I can only recognize my dependency upon 
entities in the irruption. 
159 KPM, p.236. 
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understanding of being. 
If I understand being in terms of finitude and 
finitude is the fundamental way I find myself in the world, 
then I always exist with an understanding of being, and 
therefore the possibility of metaphysics is not a foreign 
possibility to me. In other words, I do not need to go 
outside of my existence in order to take up metaphysics. On 
the contrary, the fact that I always already have an 
understanding of being shows that metaphysics is a 
possibility that arises out of my own existence. If 
metaphysics is possible only upon the basis of my finite 
existence, then metaphysics is only possible because we 
exist as Dasein. Thus the metaphysics of Dasein takes on a 
different meaning than simply a thematic study of the 
structures of being of Dasein. Instead Dasein is 
metaphysical, i, e, I 160 Dasein happens as metaphysics. The 
irruption of Dasein into entities as a whole and his/her 
existing with a preconceptual understanding of being show 
161 that metaphysics is Dasein's "destiny." We can thematize 
160 The idea of Dasein happening as metaphysics is a 
retrieval of Kant's idea o~ metaphysics as a natural 
disposition in the CPR. 
161 KPM, p.239. We can only understand destiny as the 
way in which we find ourselves situated in the world. In 
other words, thrownness gives rise to an understanding of 
destiny. Our destiny is not a result of some· agency that 
predestines us. For Heidegger, our irruption into entities 
as a whole has nothing to do with the concept of agency. Our 
thrownness occurs neither through ourselves nor anot~er 
entity. We find ourselves as irrupted, i.e., thrown into our 
world. 
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our understanding of being only because Dasein exists as the 
metaphysical event him/herself. 
Heidegger calls the understanding of being a 
projection, i.e., an understanding that we have out in front 
of ourselves in our encounter with entities. Heidegger says 
an understanding, or a projection, 11 is not only a mode of 
cognition, but is primarily a fundamental moment of 
existence in general. 11162 Heidegger means that being can be 
cognized, but for the most part being is not cognized. 
Instead, our understanding of being is more basic than our 
cognition of being. I exist with an understanding of being, 
which does not need to be thematically cognized. 
However, we can thematize our understanding of being 
and bring our understanding of being explicitly out in the 
open. Heidegger calls the thematization of being a 
"construction. 11163 In other words, a construction is the 
thematization of a projection of being. Fundamental ontology 
is an example of a construction, since fundamental ontology 
164 
makes the ontological structures of Dasein explicit. 
162 KPM, p.241. I have altered the English translation. 
The German reads 11 ••• nicht nur eine Art des Erkennens, 
sondern primar ein Grundmoment des Existierens uberhaupt 
ist ... 11 German text, p.226. 
163 KPM, p.240. 
164 If metaphysics is onto-theology, i.e., both a study 
of being as such and a study of entities as a whole, then I 
must grasp metaphysics from an understanding of f initude. In 
Kantian terms, this means that general metaphysics, which 
Heidegger interprets as the study of being as such, has to 
(continued ... ) 
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However, since the possibility of metaphysics resides 
within Casein, the construction of fundamental ontology 
takes place as a recollection. 165 The fact that construction 
takes place as recollection leads Heidegger to note that the 
understanding of being and ourselves is not explicitly there 
with us at all times. Instead, we generally comport 
ourselves toward entities in our everyday dealings with 
them. Being is forgotten for the most part. Thus a 
constructive recollection of our understanding of being must 
investigate the oblivion of being. 166 
For Heidegger, the finitude of Casein lies within the 
16' ( ... continued) 
be developed prior to special metaphysics, which Heidegger 
interprets as the study of entities as a whole. Thus 
Heidegger retrieves the idea of the distinction between 
general metaphysics and special metaphysics in terms of the 
distinction between being as such and entities as a whole. 
In terms of Heidegger's understanding, fundamental ontology 
becomes the inquiry into being as such and metontology 
becomes the inquiry into entities as a whole. The idea for 
Heidegger is that being as such must be understood prior to 
an understanding of entities as whole, since an 
understanding of entities as a whole presupposes an 
understanding of being. 
165 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 227. The 
word I am translating as recollection is Wiedererinnerung. 
166 In Heideggerian circles, oblivion is the translation 
of Vergessenheit. The word 'oblivion' has both a strong and 
a weak sense. The strong sense means complete forgetfulness, 
while the weak sense means an instance of forgetting. While 
it is true that Heidegger contends that the tradition of 
Western Philosophy has never investigated the meaning of 
being, nonetheless a sense of being has always emerged in 
the tradition. Thus being has not been completely forgotten. 
We must understand oblivion in the weak sense. The idea of 
complete forgetfulness borders on the contradictory, since 
if something is completely forgotten, then the forgotten 
thing cannot even be recalled as forgotten. 
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oblivion of being. This means that for the most part we 
understand being in terms of our everyday dealings with 
entities and others, which we are lost and absorbed in for 
the most part. Thus any thematic approach to our 
understanding of being must show how the understanding of 
being is already at work in our everydayness. As already 
being in the world, Dasein is indigent, i.e., in need of an 
understanding of being that is not determined by the 
oblivion of being. In Heidegger's understanding, this means 
that we must become aware of our transcendence and finitude, 
so that we can come to an understanding of our finitude. In 
other words, we must come to an understanding of ourselves 
in our temporal character. 
My finitude gives rise to a conception of selfhood 
that differs from the conception of self-consciousness that 
emerges in the metaphysics of subjectivity. In other words, 
the conception of the self as Dasein displaces the 
conception of the self as self-consciousness. Displacement 
means neither eradication nor forgetfulness. Instead, 
displacement means moving something out of its place. Once 
Dasein becomes the basic understanding of ~he self, self-
consciousness can no longer occupy this position. Heidegger 
retrieves this possibility from the Kantian analysis itself. 
On the one hand, Kant is describing the structures of 
immanence, i.e., the relationship between the subject and 
its corresponding object. In other words, Kant is trying to 
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establish how there are structures of representation that 
constitute the being of the object. As long as we remain 
fixed upon the notions of understanding and reason, we will 
continue to understand the Kantian project in terms of the 
structures of immanence. On the other hand, once we can see 
finite transcendence emerge out of the imagination, the 
conception of the immanent, rational subject must come into 
question. The Heideggerian retrieval of the imagination 
shows us how we are already in the world. The work done in 
the CPR "threatens the supremacy of reason and the 
understanding. 11167 Thus a displacement of the conception of 
the rational subject takes place once we see the 
understanding of being in terms of finitude. 
Thus the deed, or the Geschehen, of the Kantian 
philosophy presents Heidegger with the problem of how to 
understand the phenomenon of ground. While Kant's explicit 
intention in the logos of the CPR is to expose the rational 
ground of metaphysics, the deed of the Kantian laying of the 
foundations shows that reason does not function as the 
ground. Instead, the imagination emerges as transcendence 
and supplants reason. Heidegger's insights into the Kantian 
conception of the imagination bring the Copernican 
revolution into question by displacing reason and the 
corresponding understanding of the rational subject from its 
167 KPM, p. 252. The understanding of being in terms of 
finitude also threatens the conception of logic that arises 
in epistemological circles. 
210 
foundational position. Instead of reason being the ground of 
metaphysics, the imagination, understood in terms of 
finitude, is what makes metaphysics possible. By placing the 
imagination at the basis of the subject, Kant places us 
before the "abyss, 11 or 11 Abgrund" of metaphysics. 168 
In the Heideggerian retrieval, the displacement of 
the subject from its foundational position results in a 
replacement, i.e., Dasein comes to take the place of the 
subject. However, the replacement of the subject with Dasein 
is not a mere exchange of one conception of the self for 
another, because the replacement of the subject in this 
instance carries with it a displacement of the basic 
concepts that belong to the subject, viz., the concepts of 
unity and ground. Thus the displacement of the subject and 
its replacement with Dasein is not a simple decentering and 
169 
recentering as would be the case in metaphysics. The 
displacement of the subject and its replacement with Dasein 
brings the concepts of reason, unity and ground into 
question. In other words, we cannot understand the 
decentering that occurs in the retrieval as a simple 
recentering. So the question arises: how does Heidegger 
168 KPM, p.222. German text,·p.209. 
169 I discussed the ideas of decentering and recentering 
in the first chapter. The entity that occupies the ground 
may change in metaphysics, but the idea of the ground does 
not change. Regardless of whether the ground is god or the 
subject, the concepts of ground and unity maintain their 
priority. In Heidegger's thought, these concepts become 
questionable. 
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understand the phenomenon of ground within the framework of 
the displacement of the subject and its replacement with 
Dase in? 
The explicit investigation of this question does not 
occur in KPM, and thus the inquiry into the question of 
ground pushes my investigation beyond the retrieval 
170 
undertaken in KPM. Nonetheless, I must recall that 
Heidegger's undertaking in KPM is an investigation into the 
foundation, Grundlegung, of metaphysics. In other words, 
Heidegger is seeking for the ground of the possibility of 
metaphysics in KPM. Thus Heidegger's investigation into the 
foundations of metaphysics is an investigation into the 
phenomenon of ground. By taking an explicit investigation of 
the phenomenon of ground, I am continuing the construction 
already at work in KPM. 171 
170 As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, 
Heidegger investigates the phenomenon of ground in the 
lecture course entitled The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic and the essay Vom Wesen des Grundes, so I am directing 
my attention to these texts. 
171 The investigation in the CPR is not an analysis of 
the phenomenon of ground in and of itself, but an analysis 
of how to understand the ground within the context of 
metaphysics. Thus Kant leaves the phenomenon of ground 
undeveloped. In other words, Kant sought for the ground but 
left the issue of ground unthematized. 
Kant develops his conception of ground in terms of 
synthesis, unlike Leibniz who understands the concept of 
ground in terms of ident!~y. As Heidegger sees correctly, 
the principles of all principles in Kantian thought, i.e., 
the highest principle of knowledge, is precisely the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. Kant understands the 
foundational ground of knowledge to reside in the necessary 
interplay of the faculties of the subject, which Heidegger 
(continued ... ) 
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In fact, the analysis of KPM ends with an issue that 
directs us to the need to investigate the phenomenon of 
ground. The issue is that Dasein's indigency reveals that 
oasein stands equiprimordially in the truth and the 
untruth. 172 If I understand truth as the disclosure of being 
and untruth as the oblivion of being, and if Dasein finds 
him/herself primarily within the context of the oblivion of 
being, then Dasein must recollect the truth out of his/her 
untruth. Since Dasein's understanding of being emerges as a 
recollection, Dasein does not primarily understand 
him/herself and other entities in terms of being. Instead, 
Dasein's everyday sense of understanding being is a result 
of his/her comportment toward entities. 
Dasein's standing in the truth and the untruth has two 
consequences. First, the fact that Dasein exists in the 
untruth means that he/she does not for the most part 
recognize the difference between entities and being, or what 
is called the ontological difference. An entity cannot be 
being, since calling something an entity already presupposes 
an understanding of being. Nonetheless, there is a general 
confusion about the difference that finds expression in 
171 ( ... continued) 
retrieves under the concept of transcendence. The synthetic 
interplay of the faculties generates the possibility of the 
understanding of being and hence generates a ontological 
conception of world. 
172 By untruth, Heidegger does not mean falsity. Falsity 
is an antic comportment, while untruth is a mode of being. 
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everyday life and in philosophy. For example, the 
metaphysics of subjectivity does not recognize the 
ontological difference and thus tries to establish the 
entity called the subject as being. 173 Second, the fact that 
Dasein exists in both the truth and the untruth, and thus 
understands him/herself in terms of being or entities, means 
that Dasein is free. Dasein 1 s freedom finds expression in 
his/her ability either to recognize the truth or not to 
174 
recognize the truth of his/her being. However, this 
173 Kant falls into this problem. Kant's inability to 
recognize the difference between being and entities lies in 
his ambivalence on how to regard the subject. On the one 
hand, Kant knows that the subject is an entity. On the other 
hand, Kant sees that the subject serves as the ground of our 
understanding of objectivity. The exposition of the subject 
as self-consciousness does not solve the problem, since Kant 
does not explicate thematically the being of the subject. 
For the most part, metaphysics places being in the 
entity that understands being. Thus Kant's ambivalence about 
the subject arises due to the nature of subject itself, 
since the subject is unique and stands out from other 
entities due to its capacity to understand being. 
174 The traditional, metaphysical conception of freedom 
and determinism does not fit Heidegger's meaning of freedom. 
In a metaphysical context, freedom is always related to 
choice and determinism is always related to ground. However, 
metaphysics thinks freedom and determinism ontically, i.e., 
metaphysical thought understands freedom and determinism in 
terms of entities. For example, the ground.that determines 
us is an entity, and choices we make freely are choices of 
some particular thing or action. 
The type of freedom that Heidegger is talking about is 
not antic but ontological. Heidegger addresses the issue of 
freedom, though not explicitly, in the beginning of BT. 
Since Dasein is free, or exists as being in the world, 
Dasein makes choices about his/her own being. These choices 
allow Dasein to understand him/herself either as being 
determined by entities or as determining him/herself from 
Dasein's own possibility. In other words, Dasein can be 
authentic and inauthentic because Dasein is free. 
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expression of freedom depends upon an original sense of 
freedom, which Heidegger calls transcendence. As 
transcendent, Dasein is free. We need to see how Heidegger 
understands freedom and how the phenomenon of ground belongs 
to freedom. 
Heidegger's mode of access into the meaning of freedom 
is through the phenomenon of transcendence. In KPM, 
Heidegger shows how imagination emerges as transcendence, 
and we understand transcendence as being in the world. If 
transcendence is being in the world and Dasein is free in 
his/her transcendence, then Dasein's being in the world is a 
result of Dasein's freedom. 175 
For Heidegger, freedom is an ontological condition of 
Dasein prior to his/her ontic state. In other words, freedom 
is Dasein's a priori. If I were not existing already as 
free, i.e., as transcendent being in the worl~, then I would 
have no choices in my dealings with other entities or other 
selves. More importantly, if I were not free, then I would 
have no conception of entities and hence no self-conception. 
In other words, if I were determined, then I would not 
surpass entities, i.e., I would not be in a world and hence 
I would not be Dasein. 
The key to understanding freedom is transcendence, 
i.e., only a free entity can surpass and encounter entities 
175 In MFL, p.185, Heidegger says that "Dasein's 
transcendence and freedom are identical.," 
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like him/herself and other than him/herself. Thus, being 
free means being in the world, i.e., surpassing entities, 
seeing entities as entities and possessing an understanding 
of the being of entities. Thus freedom is Dasein's way of 
being, Dasein's mode of beingness, as understanding 
him/herself from a world. 176 Since freedom is an 
understanding of Dasein in terms of world, freedom belongs 
essentially to transcendence. 
If freedom and transcendence belong together, and if I 
understand transcendence through temporality, then I can 
understand freedom through temporality. As I show in my 
analysis of the imagination, we exist transcendentally, 
which means we understand the being of entities temporally. 
Since Dasein is the entity who is transcendent, Dasein is 
the entity who understands him/herself and the world 
temporally. Dasein's self-understanding and world-
understanding are not qualities Dasein adds to his/her 
experience of things. Instead, Dasein and world happen 
through temporality. Heidegger calls the happening of 
176 . Heidegger understands freedom in terms of the 'for 
the sake of which. 1 In relationship to the phenomenon of 
world, the 'for the sake of which' is Dasein's way of 
understanding him/herself as the· stopping point of Dasein's 
involvements. In other words, Dasein is the entity who has 
concernful activities in the world and to whom the totality 
of references refer back to in his/her concernful 
activities. As free, Dasein exists for the sake of 
him/herself. This statement does not mean that Dasein is 
solipsistic, but that Dasein understands him/herself in 
terms of his/her possibilities that arise from being in a 
world. 
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temporality the "temporalization of temporality. 11177 
Heidegger understands freedom as the temporalization of 
temporality. Temporalization is "the free oscillation of the 
whole of primordial temporality. 11178 In other words, 
temporalization is a unity that is both ecstatic and 
contractible. 179 
As oscillating, temporalization takes place as an 
uninterrupted swinging, i.e., temporalization occurs in a 
back and forth motion that is both contractible and 
ecstatic. 180 As ecstatic, Dase in is transcendent, i.e., 
177 MFL, p.193. 
178 MFL, p.208. In the Language of Difference, Charles 
Scott discusses the temporalization of temporality in terms 
of the middle voice, a verbal mode that is neither active 
nor passive. Dasein does not generate its temporality from 
him/herself nor does Dasein let time come upon him/her from 
the outside. Instead, the temporalization of temporality is 
the way Dasein happens. 
179 The metaphor that comes to mind for temporalization 
is breathing. On the one hand, temporality breathes in the 
sense that it exhales and inhales, pushes out and takes in, 
or expands and contracts. Thus breathing is a constant 
oscillation. On the other hand, breathing must take place as 
a whole that cannot become constrictive, or self-contained. 
For if breathing becomes constrictive, or closed-in, we die. 
180 Oscillation is the word used to translate the German 
word Schwingung. Oscillation is a good word to translate 
Schwingung for two reasons. First, oscillation captures the 
swinging motion Heidegger is referring to in his analysis of 
freedom and temporality. Second, the English word 
'oscillation' comes from the Latin word 'oscillum.' An 
oscillum is a mask of Bacchus that was hung in a vineyard 
and swung back and forth in the wind. The Bacchus mask was 
used as a charm to make the grapes grow and possibly used to 
ward off crows. I find the reference to Bacchus interesting 
because a mode of the oscillation of temporality is its 
ecstatic character. Bacchus, as the wine god, brought on 
(continued ... ) 
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he/she is always already in the world. As contractible, 
Dasein is always coming back to him/herself within the 
world. Temporalization carries me away into the world in 
terms of my projection, and yet temporality is not simply a 
carrying away of ourselves into the world. As I move out 
into my world, I am drawn back to myself. Thus, 
temporalization is a constant movement that "reaches and 
contracts itself. 11181 
As a whole, temporalization occurs as a unity. If 
there were no unity to the ecstatic contracting that takes 
place in temporalization, then neither world nor Dasein 
would exist. In other words, there could be no 
understanding of being without the unity. Thus, the 
ecstatic/contractible character of temporalization requires 
a unity, and Heidegger expresses the unified character of 
time in terms of a horizon. Heidegger calls this horizon 
"ecstamatic, 11 and the ecstamatic horizon is "the condition 
of the possibility of world. 11182 World is the enclosure where 
the ecstases move, and neither world nor the ecstases can 
exist without the other. World happens only through the 
happening of temporalization, and we only enter into our 
180 ( ... continued) 
fits of ecstasy. So the sense of time as ecstatic is a part 
of the word oscillation. 
181 MFL, p.208. 
182 MFL, p.208. Heidegger also says that each ecstases 
has its own horizon, i.e., a mode through which the ecstasis 
has its own unity. 
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world when temporalization takes place. Thus the 
ecstatic/contractible temporalization of Dasein is what 
makes Dasein's understanding possible, and the unity of the 
enclosure of world is the counterhold of Dasein. 
As he/she finds him/herself already ecstatically 
projected out into a world, Dasein finds him/herself 
existing freely. As being in the world, Dasein surpasses 
entities and thus generates an understanding of entities. 
However, the fact that Dasein surpasses entities does not 
mean that Dasein's freedom consists of the control of the 
entities Dasein encounters. Instead, Dasein's freedom means 
that Dasein lets entities be as they are and encounters 
entities as they are. Thus Dasein's freedom is powerless. 
Dasein does not emerge as a first cause, i.e., as a ground. 
Instead, Dasein enters its world powerlessly surpassing 
entities, encountering entities, and with the capability of 
understanding· entities in terms of their being. 183 Thus an 
understanding of being requires the freedom of Dasein and 
freedom's requisite powerlessness. 
Heidegger understands ground in terms of the 
183 If Dasein were not powerless in his/her encounter 
with entities, then Dasein would not understand entities as 
they appear to him/her. Instead, if Dasein had power over 
entities, then Dasein would be the cause of the entities and 
Dasein would only understand entities from his/her own 
ground. In other words, Dasein would not be able to 
encounter entities in terms of their being at all, since 
their being would never manifest itself. If Dasein were a 
first cause, then Dasein would not be temporal, and thus 
Dasein would not be Dasein. 
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understanding of being. If Dasein comes into his/her world 
and encounters entities in terms of an understanding of 
their being, and if the understanding of entities in terms 
of their being is the meaning of ground, then Dasein finds 
18t him/herself in the world in the act of "grounding. 11 World 
entry, or the happening of temporalization, allows Dasein to 
ground, and the world is where Dasein seeks for this ground. 
If Dasein understands being due to his/her ability to 
surpass entities, and if freedom is ability to surpass 
entities, then freedom emerges as the possibility of 
understanding being. Further, if understanding the ground of 
entities means understanding the being of those entities, 
and if freedom is the possibility of understanding entities, 
then freedom is the possibility of grounding. 
Since there is an interrelationship between the 
phenomena of freedom and temporalization, and since freedom 
is the possibility of grounding, an understanding of freedom 
in terms of temporality should yield an interpretation of 
the act of grounding. In other words, ground should occur 
temporally. Essentially, Heidegger understands grounding in 
terms of temporality and explains grounding in terms of the 
unified, ecstatic character of temporality. Since there are 
three components of the unified, ecstatic character of time, 
there must be three ways to describe grounding. The three 
lU WG, p.104,105. Grounding is an interpretation of the 
German word Grunden. 
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senses of grounding are: endowing/establishing, taking up a 
b i d f d . 185 as s, an oun ing. 
I understand the first two senses of grounding, 
endowing/establishing and taking up a basis, in terms of 
Dasein's futurity and having-been. 186 Grounding as endowing 
takes place in terms of the future and is a way to 
understand projection. When Dasein endows, Dasein 
establishes for him/herself a possibility of his/her own 
existence. In other words, Dasein comes to understand 
him/herself and/or entities through the projection that 
Dasein establishes. This endowed/established possibility is 
something Dasein exists for the sake of and is something 
Dasein has either chosen or taken over in his/her existence. 
However, Dasein can endow/establish his/her own possibility 
because Dasein is already among entities. As already being 
among entities, Dasein has always already been in his/her 
world. In other words, Dasein is able to project a ground 
for him/herself because Dasein takes up a basis from within 
185 WG, p.104. I am translating Stiften as 
endowing/establishing, Boden-nehmen as taking up a basis, 
and Begrunden as founding._ 
186 Having-been is a translation of Gewesenhei t. I do 
not refer to Dasein's having-been as a past for two reasons. 
First, Heidegger does not refer to Gewesenheit in terms of 
the past. Second, the past denotes an event that is 
completely over. Dasein's Gewesenheit is not something over 
and done with as the term past denotes. Instead, Dasein 
having-been is something Dasein carries with him/her as 
along as Dasein exists. Thus the use of perfect tense gives 
us a better sense of Dasein's 11 past, 11 since Dasein's· "past" 
has happened and is continuing to happen so long as Dasein 
exists. 
the world. Having already taken up a basis, Dasein can 
establish his/her possibilities from this basis. 187 
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Thus a relationship develops between these two modes 
of grounding. On the one hand, Dasein must surpass entities 
in order to take up a basis in the midst of entities. In the 
surpassing of entities, Dasein is able to project 
possibilities. On the other hand, Dasein's possibilities are 
limited by the way Dasein finds him/herself inscribed in the 
midst of entities. Dasein's futurity allows him/her a mode 
of understanding that arises out of his/her having-been. 
The twofold relationship of grounding as 
endowing/establishing and taking up a basis results in a 
plurality of possible modes of grounding. In other words, 
different possible senses of self-understanding occur 
through this twofold grounding. Through the activity of 
grounding, Dasein reveals entities and can understand 
him/herself in various ways through the understanding of 
entities. Thus Dasein finds him/herself disseminated in the 
world, i.e., Dasein finds him/herself thrown into his/her 
possibilities. 
Dasein's dissemination is not accidental but is 
necessary. Dasein is disseminated because Dasein is worldly. 
In other words, since Dasein has the ability to endow 
187 Heidegger interprets both modes of grounding in 
terms of Dasein's disclosedness, or being-in. Endowing is 
interpreted in terms of Verstehen and taking up a basis is 
interpreted in terms of Befindlichkeit. 
possibilities from a basis that he/she takes over from 
existing in the world, Dasein has "a variety of ways of 
inquiring, knowing, grounding and proving" in his/her 
tactical existence. 188 
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Endowing/establishing and taking up a basis give rise 
to a third mode of grounding that Heidegger calls 
founding. 189 Founding has both an on tic and ontological 
meaning. As an ontic activity, founding is the ability to 
substantiate or offer proofs for whatever entity is under 
investigation. However, as an ontological activity, founding 
is the act Dasein takes up when Oasein finds him/herself in 
the world already. In other words, a person begins to seek 
for the reasons or causes of entities because that person 
finds him/herself irrupted into entities as a whole and 
understanding preconceptually the being of entities. Thus 
founding precedes and gives rise to the possibility of 
proof. 
As being in the midst of entities, Dasein raises the 
question of 'Why?'. In fact, founding is the act that gives 
rise to the 'Why?'. Thus the questions of 11 why is something 
188 MFL, p.214. 
189 In the German text, Heidegger says that the first 
two modes of grounding 11 mitzeitigen 11 the third mode of 
grounding. On the one hand, mitzeitigen means 'give rise 
to. 1 On the other hand, mitzeitigen has a reference to 
temporalization. Since I translate 'zeitigen' as 'to 
temporalize,' I could translate 'mitzeitigen' as 'to co-
temporalize.' Regardless of the translation, the use of the 
term mitzeitigen expresses a connection between ground and 
temporality. See WG, p.112. 
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the way it is? 11 , or "why is there something rather than 
nothing?" arise due to our finite transcendence. Thus Dasein 
can as founding understand him/herself disseminatively 
because the need to establish a basis for Dasein's own 
understanding and the understanding of entities is part of 
the way Dasein exists. In other words, Dasein finds 
him/herself in the world as projected and disposed and thus 
finds him/herself as temporalizing. The irruption that 
occurs in temporalization allows entities to appear to 
Dasein and allows Dasein to question them from out of 
his/her understanding of being. 
The why arises because of our freedom. In other words, 
Dasein can ground because Dasein is free. Thus Heidegger 
characterizes Dasein's freedom as the "freedom toward 
ground. 11 190 The freedom toward ground has two meanings: 
first, the freedom toward ground can mean to seek for the 
reasons why things are the way they are; second, the freedom 
toward ground can mean to take up a possibility out of one's 
ground. 
The first sense of the freedom toward ground results 
in the dissemination of grounds, where Dasein understands 
him/herself in a multiplicity of ways. Thus freedom finds 
expression in terms of understanding, since I understand 
myself in terms of possibility and the dissemination of 
190 MFL, p.214. In the German, Heidegger calls Dasein's 
freedom "die Freiheit zum Grunde. 11 Metaphysische 
Anfangsgrunde, p. 276. 
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grounds are modes of understanding. The second sense of the 
freedom toward ground involves thrownness, i.e., 
understanding myself in terms of possibility involves taking 
over my thrownness. As Heidegger says, the dissemination of 
ground in Dasein recoils "into one ground," viz., recoils 
into 11 thrownness in itself. n l 9l In other words, the 
possibility for Dasein's ontic activity of grounding that is 
rooted in Dasein's understanding happens only because Dasein 
finds him/herself as thrown into the world. World is there 
with Dasein, and, as such, Dasein finds him/herself irrupted 
into the midst of entities. As thrown, Dasein cannot remove 
him/herself from the world that Dasein is always in already 
and thus cannot be the ground for entities or him/herself. 
In other words, "Dasein never comes back behind its 
192 thrownness. 11 Thus, the grounding that occurs in projection 
is only possible because Dasein is thrown, and thus the 
understanding that seeks into the why and how of entities is 
only possible because Dasein is free. 
However, the relationship between freedom and ground 
is still in need of explanation. Heidegger refers to freedom 
as the "ground of ground, 11 and I interpret this statement in 
the context of Dasein' s thrownness. t93 On the one hand, I can 
only seek grounds because of my freedom, and thus freedom 
191 MFL, p. 215. 
192 BT, p.434. 
193 MFL, p.214. 
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becomes the possibility of grounding. In this sense, freedom 
is the ground of ground. On the other hand, my ability to 
seek for grounds is only a result of my thrownness, and I 
cannot take control of my thrownness. Thus my freedom toward 
ground is only possible if I am groundless, which means 
Dasein is not a ground but is able to ground. In other 
words, "freedom is the abyss of Dasein. 11194 
Thus there is an abyssal character to Dasein's 
existence, and the abyssal character emerges in terms of 
Dase in 1 s finite transcendence or temporal i ty. 195 The 
temporalization of temporality is precisely where the 
powerlessness of Dasein arises. I never get outside of the 
world, i.e., my transcendence is not an escape from the 
world but an immersion in the world. Temporality is always 
already in play, and the cessation of temporalization 
results in the cessation of Dasein. Thus the abyssal 
character of Dasein is not something to avoid or overcome, 
196 
since it cannot be avoided or overcome. 
The disclosure of the abyssal character of Dasein 
leads back to the sense of Dasein 1 s self-understanding. On 
194 WG, p.127. 
195 I have chosen the word abyssal over abysmal because 
abysmal is an ugly word that possesses many negative 
overtones in English. Abyssal is a synonym of abysmal does 
not make Casein sound so wretched. 
196 All attempts to avoid or overcome the abyssal 
character of our Dasein would already be modes of grounding, 
and thus the attempts would already be involved in the 
abyss. 
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the one hand, Dasein understands him/herself in terms of the 
dissemination of grounds, and the disseminated modes of 
self-understanding give rise only to factical modes of self-
understanding. On the other hand, the abyssal character of 
Dasein gives rise to an ontological mode of self-
understanding. In this instance, Dasein understands 
him/herself as being free and hence as being abyssal. 
I am able to understand both the factical and 
ontological modes of self-understanding in terms of the 
'why.' In the factical mode of self-understanding, raising 
the question why something is the way it is disseminates me. 
In other words, this mode of questioning thrusts me into the 
world, where I seek for the ground of things. In the 
ontological mode of self-understanding, I do not direct my 
question of the why toward entities. Instead, I direct the 
why toward the question of why. As Heidegger states the 
issue, I ask the question: "Why the why? 11197 In the question 
"why the why?", the second why refers to my factical 
questioning and my situatedness in the midst of entities, 
while the first why refers to the inquiry into my 
situatedness. In other words, the first why expresses my 
freedom. This sense of the why Dasein never overcomes, since 
it is the way Dasein finds him/herself in the world. Thus 
Dasein is the "why-questioner" because of the abyssal free 
character of Dasein. 
197 MFL, p.214. 
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D. THE DECONSTRUCTIVE READING OF THE KANTIAN IMAGINATION 
My analysis of the Heideggerian retrieval of the 
Kantian imagination results in possibilities that extend 
beyond the intended limits of Kantian philosophy. However, I 
do not introduce the possibilities into the text as if the 
text did not suggest the possibilities. On the contrary, the 
possibilities that result from extending the limits arise 
from a reading of the Kantian philosophy and thus are not 
external to the text. 198 Specifically, I am able to see a 
sense of the self emerge in the Heideggerian retrieval of 
the imagination that extends beyond the conception of 
subjectivity. Further, the temporal character of the self 
reveals the freedom of the self in terms of his/her 
groundless character and exposes an understanding of the 
self as the questioner. 
However, these possibilities neither terminate the 
questioning nor exhaust the possibilities present in the 
Kantian imagination. As I state in the introduction to this 
chapter, the Heideggerian reading of the transcendental 
imagination is only one reading of Kant's thought. Thus 
198 In a strict sense, the possibilities are neither 
external nor internal to the text. The possibilities do not 
flow from the text as conclusions from syllogisms. No text 
is self-present. Instead, the possibilities arise from the 
text through the play of differance. Hence, the 
possibilities that flow from the text are inexhaust~ble. The 
only limiting condition is that the text serves as a 
guardrail for the development of the possibilities. 
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there are other readings of the Kantian imagination. 199 
I want to perform one of these other readings, and the 
particular reading I want to perform is a deconstructive 
reading. My deconstructive reading of the Kantian 
imagination in this section has three parts. First I show 
why the need arises to advance into a deconstructive 
reading. Second I explain deconstruction. Third I perform 
the deconstructive reading upon the Kantian imagination. 
The need for a deconstructive reading of the Kantian 
imagination arises from the results of the Heideggerian 
retrieval. On the one hand, we see that Heidegger's 
retrieval shows how Dasein is metaphysical. On the other 
hand, we see that Dasein's metaphysical character rests in 
the abyssal character of Dasein. If metaphysics and ground 
belong together intrinsically, and if an abyss lies at the 
basis of metaphysics, then metaphysics is groundless. The 
question that arises is: how does the groundless character 
affect metaphysics? 
The possibility of the groundless character of Dasein 
that arises out of the Heideggerian analysis of the Kantian 
imagination leads to questioning the project of metaphysics 
itself. In other words, I come to question the very 
possibility of metaphysics and its corresponding concept of 
199 As I have stated previously, there are many other 
possible readings of Kant. For example, there are the 
readings of the German Idealists, the Neo-Kantians, the 
Frankfurt School, and the Anglo-American philosophers. 
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presence. Thus, Heidegger shows that the traditional 
conception of metaphysics, which I call the metaphysics of 
presence, is problematic. If the purpose of the metaphysics 
of presence is complete self-containment, or closure, then 
metaphysics becomes a problem if presence cannot be 
fulfilled. The deconstructive reading takes up the 
problematic character of metaphysics and shows how the 
notion of presence is necessarily self-defeating. Thus, the 
deconstructive reading carries on the play of displacement 
and takes us into another mode of the decentering of 
metaphysics. 200 
I am strategically employing the deconstructive 
reading at this juncture, because the deconstructive reading 
brings the very project of metaphysics into question in 
toto. At the time of KPM, Heidegger's retrieval of Kant 
remains too metaphysical in its orientation. On the one 
hand, Heidegger is beginning to question radically 
metaphysics. On the other hand, Heidegger is still exploring 
the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics, albeit in 
a completely different way than the metaphysical tradition 
explores the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics. 201 
200 One basic difference between the deconstructi ve 
reading and the destructive reading is that the destructive 
reading functions within the text of the oblivion of being, 
while the deconstructive reading sees the oblivion of being 
as part of the metaphysical text. 
201 Heidegger's decentering displacement does not allow 
for a strict recentering, since the ground is displaced and 
(continued ... ) 
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I want to show at this juncture how another reading of the 
Kantian imagination brings the conception of metaphysics 
itself into question, and this reading provides a transition 
into Heidegger's later thinking. Thus, I am going to show 
through a deconstructive reading of the Kantian imagination 
how an irreducible absence enters into the project of 
metaphysics and thereby brings the project of metaphysics 
into question. 
In general, deconstruction is a strategic reading of 
texts that shows how a text is structured by forces that the 
text cannot account for within its own limits. In other 
words, deconstruction shows that the closure, or full 
presence, of a text is impossible, due to undecidable 
factors within a text which Derrida calls 11 traces. 11202 
Specifically within the context of metaphysics, 
deconstruction is a strategic reading of the metaphysical 
text that reveals how the text is structured by a movement 
of "differance. 11203 The movement of differance exposes both 
201 ( ••• continued) 
Dasein is abyssal. Nonetheless, the metaphysical project 
remains, since Dasein is tpe very possibility of the project 
itself. Heidegger comes to question his conception of 
retrieval and his reading of Kant in his later thought. 
202 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon, trans. David 
B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 
p.156. 
203 SP, p.129 ff. Derrida spells differance 
intentionally with an 1 a 1 , in order to distinguish the word 
from difference. The difference between the two is that 
differance is the movement that puts the play of differences 
(continued ... ) 
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the structured play of signification operative within the 
metaphysical text and an irreducible absence, or a "trace," 
that arises within the text and disallows presence. In order 
to understand these descriptions of deconstruction, I must 
explain the terms text, differance, trace and strategy. 
For Derrida, a text is a heterogeneous play of 
differential forces that we find ourselves inscribed within 
204 
already. In other words, a text is any structural 
configuration of forces that results in a differential 
system of signification. The text orders and structures 
conceptual and practical oppositions such that meaning 
arises within the text. Further, we are already interpreting 
the text since we are inscribed within it. 205 
What appears in the text are the oppositional forces 
that structure the discourse. However, the oppositional 
forces are present because of a movement within the text 
203 ( ••• continued) 
into motion and allows the differences to differ, while 
difference is a term caught up within the metaphysical 
system of signification. Differance may be said to be the 
possibility of difference, as long as we do not conceive of 
possibility as a metaphysical term. In other words, the term 
'possibility' must be put under erasure. 
204 Jacques Derrida, "Critical Response, 11 Critical 
Inquiry, 13, Autumn 1986, p.168. 
205 We should not banally conceive of a text merely as 
book or a written document. Any structure that is a play of 
differential forces is a text, and thus, for example, 
institutions are texts. The notion of a text as a play of 
differential forces is an insight of structuralism and not a 
creation of Derrida. Derrida's addition to the notion of 
text is the post-structural insight of the non-closure of a 
text. 
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that does not appear, and this movement is called 
differance. Differance is the play of "spacing" and 
"temporalizing" within a text that allows the text to be a 
206 
structure of signification. As a play of spacing and 
temporalizing, differance is play of "differing" and 
"deferring" that gives rise to the field of presence.HT 
However, differance is not a present thing and is not caught 
up into the system where presence is found. As Derrida 
states, 
Differance is what makes the movement of signification 
possible only if each element that is said to be 
"present," appearing on the stage of presence, is 
related to something other than itself but retains the 
mark of a past element and already lets itself be 
hollowed20igiut by the mark of its relation to a future 
element. 
I take Derrida to mean that whatever is before me only 
appears because what is appearing has been spatially marked 
off from what has preceded it and yet also allows the space 
of what is to come. Thus the movement of differance 
temporalizes and spaces, i.e., the movement of differance 
allows what is being signified to be present because the 
signified carries its past, awaits its future, and yet 
constantly separates itself from what it is not. Thus 
206 SP , p . 14 3 • 
207 SP, p.136. Differance is similar to Heidegger's 
conception of the ontological difference, and yet they are 
not the same. Derrida understands differance as the 
possibility of the ontological difference. 
208 SP, p. 142. 
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differance sets up a play of temporalizing and spacing, such 
that spacing is "time's becoming-spatial" and temporalizing 
is "space 1 s becoming-temporal. 11209 
If the play of signification is to occur, then 
differance must hold itself back and not appear in the play 
of signification. Thus a deconstructive reading exposes an 
element lying at the heart of presence such that it cannot 
be drawn into presence and yet makes the notion of presence 
possible. This undecidable element within a text is called a 
trace. By definition, a trace cannot appear in the text, 
i.e., cannot be present within a text. However, elements 
arise within a text that cannot be accounted for within the 
confines of the text. These elements reveal the operations 
of a trace. Thus the trace is not a present thing but is a 
"simulacrum of presence. 11210 The trace appears in the text 
virtually in the guise of something signified~ However, the 
trace decenters and displaces the text while effacing itself 
within the text. The trace has no place within the text, 
i.e., it is marginal. Yet, the trace makes the space of the 
text possible. 
The exposure of the movement of differance and the 
trace operative in the text of metaphysics, or any text, 
209 SP, p.143. 
210 SP, p. 15 6. The trace is an inass imi la bl e alter i ty 
that opens the space of a text. 
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requires a strategy, and a strategy involves 11 risk. 11211 As a 
strategy, deconstruction must show how the displacement 
arises out of the text itself, and it must show the 
displacement by recounting the structure of a text, showing 
what allows for the possibility of the structure, and 
exposing the trace element within the text that gives rise 
to the displacement. Further, deconstructive strategy 
involves risk taking because there is no final goal in this 
strategic play. However, deconstruction is not meaningless. 
Instead, deconstruction affirms the unnameable play of 
differance that results in the lack of totalization. 
I refer to deconstruction as a strategy rather than a 
method, and I make the distinction for two related reasons. 
First, the notion of method is metaphysical, and thus the 
use and understanding of method is already inscribed within 
the metaphysical text. 212 As being within the metaphysical 
text, the notion of method is capable of being subjected to 
a deconstructive reading. Second, a philosophical method 
attempts to gain a transcendent starting point and form the 
text from the ground up, while a strategy must recognize 
that there is no transcendent position and no absolute 
211 SP, p.135. 
212 Modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel is totally 
characterized by the concept of method, i.e., these thinkers 
understand philosophy as a method. Particularly, they 
understand philosophy as a reflective method that analyzes 
consciousness and establishes subjectivity as being. 
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t · . t 213 Th t t . th. t star ing po1n . us a s ra egy must arise w1 in a ext 
because there is nothing outside the text. Thus 
deconstruction puts into question the metaphysical text from 
within the metaphysical text itself, because there is no 
transcendent signifier that could function as a starting 
point. 
The problem with trying to explain deconstruction is 
that deconstruction has to do with the reading of texts. 
Thus we can arrive at a better understanding of 
deconstruction if I enact a deconstructive reading. As I 
state above, a deconstructive reading must recount the 
structure of the text in question, show what makes the text 
possible, and then expose the trace within the text. I have 
already allowed the Kantian text to have its say. Now I must 
show how Kant's own intentions undercut his metaphysical 
project and the notion of presence, i.e., I want to show 
that the imagination disrupts the Kantian conception of the 
metaphysics of subjectivity. 
The Kantian critical project is a metaphysical project 
213 In The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), Rodolphe Gasche describes 
deconstruction as a method. However, he predicates his 
description of deconstruction as a method upon an 
examination of the difference between reflective method and 
deconstruction. Gasche's claim is that deconstruction is not 
a method in the way modern philosophy characterizes method. 
To me, Gasche's approach is very convoluted. He wants 
to show that deconstruction is a method but not a method 
like this method and so on. Since Derrida claims that 
deconstruction is not a method, I contend we should take the 
claim seriously. My question to Gasche is: why not take 
Derrida seriously and explain deconstruction in another way? 
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and thus is a text inscribed within metaphysics. An 
understanding of the notion of critique shows how the 
Kantian project is inscribed within the metaphysics of 
presence. The notion of critique characterizes the Kantian 
project in general, and the CPR is a critique of reason. 
Kant understands critique as the delimitation of the power 
of reason, and Kant employs the critique in two related 
directions. First, Kant establishes the transgressive 
character of reason by showing that reason cannot 
legitimately overstep the limiting condition of sensibility. 
Thus the finite, self-conscious entity cannot know the 
highest ideas of god, the world and the soul. 214 Second, Kant 
establishes the proper limits of reason. Reason, 
characterized as the understanding, comes to know entities 
through its connection to sensibility. In the first sense of 
critique, presence is an ideal, and the complete closure of 
knowledge stands before us as an unattainable goal. The 
ideas are necessary for the critical system, but they are in 
principle never fulfilled. Reason cheats itself of 
fulfillment due to reason's own structure. 215 In the second 
214 The ideas have a regulative, not a constitutive, 
function within knowledge. As ideas, the ideas function as 
ideals that allow for the continuation of seeking knowledge. 
However, the ideas are never sensibly realized. Thus the 
ideas stand as the goal of the complete presence of a system 
that by definition remains unattainable. 
215 In this sense of critique, reason remains cheated 
because reason can never attain the status of the divine. 
Finite intuition will never become original intuition, and 
(continued ... ) 
237 
sense of critique, a sense of presence also arises. In other 
words, reason fulfills what it is capable of fulfilling, and 
reason is capable of fulfilling the objectivity of the 
object. As a mode of being, objectivity is a mode of 
presence. Thus, a deconstruction of presence must aim at the 
area where presence, or objectivity, arises, and presence 
arises in the CPR in the Transcendental Analytic. 
Kant's purpose in the Transcendental Analytic is to 
establish a priori synthetic judgments, and these judgments 
are the way presence arises. However, what makes presence 
possible is synthesis, and Kant locates synthesis within the 
province of the imagination. Thus, the deconstruction of 
presence in the CPR must arise within the context of 
synthesis and the imagination. The issue I am investigating 
is how the imagination disrupts presence within the Kantian 
t t 216 ex . 
215 ( ... continued) 
thus human knowing will never become divine knowing. Once 
Kant frames his project in terms of the human/divine 
opposition, the fulfillment of presence on the side of pure 
reason must be infinitely deferred, since the human entity 
can never escape his/her sensible condition. 
216 One possible strategy that I am not. employing is to 
play off the multivalent character of the imagination. 
Simply, the imagination has within the context of 
metaphysics a reference to sense and nonsense, or to reason 
and non-reason, or to sanity and madness. The metaphysics of 
presence has always believed the truth of the imagination to 
lie on the side of reason. However, the privileging of 
reason and the imagination functions within the space of the 
metaphysics of presence. Once this space comes into 
question, the privileged coupling of reason and imagination 
comes into question, and the imagination allows for the 
(continued ... ) 
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I locate the place of presence in the imagination 
because of the imagination's synthetically productive power. 
The imagination becomes the place to locate presence due to 
Kant's establishment of the opposition between derivative 
and original intuition. 211 Kant shows that the finite, 
sensible entity cannot create his/her object, since only a 
divine entity can create its object. However, the finite, 
sensible entity, or the subject, is productive of the 
structure of his/her representations, and thus the subject 
is productive of the way the object comes to be present. 
Therefore the subject is productive of objectivity, or the 
presence of the object. 218 In a limited and analogous sense, 
the productive power of the imagination is like the power of 
the divine entity. 
If imagination gives rise to objectivity and thus to 
the presence of the object, then synthesis is ,the place to 
locate presence. Kant describes synthesis in the A 
216 ( ... continued) 
displacement of reason. From a Nietzschean perspective, I 
could say that metaphysics has been a form of madness since 
the time imagination became a part of the metaphysical 
corpus. 
217 Kant makes constant references in the A edition to 
human intuition and other types of intuition, but he makes 
an explicit distinction between derivative and original 
intuition in the B edition. The seeds for the distinction 
are in the A edition and are found in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic and in the section dealing with the difference 
between phenomenon and noumenon. 
218 I established the subject 1 s production of 
objectivity in the sections on Kant and Heidegger. 
Deduction, particularly in the Subjective Deduction. 
Therefore I direct my attention toward this section. 
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Part of what characterizes the metaphysics of presence 
is the privilege given to the mode of time called the 
present. Thus being is interpreted within the metaphysics of 
presence through a sense of the present. The privileging of 
the present arises within the metaphysics of subjectivity, 
and the mode of being that is interpreted through the 
present is called objectivity. The purpose of objectivity is 
to establish the presence of the present object. My strategy 
is to see whether a play of differance arises in the 
privilege given to the present. If a play of differance 
arises in the present, then I must show the trace that 
exposes the play of differance in the text. Moreover, if I 
can show the operation of the trace, then I can claim that 
this trace disrupts presence. 
As Kant says, the imagination is the power of 
synthesis that connects the representations provided by 
sensibility and understanding. As connective of the 
representations of sensibility and understanding, the 
imagination is itself "blind," i.e., the imagination 
functions without sight and is without direction (A78,B103). 
Further, I understand the blind character of the imagination 
to mean that the imagination is without content. The 
imagination can reproduce images or produce schema, but the 
content for reproduced images and produced schema arises 
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from the senses and the understanding. The imagination does 
not add anything to the images or the schematized concepts 
but only synthesizes images and the schematized concepts. 
However, there is no knowledge without the imagination. 
As Kant says, "we are scarcely ever conscious" of the 
synthetic function of the imagination (A78,B103). We are 
rarely aware of the imagination, because we are mostly 
directed toward entities such as sensible things and 
concepts, and the imagination withdraws in favor of the 
appearance of entities. 219 However, what happens when we 
become aware of the imagination? 
In order to answer this question, let us examine the 
synthetic character of the imagination. As I show in the 
second section of this chapter, the imagination is temporal, 
and thus the three modes of synthesis that Kant describes in 
the A Deduction are the three modes of temporality. Kant 
discusses the present under the heading of The Synthesis of 
Apprehension in Intuition. Let me recall what Kant says: 
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which 
can be represented as a manifold only in so far as 
the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of 
one impression upon another; for each representation, 
in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can 
never be anything but absolute unity. In order that 
unity may arise out of this manifold (as is required 
in the representation of space) it must first be run 
through and held together. This act I name the 
219 The ambiguous character of the imagination arises 
again. The closest we ever get to the imagination is our 
understanding of it in terms of synthesis. Otherwise, Kant 
describes the imagination always in connection with another 
faculty. 
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synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed 
immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a 
manifold, but a manifold which can never be 
represented as a manifold, and as contained in a 
single representation, save in virtue of such a 
synthesis (A99). 
I cite almost the entire passage of this section, because 
Kant shows in this passage, contrary to his intention, that 
the present is a constituted moment. Kant's intention is to 
show that the present is an absolute unity, i.e., a self-
contained moment. However, what Kant shows is precisely that 
the present cannot be an absolute, self-contained unity. 
Essentially, Kant shows that I can represent a manifold only 
insofar as one moment distinguishes itself from another 
moment. In other words, the moments must differ from one 
another. Without the differing that occurs temporally, i.e., 
without the spacing of impressions, the present could not 
arise. 220 Each moment is an absolute unity but only as a 
constituted unity. Thus each moment must be "run through" 
and "held together" in order to be a moment (A99). I 
interpret this act of the constitution of the present to 
mean that the present only arises by deferring and differing 
itself from what came previously. Each moment must 
220 Heidegger points out that Kant explains time 
spatially and space temporally, thus I can say that Kant 
mixes his metaphors. Some thinkers believe that the mixing 
of metaphors is an error that can be corrected, if we can 
find the 'proper' terms for space and time. However, there 
is another issue at work in this context, viz., that space 
and time are inseparably connected. Thus there is no · 
unmixing of metaphors, but only the play of differance as 
spacing and temporalizing. 
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distinguish itself from what it is not while retaining the 
past within it. Thus the present moment is a mark already 
inscribed within a play of what I have described above as 
differance. Thus the present only makes sense as a mark 
inscribed within a text. The present arises only due to a 
play of supplementation of what the present is not. 221 
The idea of the supplementation of the present arises 
more emphatically in the section entitled The Synthesis of 
Reproduction in Imagination in the A Deduction. In this 
section, Kant shows how the imagination makes experience 
possible, which means that the imagination makes the present 
possible. Kant shows how the imagination makes the present 
possible, again contrary to his intentions, by explaining 
the constitution of the present in terms of the play of 
222 differing and deferring. Kant says: 
But if I were to drop out of thought the preceding 
representations ... and did not reproduce them while 
advancing to those that follow, a complete 
representation would never be obtained: none of the 
above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most 
elementary representations (Grundvorstellungen) of space 
and time could arise (A102). 
221 The present is itself only possible due to 
representation. A mode of Vergegenwartigung makes the 
Gegenwartigung possible. 
222 I find it interesting that Kant cannot describe any 
mode of synthesis purely. He cannot describe the present 
without reference to the past, he cannot the past without 
making reference to the future, and he cannot describe the 
future without reference to the past. This shows how the 
modes of time do not make sense without being already 
inscribed in a structure of signification that allows them 
to refer to each other. Further, the structure of 
signification shows a play of differance. 
243 
Kant states in this passage what a sense of the present 
would be outside and inside of experience. Outside of 
experience, the present would be eternity without 
representation, i.e., the act of always being present 
without differentiation. For a hum.an entity, eternity would 
be like a comatose state. However, eternity and experience 
are incompatible, and experience is nothing like eternity. 
Within experience, the present moment is possible only if 
the present is separate from both what precedes it and what 
is yet to come. The past does not become the present, as if 
the present could encapsulate the past within it. The 
present is not the past, and the present is not yet the 
future. This spacing must remain if there is to be anything 
like a present, and yet the trace of both the past and the 
future make the present possible. Thus there must be a 
spacing that differentiates the past, present.and future and 
a temporalizing that defers closure. I can only have a 
present if the present is inscribed already in the play of 
signification. Since imagination is what allows the present 
to emerge as present through a play of differing and 
deferring, I can understand the imagination in terms of the 
play of differance. 
If the imagination generates the play of differance in 
the CPR, then the imagination functions as a trace. However, 
a trace is only a simulacrum. of presence but is not itself 
present. In the CPR, the imagination appears in the text. 
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So, if the imagination is a trace, how can I account for the 
appearance of the imagination in the CPR? As I have shown, 
the imagination has an ambiguous character in the CPR. On 
the one hand, Kant presents the imagination as a faculty of 
the subject. As a faculty, the imagination is inscribed in 
the text of the metaphysics of subjectivity, since 
imagination belongs to and is an essential part of the 
subject. On the other hand, the imagination is what makes 
the space of presence possible and thereby sets the Kantian 
text in motion. In other words, the CPR becomes a 
differential play of forces through the play of the 
imagination. As such, I can no longer understand the 
imagination as a faculty, since the imagination allows for 
both the possibility of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Understood as a trace, the imagination is marginal, i.e., 
does not appear in the text, or is not present in the text. 
Heidegger refers to the ambiguous character of the 
imagination in KPM when he suggests that the name 
'imagination' is no longer adequate for the possibilities 
that emerge in the analysis of the imagination in the CPR. 
If I may be allowed to phrase this insight in a 
deconstructive manner, the name 'imagination' is no longer 
adequate because the imagination sets the field of naming, 
or signification, into play. As such, the entry of the 
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imagination into the text would displace the text. 223 Thus 
the imagination disrupts presence, and the critical project 
comes into question. 
The disruption of presence within the metaphysics of 
subjectivity results in a decentering of the subject. In 
this decentering, a recentering is no longer possible, since 
the possibility of the subject resides with the imaginative 
play. Thus the subject is not self-constituting. Instead, 
the subject finds itself inscribed within a text that owes 
its possibility to the play of differance. 
The question arises: does the disruption of the 
subject in the deconstructive reading lead to an 
understanding of the self as the why-questioner, i.e., as 
Dasein? The answer to this question is no. By answering this 
question negatively, I do not mean that questioning ceases. 
Instead, I mean that questioning arises as a responsive 
gesture. As being responsive, questioning cannot be the 
primary designation of the self because questioning can only 
be a response to something. Thus asking the question 'why?', 
223 As a trace, I can say that the imagination appears 
on the margin of the text. Further, if the imaginative trace 
were incorporated into the text of the CPR, which is a text 
of the metaphysics of presence, the CPR would displace 
itself. Heidegger attempted to incorporate the imagination 
into the text and developed a totally different text than 
the CPR. 
The notion of the imagination as a marginal trace 
suggests another way to understand the Kantian recoil 
besides Heidegger's way. I can say that Kant recoiled from 
his insights into the imagination, because the imagination 
not only disrupted Kant's project but also disrupted the 
entire project of metaphysics. 
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or 'why the why?', is only possible if a condition exists 
that makes the response possible. 
There are signs of the responsive character of the 
question in Heidegger's early works, even though he does not 
thematically develop it there. Specifically, Heidegger 
expresses the responsive character of the question in his 
phenomenological description of the formal structure of the 
question in BT. Heidegger describes questioning as a 
"seeking," and "every seeking gets guided before by what is 
sought. 11224 In fact, Heidegger says that every seeking has 
11 its preceding guide. 11225 Heidegger understands the guide as 
the understanding of being that we possess already in our 
tactical existence, only because he is seeking the meaning 
of being as such rather than discussing the possibility of 
questioning in itself. However, the sense that there is a 
guide expresses the fact that there is a condition prior to 
the questioning, and that the questioning only arises as a 
response to this condition. How can I understand this prior 
condition? 
In a certain sense, Heidegger provides a clue to the 
prior condition in his discussion of self as the why-
questioner. Within a Heideggerian framework, what makes it 
possible for me to ask a question is my thrownness. I am 
224 BT, p.24. 
225 The German text reads, "sein vorgangiges Geleit. 11 
See sz, p. 5. 
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free to ground, i.e., I am free to question, because I am 
thrown into my world. However, I can never get behind the 
thrownness, and thus I remain abyssal. As being thrown into 
the world, I can say I am inscribed within the world. 
Questioning arises as a response to this inscription. In 
other words, if I were not thrown, then I would not 
question. 
If I understand questioning as a response to my thrown 
inscription, tnen questioning has to affirm this condition 
prior to questioning. Thus the affirmation of the thrown 
inscription stands prior to the act of questioning. In this 
context, affirmation is neither an act of judgment nor an 
intentional act. Instead, the affirmation is how I find 
myself as being inscribed in a text. As being prior to the 
act of questioning, the affirmation provides the space where 
the questioning can occur. As arising out of the play of 
inscription, I come to understand that I am not the 
constituter of possibilities. Instead, if I may be allowed 
to use a Nietzschean expression, I come to understand myself 
as the yes-sayer, where the affirmation results from my 
226 textual inscription and dissemination. 
226 The problem of language arises in this context, but 
the problem extends beyond the confines of the dissertation. 
Thus I cannot develop the issue in the body of the text. 
However, allow me to mention the issue. The issue begins at 
the end of WG. It is possible to interpret founding, i.e., 
the third mode of grounding, in terms of a mode of Dasein's 
disclosedness called discourse. Poggler interprets founding 
in this manner (Path of Thinking, p.73). This interpretation 
(continued ... ) 
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The reference to Nietzsche brings me back to the 
history of an error. In a certain sense, I can say that my 
dissertation has been an interpretation of this history. On 
the one hand, I have offered an interpretation of the 
error/era of the Kantian subject. Through this 
interpretation I have shown how Kant's project is 
ontological, how he understands the being of the object in 
terms of subjectivity, how the imagination retains its 
priority in both editions of the CPR, and how the 
Heideggerian idea of the recoil is questionable. On the 
other hand, I have offered an interpretation of the era of 
Zarathustra. Through this interpretation I have shown 
through two double readings how the imagination disrupts and 
decenters the idea of subjectivity, and how this disruptive 
decentering gives rise to other possible modes of self-
understanding. Thus I come full circle in my dissertation 
226 ( ... continued) 
is possible because founding requires proof on an antic 
level and thus requires an articulation of an understanding. 
However, the ontological sense of founding gives rise to the 
basic question for Heidegger, or to the why. The basic 
question does not simply emerge as an articulation of an 
understanding. Instead, the question gives rise to the 
possibility of articulation and possibly to the very 
possibility of understanding, suggesting to me that a sense 
of language other than discourse is beginning to emerge in 
Heidegger's thought. This other sense of language would lead 
to the sense of affirmation and the responsive character of 
questioning, since questioning would find itself inscribed 
in this other sense of language. In other words, the issue 
of language has something to do with thrown inscription. 
Derrida raises the issue of language and affirmation in both 
"The Ends of Man" and Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. 
If I were to expand upon this issue, I would have to develop 
the insights in these texts. 
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and pull the beginning into the end. Only now I must 
recognize that the end is only a place for a new beginning, 
and that I too am inscribed in the text. 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation is an investigation into the mode of 
self-understanding that arises once the conception of 
subjectivity is displaced from its foundational position in 
metaphysics. I examine the problem of the displacement of 
the subject by focusing on the philosophy of Kant and 
Heidegger. I choose Kant and Heidegger for two reasons: 
first, Kant's Copernican Revolution places the subject at 
the ground of metaphysics and defines the place of the 
subject in philosophy up to the contemporary period; second, 
Heidegger's investigation of Kant displaces the metaphysical 
conception of the subject and gives rise to other possible 
understandings of the self. 
The dissertation consists of four chapters. First, I 
develop the problem of displacement, place my dissertation 
within the context of contemporary thought, and discuss 
three modes of reading the history of philosophy. These 
three readings are the polemical, the destructive and the 
deconstructive. Of the three readings, I choose to conduct 
both a destructive and a deconstructive reading of the 




conception of subjectivity in terms of the Copernican 
Revolution. Here, I introduce the Kantian conception of the 
imagination through an investigation of the imagination's 
empirical employment. Third, I examine the relationship 
between the imagination and subjectivity as it emerges in 
the two transcendental deductions of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. In this chapter, I show the ontological priority of 
the imagination in Kant's thought. Contrary to the 
'orthodox' body of Kantian interpretation, I argue that Kant 
retrieves the findings of the A deduction within the B 
deduction and that the imagination maintains its place of 
importance in Kant's thought. Fourth, I examine Heidegger's 
understanding of the imagination in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics. I show how the temporal character of the 
imagination displaces the conception of a self-grounding 
subject and replaces the subject with an understanding of 
ourselves as Dasein, or as the questioner. After discussing 
this mode of the self, I show how the imagination 
deconstructs subjectivity and the metaphysical project. The 
deconstructive reading leads to a discussion of the self 
within a Derridean and Nietzschean context. 
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